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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
From time immemorial technology has played a vital role in human development and history.1 
The progressive advancement of mankind and the development of its capabilities,  from the 
earliest stages in the Stone Age to its contemporary manifestation in the ultra-connected 
Information Age, these factors largely have been shaped by developments in technology.2 
Irrespective of whichever lens one chooses in order to observe human history, the course of 
mankind’s development indisputably is a product of technology.3 Yet, over a long period in the 
course of  these developments, one aspect of our existence managed to endure these many 
changes unaltered. 
Similar to the position outlined above with reference to technology, work has been the 
backbone of human society and its development for millennia. Whether one studies the 
plebeians of ancient Rome, the textile workers of pre-industrial Great Britain or even the now-
furloughed steelworkers of the American Rust Belt, the nature and character of work in relation 
to humanity remains largely the same.4 Work has long been characterised by the provision of 
labour by a person in exchange for a benefit,5 that is, an employer employs a worker and 
compensates him for the work rendered on his behalf which without the worker’s exertion, 
otherwise would not have been fulfilled.6 It is this transactional nature of work that persists 
throughout history and subsists to this day. However, this quality and character of work which 
has endured millennia of transformations may finally be about to change. 
Over the last three and a half centuries the way in which work is conducted has been 
transformed as a result of progressive changes in technology. Beginning in the eighteenth 
century, millions of jobs either have been altered or partially (if not entirely) eliminated as a 
result of the introduction of machinery in the workplace.7 The advances in technology that 
                                                 
1 See Volti Society and Technological Change (2009) 4. 
2 Volti (n 1) 4. 
3 Volti (n 1) 4. 
4 Grogan notes that under Roman law three locatio conductio existed which regulated the hiring and letting of 
services between people, one of which, the locatio conductio operarum, was a forerunner to the modern contract 
of employment (see Grogan Workplace Law (2017) 2).  
5 Grogan (n 4) 2; Hopley J described in 1910 the relationship between employer and employee as one where the 
employee hires out his services for the mutual “rendering of benefits stipulated for, viz.: ‘work for reward, and 
reward for work’” (See Boyd v Stafford 1910 AD 101 104). 
6 Boyd (n 5) 104. 
7 Volti (n 1) 172. 
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eliminated jobs also created millions of new occupations.8 Apart from offsetting the losses, 
these newly-created jobs led to an improvement in productivity as well as work conditions.9 
Nevertheless, today’s technological revolution poses an altogether novel challenge unlike  
previous industrial revolutions. The upheavals of the current industrial age are characterised 
by automation (including but not limited to computerisation), robotics, internet-based ultra-
connectivity, digitalisation and advances in artificial intelligence. Despite the capabilities of 
some of these technologies yet to be fully realised, already they raise more questions about the 
future of work and offer little in terms of answers. 
Over the same period the perception of work and the value attached to it also changed. The 
notion of social justice that arose in the course of the last century has meant that work is 
assigned a different role, that of an equaliser and as a tool to combat economic and social 
inequality.10 This change is evidenced by the fact that multiple countries and including the 
international organisations to which many belong now recognise the importance of work as a 
means of pursuing socioeconomic parity.11 
In support of this goal, in a report titled “Work for a Brighter Future”, the Global Commission 
on the Future of Work succinctly summed up that work is a means by which people “escape 
poverty and build decent lives”.12 Furthermore, the Commission affirms that people have the 
right to pursue “economic security” in an environment in which their employment is not 
commoditized.13 This view accords with the many changes in attitude towards employment 
and the introduction of regulation, especially in the latter period of the last century. As a result 
the foundations of the once ‘textbook’ (and purely contractual) relationship between employer 
and employee have been transformed.14 
Many aspects of the employment relationship now are subject to regulation and extensive legal 
protection has been extended to workers as legislatures and international organisations attempt 
                                                 
8 It is important to note, although often leading to job displacement and elimination, technology also creates 
millions of jobs that did not exist before. Volti uses the example of the transistor, arguing that upon its 
development, the transistor had a singular application in compact hearing aids but eventually would form the 
foundation of industries that were unknown at the time of its invention (see Volti (n 1) 174). 
9 There were close to 200 000 locomotive engineers in the United States at the end of 1920. In contrast, there were 
about 40 000 engineers in 1980 despite the gradual increase in the volume of freight over the same period  (see 
Volti (n 1) 171). 
10 Kenner EU Employment Law: from Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond (2003) 23; see also Preamble Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and Art 25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
11 Kenner (n 10) 23; see also Van Staden “Towards a South African understanding of social justice: the 
International Labour Organisation in perspective” 2012 TSAR 91 92. 
12 Global Commission on the Future of Work (hereinafter “GCFW”) Work for a Brighter Future (2019) 18. 
13 GCWF (n 12) 23. 
14 Kenner (n 10) 24. 
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to safeguard this key aspect of human existence. In South Africa legal protection is entrenched 
under sec. 23(1) of the Constitution which states: “[e]veryone has a right to fair labour 
practices”.15 The Preamble to the same document also implies that every citizen’s quality of 
life deserves to be improved and their potential to be freed.16 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
It is the purpose of this study to investigate whether the Labour Relations Act together with the 
judicial interpretation of the ground for dismissal based on the operational requirements of the 
employer in terms of sec. 188 of the Labour Relations Act, as well as the accompanying 
regulations, still are appropriate justifications for dismissal. This observation is made, first, in 
consideration of the constitutional objective to attain social justice and equality in the 
workplace (and, importantly, the alleviation of inequality in our society) and, second, in view 
of the attendant technological vicissitudes industry 4.0 will wreak on the workplace and which 
threaten to hamper the achievement of alleviating inequality.  
The right to fair labour practices, which is the foundation of an employee’s workplace rights, 
is given expression, primarily, in two items of legislation: the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act and, most importantly, the Labour Relations Act (“BCEA” and “LRA” respectively).17 
Under the LRA the employee is afforded the “right to not be [dismissed] unfairly […]”18. This 
right extends to cater for dismissals that are for a “fair reason based on the [employer’s] 
operational requirements”.19 
The employer’s operational requirements have to be based on “economic, technological, 
structural or similar” considerations for them to be valid grounds for this particular dismissal.20 
In addition, it should be noted that both the BCEA and the LRA’s stated purposes are to 
“advance economic development [and] social justice […]”, among others.21 Indeed, one can 
postulate that the definition provided in sec. 213 captures the spirit of an objective stated above 
and thus seemingly is reasonable, if not appropriate, in that it gives effect to the advancement 
of economic development. 
                                                 
15 Constitution (n 10). 
16 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
17 See s 2 of Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; see also s 2 of Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
18 See s 185 of LRA (n 17). 
19 See s 188(1)(a)(ii) of LRA (n 17). 
20 See s 213 of LRA (n 17). 
21 S 2 of BCEA (n 17); see also s 2 of LRA (n 17). 
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Key issues that become apparent when one considers operational dismissals are found in the 
responsibilities (or burdens) placed on the employer by the LRA. Under the LRA-sanctioned 
dismissal for operational requirements, an employer who contemplates a dismissal on this 
ground does not bear the burden to safeguard employment, as such. The duties imposed on an 
employer by the Act (in terms of sec. 189 and sec. 189A, both being the provisions regulating 
the procedure concerning this particular ground of dismissal) may be argued to have the 
semblance of mere formalities that in spite of their intended purpose result in retrenchments 
should an employer choose to automate the occupations in their business.22 What immediately 
is clear is that in a context where new technology is adopted or would be adoptable, neither the 
LRA nor the labour courts shield employees from tech-induced retrenchments, even in 
instances where the need to automate may not be of critical economic import. 
In addition, the prerequisite actions required on the employer’s part before such a dismissal is 
affected may be equally insufficient23 and probably unfair, given that such dismissals are based 
not on any act or omission on the part of the employee.24 Apart from the so-called “meaningful 
joint-problem solving exercise”25 in the case of the likely retrenchment of employees, which 
may be argued to provide some safeguards and a meagre severance pay26, there is no 
responsibility placed on the retrenching employer to take substantial steps towards preventing 
the retrenchment of employees or on any further steps thereafter. 
The nature of technological development in the fourth industrial revolution, as indicated above, 
has the potential to increase the frequency of faultless dismissals and to affect a wider group 
of workers than ever before. In its current form the ground for dismissal based on the 
operational requirements of the employer leaves much to be desired and may be a prime cause 
of exploitation. Various decisions by the labour courts support the assumption that such 
exploitation favours private capital and does not benefit the welfare of citizens.27 
Derived primarily from Part II of the International Labour Organization Convention 158 of 
1982,28 similar provisions exist in other jurisdictions. Some of these can be found in the 
                                                 
22 An employer is entitled for their survival to keep abreast with technological developments and can adopt new 
technologies that may render jobs redundant (see Singh and Others v Mondi Paper 2000 ILJ 966 (LC) 972A-B; 
see also Wolfaardt and Another v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd 2002 ILJ 1610 (LC) 
par 23). 
23 See s 192(2) of LRA (n 17). 
24 See Grieg v Afrox Ltd 2001 ILJ 2102 (CCMA) par I. 
25 Ss 84(e); 189(2) and 189A(2)(a) of LRA (n 17). 
26 See s 41 BCEA (n 17). 
27 General Food Industries v Food & Allied Workers Union 2004 ILJ 1260 (LAC) par 62. 
28 Art. 4 of Termination of Employment Convention 158 of 1982. 
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German Kündigungsschutzgesetz (Protection Against Dismissal Act/KSchG) and the French 
Code du Travail (hereinafter “the French Labour Code” or “Labour Code”).29 Equally, taking 
the aforementioned foreign jurisdictions into account, one can posit further that the continued 
recognition of dismissals for operational requirements shows that South African employment 
law not only accords with international labour standards but also accedes to the country’s 
international obligations under the Constitution.30 One needs to look no further than within the 
statutes themselves.31  As important as it is, the context in which this particular dismissal 
provision was adopted and understood has changed or is expected to change significantly. 
Thus, it may be advanced that it no longer is sensible to continue with it, at least not without 
the legislature making appropriate adjustments. 
In South Africa these changes are starting to take shape. At the time of writing the country’s 
largest bank announced plans to retrench over a thousand workers. Standard Bank stated that 
it would be closing 91 branches by June of 2019 across South Africa as the jobs “currently 
being performed in [its] branches” have changed.32 In explaining its decision, the bank 
reasoned that the decision to retrench was driven by its customers’ “rapid adoption of digital 
banking products and services”.33 
Similar reasons have been advanced by subscription-based direct satellite television operator, 
MultiChoice, which announced in 2018 that it might have to close its call centres. It cited its 
customers’ abandonment of “call centres and traditional contact centres for digital services” as 
the primary motivator.34 In both these developments the primary drivers of the expected job 
losses are linked to changes brought by industry 4.0 (and in this case the job losses are 
influenced by digitalisation). 
In interpreting the above issues, it is important that one accepts the reality that the law does not 
exist in a vacuum and should not be understood to do so. As this study shows, the fourth 
industrial revolution is expected to have a serious, negative and lasting impact on the South 
                                                 
29 Operational requirements dismissal is recognised as a so-called ‘socially justified’ dismissal (Kirchner, Kremp 
and Magotsch Key Aspects of German Employment and Labour Law (2010) 139; see also L233-3 of Code du 
Travail, 1973. 
30 Ss 231 and 233 of Constitution (n 10); see also s 1(b) of LRA (n 17) and s2 (b) of BCEA (n 17). 
31 above. 
32 “Standard Bank South Africa implements a new banking delivery model” Standard Bank 2019 
(https://www.standardbank.com/pages/StandardBankGroup/web/newsArticle/2019/NewsArticle-
14March2019.html (08-07-2019)). 
33 Above. 
34 “Why MultiChoice will be cutting jobs” Eyewitness News 2019 (https://ewn.co.za/2019/06/22/why-
multichoice-will-be-cutting-jobs (08-07-2019)) 
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African labour market which, inevitably, will affect employment relations. According to some 
(conservative) estimates, close to three million South Africans today occupy work positions 
that have been cited as being ‘at risk’ of automation in the foreseeable future.35 
A question that immediately comes to the fore is whether the employment laws are equipped 
to deal appropriately with these impending issues. As indicated above, South Africa has a 
dismissal regime that permits employees to be dismissed based on the operational requirements 
of an employer. These operational requirements of the employer are broad and wide-ranging. 
Similarly, the breadth of their reach and attendant effect on employees likely will be magnified 
by the emergence of technology capable of replacing traditional labour. In view of the above, 
it is further posited that such a regime if not immediately adjusted may end up facilitating 
unintended and systematic creation of new inequalities while perpetuating the old. 
The study therefore aims to address the following questions: 
• Is it appropriate to continue the perception of viewing employment law as an equaliser 
rather than a neutral tool within the economic development-social justice dichotomy? 
• Can the current legislative framework and its attendant regulatory regime function 
appropriately and fairly in retrenchment cases in light of the fourth industrial age? 
• Are there other jurisdictions with similar provisions that are doing things differently or 
better than is South Africa and can their approaches be a positive influence in South 
Africa? 
Ultimately, the aim of this study is to propose legislative reforms with reference to the current 
operational dismissal provisions by proposing substantive consideration in determining the 
fairness of a dismissal, the prerequisite conditions to be fulfilled beforehand, the procedure to 
be followed should an employer ultimately decide to retrench and, if appropriate, penalty for 
noncompliance with the procedure. 
Although reference to aspects of procedural fairness may be made throughout this contribution, 
this study will not explore the issue as it relates to the question of procedural fairness in 
                                                 
35 Le Roux estimates that 3.6 million of all jobs in South Africa are ‘highly susceptible to computerisation due to 
developments in AI and robotics. (Le Roux “Automation and employment: the case for South Africa” 2018 
African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development 507 515); Others have estimated the 
number to be upwards of 5 million (see “South Africa has a high risk of losing jobs to automation” Business 
Report 2018 (https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/south-africa-has-a-high-risk-of-losing-jobs-to-
automation-14491745 (14-07-2019)). 
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retrenchment. This lack is due to the fact that procedural fairness generally is an 
uncontroversial aspect of the dismissal based on operational requirements. 
The issue of large-scale, widespread job losses and/or displacements resulting from the 
introduction of new technology is relatively new. Equally novel is the research which 
concludes that automation and computerisation pose an existential threat to people’s current 
and future prospects of employment. In light of these factors, currently there is a dearth of 
research in South Africa and internationally which examines the problem of and the risks 
created by laws permitting dismissals based on the ground of operational 
(technological/structural) requirements within a rapidly automating world. This study aims to 
fill this gap and to address an issue that may be of fundamental socioeconomic and legal import. 
1.3 Literature Review 
In past technological or industrial revolutions, the technologies of those eras changed the way 
in which work was performed. The first industrial revolution replaced workers but also created 
new jobs, the second revolution employed many more workers on the assembly line in 
manufacturing.36 The third industrial revolution, on the other hand, saw the widespread 
introduction of computers in the workplace which had the effect of enhancing the manner in 
which work was done.  The changes bettered working conditions through eradication of certain 
tasks as opposed instituting the wholesale elimination of work.  However, the fourth industrial 
revolution is expected to produce exactly that; the wholesale transformation, not only of 
existing technology but the workplace as well. 
Groover defines automation as a technology by which a particular procedure can be carried out 
with no assistance from a human.37 Though humans may be present during that process, their 
involvement is merely that of an observer since the process is self-executing.38 This ability of 
a technology to execute a process independent of human intervention,  however, is not 
necessarily a form of intelligence. Machines have long been able to self-execute with little 
human assistance.39 Now machines possess a facsimile of intelligence. This ‘intelligence’ is 
described by McCarthy as the ability or capability of a technology to behave in a manner 
                                                 
36 Moore Understanding the Industrial Revolution (2000) 66. 
37 Groover Fundamentals of Modern Manufacturing (2010) 887. 
38 Groover (n 37) above. 
39 Automatic machines have been in existence for as far back as in the 15th century (Nam “Jang Yeong-Sil: inventor 
of the striking clepsydra during the reign of King Sejong in Joseon” in Koetsier and Ceccarelli (Ed) Explorations 
in the History of Machines and Mechanisms (2012) 89). 
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deemed intelligent were a human to behave in a similar manner.40 An example of such an 
‘intelligent machine’ is Wordsmith, an algorithm capable of analysing data, organising data 
and producing reports written in human-friendly language based on that data. 41 
In 2014 the Associated Press (AP), an American news media organisation, began employing 
Wordsmith to produce earnings reports.42 Before AI was implemented AP used to produce an 
average of 300 reports per quarter,43  Wordsmith now churns out over 4000 reports per quarter 
allowing traders and investors to make financial decisions on time and with the necessary 
information at hand.44 Wordsmith, essentially, analyses new data, makes market comparisons 
and then generates a report; an ordinary reader is unlikely to tell that an algorithm ‘wrote’  it. 
The possibility that Wordsmith will result in a wholesale displacement of creative, in-depth 
journalism remains minimal, but is not far-fetched. Machines are beginning to perform creative 
tasks that often are indistinguishable from those carried out by humans.45 Another example is 
Heliograf, an AI similar to Wordsmith employed by The Washington Post which, unlike the 
latter, generates sharper content using an explanatory ‘editorial voice’ that can be changed to 
fit the target audience.46 Still in its infancy, Heliograf already is able to update published news 
stories, publish stories on its own (and social media updates) and analyse data-intensive content 
to create unique news content based on a template fed to it by editors.47 Also, it is able to alert 
reporters of suspicious or questionable data48 (perhaps the forerunner to an artificially 
intelligent fact-checker). 
                                                 
40 This definition of AI was provided in a proposal for a project in 1955 (McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester and 
Shannon “A proposal for the Dartmouth summer research project on artificial intelligence” 1955 
(http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/dartmouth/dartmouth.pdf) (15-03-2019). 
41 Miroshnichenko “AI to bypass creativity: will robots replace journalists (the answer is “yes”)” 2018 Information 
1 8. 
42 Miroshnichenko (n 41) 9. 
43 Miroshnichenko (n 41) 9. 
44 Miroshnichenko (n 41) 9. 
45 Brown “Artificial authors: a case for copyright in computer-generated works” 2018 Columbia Science 
&Technology Law Review 1 3. 
46 Herein Ford makes reference to the Quill natural language generation algorithm created by Narrative Science 
(Ford “The rise of robots: impact on unemployment and inequality” in Paus Confronting Dystopia: The New 
Technological Revolution and the Future of Work (2018) 37); see also Brown (n 45) 5. 
47 Madison and Dejarnette Reimagining Journalism in a Post-Truth World: How Late-Night Comedians, Internet 
Trolls, and Savvy Reporters Are Transforming News (2018) 125; see also “Washington Post experiments with 
automated storytelling to help power 2016 Rio Olympics coverage” The Washington Post 2016 
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/pr/wp/2016/08/05/the-washington-post-experiments-with-automated-
storytelling-to-help-power-2016-rio-olympics-coverage/? (07-03-2019)). 
48 The Washington Post (n 47). 
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In a work context the implementation of intelligent innovation like Wordsmith and Heliograf  
eventually may be problematic because the tasks performed by these machines or programmes  
not only involve technical skills but a certain degree of creativity and cognition, traits long 
believed exclusively human.49 Unlike the innovations of the preceding industrial revolutions, 
digitalisation and Big Data in the fourth industrial revolution allow machines to do more than 
previously was thought possible.50 
Whether it is Rio Tinto’s fully-implemented and functioning predictive simulation AI, 
AutoHaul, which already displaces truck drivers in the mining industry51 or the Slovakian start-
up Datamolino AI, which purportedly performs and completes the tasks of a bookkeeper,52 
these new technologies possess the ability to compute large amounts of data and are said to be 
able to make relevant decisions in a fraction of the time it takes humans. 
An evident consequence of these developments is that of possible widespread job displacement. 
Frey and Osborne posit that a significant number of jobs are vulnerable to automation (and 
computerisation).53  Clark emphasises that the unique nature of the current wave of technical 
innovations likely will affect a broader spectrum of jobs than any of the three preceding 
industrial revolutions.54 The problem with much of the prevailing research is that it is 
speculative in nature and lacks empirical proof since these scholars refer to future events. 
That may be the case but there generally is consensus regarding the negative impact of 
automation on current and prospective employment that validates these speculations. Clark  
notes that given the capabilities of machines of this present revolution and the context of their 
development, it is unlikely that a similar economic trajectory will be followed by the current 
                                                 
49 Clark “Creative destruction: emerging technology and the changing course of job creation” in LaGrandeur and 
Hughes Surviving the Machine Age: Intelligent Technology and the Transformation of Human Work (2017) 44; 
see also Ford (n 46) 37 and Brown (n 45) 5. 
50 Aguilera and Ramos “Technological unemployment: an approximation to the Latin American case” 2016 AD-
minister 59 61. 
51 Bruner “Australia: attivazione del primo Sistema ferroviario autonomo per il transport merci” 2018 Ingegneria 
Ferroviaria 853 853. 
52 The Datamolino website lists fast, efficient paperless accurate extraction of large amounts of invoice data among 
the features of the Datamolino algorithm (“Features” Datamolino 2019 (https://www.datamolino.com/features 
(07-03-2019)). 
53 Frey and Osborne argue that a significant portion of work in office and administrative capacities as well as the 
service sector are highly susceptible to automation (Frey and Osborne “The future of employment: how 
susceptible are jobs to computerisation” 2013 44 
(https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf) (05-03-2019). 
54 Clark argues that advances in technology in the past took a long time and allowed for preparation for the  change 
but the same cannot be said of the current wave of technological innovation (see Clark (n 49) 40). 
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industrial revolution.55 Even if the developments do follow a similar route, present data 
suggests that the ability of human beings to keep up with the changes may be limited.56 
Considering the above issues, it is evident that tasks that once were the exclusive province of 
human capability probably can be carried out by computers or computerised machines with a 
high degree of success if not at a better level than humans. These technological changes have 
become so advanced that a transactional concept of work, that relationship between employer 
and employee alluded to, is under threat of obsolescence. 
The operational requirements ground for dismissal comes into full view at this point. As already 
indicated, in the context of its interpretation and attendant substantive consideration and 
procedures, the provision (particularly permitting dismissals based on technological 
considerations) creates a high risk of retrenchments upon the adoption of new technologies and 
without stringent prerequisite action required of the retrenching employer.57 It is clear from the 
above that this permission attempts to “advance economic development” by allowing 
businesses to pursue profit without excessive legislative or bureaucratic interference, however 
they may betray the purpose of advancing social justice in the workplace and will disrupt labour 
peace.58 
The crisis created, especially in South Africa, is likely to be the exacerbation and perpetuation 
of existing inequality. South Africa has among the highest levels of unemployment in the world 
and has been said to be one of the most economically unequal societies.59 As posited above,60 
work plays an important role as a tool in reducing inequality. High as unemployment is, the 
rate does not reflect the real crisis.61 
The 27% unemployment rate is narrowly-defined and does not account for those people who, 
for whatever reason, are not actively looking for work.62 If those people are accounted for, the 
situation is even more concerning. Estimates of the current expanded unemployment rate range 
                                                 
55 Clark (n 49) 41 discusses the effect of globalisation on technological innovation in relation to work; see also 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee “The great decoupling” 2013 New Perspectives Quarterly 61 62. 
56 Clark (n 49) 40; see also Brynjolfsson and McAfee (n 55) 63. 
57 It is important that this assertion is not conflated to mean the employer has virtually no duties. 
58 See s 1 of LRA (n 17). 
59 Statistics South Africa Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Q3 2018 (2018) 7 (hereinafter “QLFS”) (available on 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02113rdQuarter2018.pdf (05-03-2019)); see also Mahadea and 
Kaseeram “The relationship between unemployment, entrepreneurship, rising income in South Africa an 
exploratory study” 2018 African Journal of Business and Economic Research 203 204. 
60 Kenner (n 10) 24. 
61 QLFS (n 59) 7. 
62 QLFS (n 59) 7. 
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between 35 to 37 percentage points; that is over a third of the workforce currently is without 
work.63. A further loss of jobs, especially en masse, caused by the adoption and implementation 
of new technology will do little to alleviate the problems of inequity and poverty in our society. 
Importantly, this consequence does not accord with the understanding that the supreme law of 
the Republic commits this nation, citizens and leaders to achieving social justice, which is 
alluded to in both the BCEA and LRA, by “[improving] the quality of life of all citizens and 
[freeing] the potential of each person”.64 Indeed, the sec. 23 right to fair labour practices is an 
example of the Constitution’s commitment to social justice. Importantly, the Constitution tasks 
the state with a duty to ensure the realisation of these objectives.65 The legislature bears the 
responsibility to foster an environment capable of progressively realising the “just and equal 
society”66 envisioned in the Constitution. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The primary focus of this study is the South African regulatory framework dealing with 
dismissals for operational requirements. It follows a doctrinal approach through consultation 
of legislation, case law and the Constitution and will be restricted to library research. This study 
compares the South African legal system in this respect with that of a foreign jurisdiction, 
France. 
The choice of France is justified by the existence of operational dismissal provisions similar to 
those under South African employment law but which, on preliminary reading, contain more 
extensive protection and consideration that may likely be useful to consider in redesigning the 
legislative framework to accommodate changes in the future.67 This study is not an exploration 
of the entire legal system of France in respect of dismissal but only of those best practices in 
dismissals for operational requirements that, from observation and analysis, best inform the 
reconsideration of the South African law on dismissals for operational requirements. Because 
of the socioeconomic nature of this study and its object in establishing the social importance 
                                                 
63 QLFS (n 59) 7. 
64 Preamble of Constitution (n 10); see also s 1 of Constitution (n 10). 
65 Examples of some of these rights are found in the Bill of Rights (See inter alia ss 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 and 29 
of Constitution (n 10)). 
66 Preamble Constitution (n 10) 
67 Art. L 1233-4 of Code du Travail (n 29); see also Grandu “Labour law” in Bermann and Picard Introduction 
to French Law (2012) 402. 
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of employment, in light of the fourth industrial revolution, a social justice approach towards 
the law generally informs the author’s analysis. 
1.5 Structure of Study 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the research and identify the problem created by 
technology and its resultant effect on dismissal on operational requirements grounds in South 
Africa. The purpose and importance of the study, its aims, methodology and framework are 
identified in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 - Conceptual Framework 
This chapter discusses and explains key concepts that will be explored in the study. 
Chapter 3 – The Regulatory Framework in South Africa 
The general regulatory framework for the law concerning labour and employment issues is 
discussed in this study as well as the relevant interpretative tools employed. 
Chapter 4 – Dismissal for Operational Requirements 
The aim in this chapter is to examine the legal framework dealing with dismissal for operational 
requirements in South Africa. A comprehensive examination is achieved through the 
assessment of legislation dealing with operational requirements, case law and other relevant 
developments in the field.  
Chapter 5 – Best Practices and Lessons from France 
This chapter discusses best practices in a foreign jurisdiction, particularly French law on 
dismissal, as explained above, because of the extensive protection afforded for employees in 
comparison to South Africa and other jurisdictions.68 
Chapter 6 – Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion 
This chapter aims to provide a summary of the findings reached in this study. Flowing directly 
from the findings of the preceding chapters, this chapter offers proposals through co-opting 
best practices if any are identified from South African and foreign jurisdiction(s); recommends 
                                                 
68 French employment law is especially stringent when it comes to the dismissals (see Le Barbachon and 
Malherbet An Anatomy of the French Labour Market: Country Case Study on Labour Market Segmentation 
(2013) 11). 
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any other policy considerations identified in the study if appropriate for adoption and, lastly, 
shares a suggestion of new socioeconomic functions that ought to be assumed by stakeholders. 
1.6 Concluding Remarks 
It is posited in this chapter that the provisions dealing with dismissals for operational 
requirements in South Africa are ill-suited to deal with recent changes in technology which 
render entire occupations obsolete. The permission by the LRA and, indeed international law, 
of dismissals as a result of adopting new technologies (operational reasons) endangers the jobs 
of more people today than was the case in the past. With a society as unequal as in South Africa, 
steps need to be taken to enhance the protection extended to vulnerable employees in our 
employment law so as to avoid an increase in inequality for the sake of advancing economic 
development. 
Consequently, the overarching question this study aims to answer is: “How can the ground for 
dismissal for operational requirements be better adapted for the fourth industrial age?’ 
The following questions will also be answered: 
• Will (or are) employees in South Africa be exposed to a risk of mass job losses as a 
result of the operational requirements ground of dismissal in light of the fourth 
industrial revolution? 
• Which key aspects of South African employment law (regarding operational 
requirements) better address or do not address changes in technology? 
• Should employment law promote social justice in society in general and in the 
workplace in particular? 
• How would employees who lose their jobs through operational dismissals be 
reintegrated in the workplace and what can be done to realise such reintegration? 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
As technology continues to break new ground, major employers in South Africa are taking 
advantage of its attendant developments and essentially are transforming the workplace.69 As 
a result of the implementation of these new technological products, some occupations are 
transformed whereas others will likely be rendered redundant in the foreseeable future.70 These 
developments create an environment in which uncertainty is the norm as automated, 
computerised machines and a plurality of other technological advances continue to enter the 
workplace and eliminate positions occupied by workers. As a result of these changes, workers 
face a growing possibility of widespread retrenchment. The consequence is the likelihood of 
losing what may be their only viable means of earning, not an income, but a living. Even more 
concerning is the impact their retrenchment likely will have not merely on their individual 
status but the upset it will cause in the lives of their dependent families, as well as aggravating 
an already existing poor situation in the community.71  
This chapter aims to discuss theoretical issues concerning retrenchment and the fourth 
industrial revolution as well as the real and expected impact on workers and on the law.  This 
chapter first describes the historical development of the concept of dismissal for operational 
requirements in South Africa. Because the development of this particular aspect of South 
African law (dismissal for operational requirements) mirrors that of the general dismissal law, 
it seems prudent that a proper investigation of the historical development of dismissal law and 
by extension retrenchment law is undertaken.  Secondly, this chapter considers the issue of 
industry 4.0 and what makes it different from earlier technological revolutions. Then it explores 
the moral and ethical issues that are likely to arise from the introduction and implementation 
of new technological products as they relate to employment and society. Lastly, the key 
                                                 
69 Many service occupations in South Africa such as bank tellers and call centre assistants face a threat of being 
eliminated as employers adopt and exploit new ways of communicating and interacting with customers, a 
situation driven primarily by digitalisation of their services which theoretically render these occupations 
redundant. (see Standard Bank (n 32) and Eyewitness News (n 34)). 
70 According to the 2019 OECD Employment Outlook report, an average of 14% jobs in OECD nations face the 
likelihood of being eliminated while a further 32% have a 50 to 70% chance of changing significantly 
(Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development OECD Employment Outlook 2019: The Future of 
Work (2019) 50); The World Economic Forum echoes a similar sentiment, noting that 50% of global companies 
expect a reduction in their workforce driven by automation and 59% expect to have significantly adapted their 
value chain (see also World Economic Forum The Future of Jobs Report (2018) 8). 
71 Nicholson JA in General Food Industries Ltd describes the loss of employment for an employee as a “matter 
of life and death” and  states that “[t]he loss of jobs […] has […] a deleterious impact on the life of workers and 
their families[…]” (General Food Industries (n 27) 1276A-D). 
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concepts ‘redundancy’ and ‘retrenchment’ which inform this study are described and 
distinguished with the aim of laying the groundwork for their further use throughout this study. 
2.2.The Dismissal for Operational Requirements in South Africa 
2.2.1. Development of the Law Concerning Dismissal for Operational Requirements 
Labour relations laws in South Africa largely have been codified under various statutes which 
aim to give effect to the constitutional right to fair labour practices and other related rights.72 
Prior to these statutory regulations, employment relations primarily were a species of the 
common law.73 The employer and the prospective employee agreed and were bound by a 
contract of employment in terms of which their relationship was regulated.74  This contract, as 
any other locatio conductio,75 merely was an agreement where one party agrees to let his 
services out to another in exchange for compensation.76 Much as in most normal contractual 
transactions it allowed both worker and employer to determine the terms and conditions of their 
relationship and how it was regulated. Hopley J in Boyd v Stuttaford described it as follows:77 
“[I]n contracts of hire of services, the employee is the lessor of such services, and the employer 
the lessee, and by our law (…), there is […] no difference between the letting of services and 
the letting of lands or any other thing capable of being hired and leased. […] [T]he principle 
underlying the contract is undoubtedly a mutual rendering of the benefits stipulated for, viz.: 
‘work for reward, and reward for work.” 
Regulating employment relations in terms of the common law however meant that matters of 
fairness were unlikely to arise in labour-management disputes.78 
Because the employment contract was viewed through the lens of the traditional law of 
contract, various considerations applicable to ordinary commercial contracts applied.79 The 
courts inevitably found themselves in a position where they had to intervene in what, prima 
                                                 
72 These statutes include inter alia the LRA, BCEA, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 and the Skills 
Development Act 97 of 1998; see also Grogan (n 4) 5. 
73 See Grogan (n 4) 2; see also Basson, Christianson, Garbers, Le Roux and Strydom The New Essential Labour 
Law Handbook (2017) 8. 
74  South African law of contract has a long history, an extensive exploration falls well out of the scope of this 
study. Suffice it to say however that the modern contract of employment originates from the Roman law locatio 
conductio operarum which regulated the leasing of services by one person to another in return for 
compensation; see Grogan (n 4) 2. 
75 Grogan (n 4) 2. 
76 Basson et al (n 73) 8;  
77 Boyd (n 5) 104. 
78 See Brassey ‘The Industrial Court’ in Brassey, Cameron, Cheadle The New Labour Law (1987) 2. 
79 Above. 
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facie, was a valid commercial transaction.80 Were they to intervene, they would have acted 
against the consensus in a purely commercial transaction arrived at by two, supposedly free, 
equal and competent parties. 
2.2.1.1.The Problem of Contract of Employment in Retrenchment 
2.2.1.1.1. Pacta Sunt Servanda 
An intrusion of that kind did not accord with principles in the law of contract either, because 
the contract of employment implied the common law principle which holds that an agreement 
freely entered into by competent persons has to be honoured.81 The Constitutional Court in fact 
described this principle, the pacta sunt servanda, as a “profoundly moral principle [upon] 
which [certainty in our society depends]”82. In Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mines Estates, the 
Appellate Division was called upon to decide if a term in a contract of employment which 
required an employee to acquire the employer’s consent before ceding his wages was against 
public policy. The court held in this respect:83 
“the conclusive answer to the [view that a stipulation] is contrary to public policy is to 
be found in the [fact that even if such stipulation were to be proven oppressive] to the 
workman …, it would not … be sufficient to justify the Court in declaring the 
agreement freely entered into by the parties [to be] contra bonos mores.” 
The court effectively withdrew from intervening in employment contracts even if in the court’s 
opinion doing so allowed perverse and oppressive terms to remain. 
2.2.1.1.2. Equality of Parties 
In addition to the primacy awarded the sanctity of the employment contract, the common law 
regime is premised on an assumption that parties to a contract of employment are somewhat 
equal.84 In ordinary contracts this probably is the case, but it does not hold true in employment 
matters.85 
                                                 
80 Brassey notes that the court in such circumstances would be empowered to invalidate the contract for its 
illegal or immoral terms or if a term therein offends public policy (Brassey (n 78) 3). 
81 Herein, the author makes reference to the judgment of Jessel MR in Printing & Numerical Registering Co v 
Sampson 1875 LR 19 Eq 462 (Brassey (n 78) 2); Visser ‘The principle pacta sunt servanda in Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law, with specific reference to contracts in restraint of trade’ 1984 South African Law Journal 
(SALJ) 641 654. 
82 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) par 87. 
83 Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mines Estates 1920 AD 600 616. 
84 See Haysom and Thompson ‘Labouring under the law: South Africa’s farmworkers’ ILJ 218 221; B Jordaan 
‘The law of contract and the individual employment relationship’1990 Acta Juridica 73 77; Grogan (n 4) 3. 
85 Above. 
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The employment contract is different from an ordinary contract particularly because the parties 
naturally occupy different positions of influence and wield varying degrees of power. Their 
respective influence is important to the bargaining process but does not carry the same weight. 
Assisted by the influence by virtue of being the owner of the means of production,86 the 
employer inevitably is the dominant party in any negotiation.87 
In instances where the employee resists the employer’s influence the employee is likely to 
suffer.88 In  agreeing that it is inappropriate to conclude that the contract in employment 
relations is an agreement between two equal parties,89 Haysom and Thompson note that the 
contract of employment ignores the social and economic power of the parties.90 They further 
argue that it conceals the agreement’s inherent need for the subordination by the employee to 
the control of the employer.91 In many cases the employee is unaware of the working conditions 
under which he is expected to function and the risks such conditions pose.92 
The contract grants the employer the sole discretion to determine working conditions and, 
given its interpretation and understanding as a commercial transaction, it shields the terms of 
the contract from judicial scrutiny by removing it from considerations of public policy.93 Such 
a position does not accord with the idea that both parties are equal, it misrepresents reality. 
2.2.1.1.3. Termination of Employment 
Nothing about dismissal of itself is strange nor should it be. It makes little sense unreasonably 
to stand in the way of an employee who wishes to discontinue employment under an employer. 
Neither should an employer be unconscionably deprived of his ability to terminate the 
employment relationship with his employee. In a society that purports to adhere to and 
encourages adherence to freedom of enterprise,94 this position is incongruous with its core 
tenets. For this reason, the common law contract of employment grants both employer and 
                                                 
86 Pillay J held that “[n]either the Constitution nor the legislature takes away or diminishes rights, especially not 
of the weak and vulnerable. In relation to employers as the owners of the workplace and the means of 
production, employees are weak and vulnerable” (Mohlaka v Minister of Finance & Others 2009 30 ILJ 622 
(LC) 630); Basson et al (n 73) 8; Kanamugire “The concept of managerial prerogative in South African labour 
law” 2014 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 424 at 425. 
87 Jordaan (n 84) 77. 
88 Haysom (n 84) 221. 
89 Haysom (n 84) 221. 
90 Above. 
91 Haysom (n 84) 222. 
92 Haysom (n 84) 222. 
93 Above. 
94 South Africa partly adheres to the economic doctrine of free enterprise (see Brassey “Fairness: Commercial 
Rationale” in Brassey et al (n 73) 65; The Constitution grants the right to freedom of trade and occupation (see 
also s 22 of Constitution (n 10). 
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employee the right to terminate their relationship. Notwithstanding the argument, this right is 
problematic.  
When either party under the common law contemplates termination, they do so with the utmost 
degree of freedom possible. Apart from a requirement to give reasonable notice to the other 
party the common law requires no reason to be tendered.95 Merely by giving notice the party 
terminating the employment relationship dispenses with all formalities for dismissal. Because 
employment relationships are conceived as contractual agreements, the same understanding 
and assumptions applicable to normal contracts are applicable in the contractual relationship. 
As such, the release of an employee by an employer amounts to nothing more than the 
termination of his letter of appointment. In cases where an employee loses his job, he cannot 
take the employer to court and claim he has been dismissed unfairly. As Grogan notes the 
common law has no concept of dismissal let alone an unfair one;96 merely giving reasonable 
notice renders the termination lawful. 
Similarly, dismissal on the strength of the employer’s operational requirements is not perceived 
differently from any other motivation. The prescripts of the common law applicable to other 
dismissals apply equally to dismissals for operational requirements. From a business 
perspective the rationale for operational requirement dismissals is found in the belief that an 
employer has a natural right to control his employees and to safeguard the welfare of the 
business.97 
He is entitled to increase and decrease the size of his workforce in response to the needs of the 
business or to cyclical economic changes and changes in production.98 The common law 
perspective of dismissal does not question this entitlement. Neither party is required to give 
reasons for terminating the contractual relationship. Consequently, whether the termination is 
occasioned by the employer’s economic reality or the employee’s conduct is irrelevant. The 
employer can terminate all employment contracts provided that reasonable and sufficient notice 
is given. 
                                                 
95 see Le Roux Retrenchment Law in South Africa (2016) 4; see also R Zondo ‘Redundancy and retrenchment’ 
1990 ILJ 339 340 and Grogan (n 4) 2. 
96 Grogan (n 4) 14. 
97 S Bendix Labour Relations: a South African Perspective (2019) 336. 
98 Above. 
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Other than tendering reasons or not, an employer contemplating dismissal in response to 
operational changes is not enjoined to consult with employees under the common law.99 Until 
1979 the courts did not recognise an employee’s right to be consulted before a dismissal.100 
Also, it does not make sense to require prior consultation given that reasons are not required to 
justify a dismissal. In addition, it was not a requirement for the employer to provide any 
severance benefit for dismissal resulting from operational requirements.101 
It is disingenuous to give the impression that an aggrieved employee could do nothing 
whatsoever, about the loss of his job. In exceptional circumstances he had recourse against the 
employer. For example, if an employer fails to give reasonable notice, the employee has legal 
recourse for breach of contract.102 Similarly, this also applied to a failure to comply with a term 
in the contract. 
Important as this possibility is, it offers little consolation to an employee who loses more than 
he can regain. The courts were unwilling to allow an employee to succeed in a claim for specific 
performance under the contract of employment, which is an odd position to adopt given their 
readiness to import other aspects of the law of contract that reinforced the power of the 
employer to hire and fire at will.103 
Grogan observes that although an employee theoretically is entitled to reinstatement in the 
event of a breach, the most “in all likelihood [he would] have obtained [would have been] no 
more than a sum of money equivalent to the wages he would have received [during the period 
of notice]”.104 In cases of post-dismissal disputes such as in dismissals for operational 
requirements, Le Roux’s observation suggests that there was no deviation from the standard 
applied to the other forms of dismissal.105 
The interpretation of the employment contract as if it were an ordinary commercial transaction 
essentially muted and relegated matters of fairness. The contract of employment was designed 
                                                 
99 Zondo (n 95) above. 
100 In Mustapha, the Court commented: ‘I am not aware of any authority which has applied the rule of Rex v. 
Abdurahman to the field of contract, and in all the circumstances there is, in my judgment, no sufficient warrant 
for holding in the present case’. The principle referred to in the Rex v Adurahman is the audi alteram partem 
principle which the Mustapha court found no authority to apply to the employment issue before it (Mustapha and 
Another v Receiver of Revenue, Lichtenburg and Others 1958 3 All SA 303 (A) 314). 
101 Zondo (n 95) above. 
102 Grogan (n 4) 4. 
103 N Cassim ‘The changing contours of labour law’ 1984 Comparative and International Law Journal of South 
Africa 340 341. 
104 Grogan (n 4) 4. 
105 Le Roux writes ‘in the absence of the notice, an employee’s only remedy was damages equal to the required 
notice pay’ (Le Roux (n 95) 4). 
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to “[allow] the employer the power of a private despot” and to be an “instrument for entering 
into legally unsupervised relations…” the consequences of which likely were unfair to the 
employee.106 
2.2.1.2.Unfair Labour Practice Jurisprudence 
In 1977 the South African government initiated a shift away from the autocratic employment 
regime that had been in place.107 Following the first report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Labour Legislation (“the Wiehahn Commission”), various legislative measures were 
introduced. These measures had a transformative impact on the judicial attitude towards many 
aspects of labour management relations in the country. The issue of unfair dismissal is one such 
aspect.  
Implementation of the first report meant the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979108  
(which amended the Industrial Conciliation Act109) was passed. Sec. 19 of the 1979 amendment 
provided for the establishment of an Industrial Court110 and introduced unfair labour practice 
jurisprudence into South African labour law.111 The establishment of the Court and its unfair 
labour practice jurisdiction took away labour-management disputes from the shop-floor and 
brought them in the reach of the judiciary.112 
The initial amendment defined an unfair labour practice as any labour practice that is unfair in 
the opinion of the Industrial Court.113 A second attempt to define this relatively new concept 
was a lot more extensive, it was defined as:114 
                                                 
106 Haysom (n 84) from 222-223. 
107 It should be noted that the contract of employment was not the sole regulatory instrument for employment 
relations. Other legislative measures regulated employment relations, such as for farm workers by the Master 
and Servants Act and, to a certain extent, the 1956 LRA (see Haysom (n 84) 225); Nevertheless, the dismissal 
regime was a common law matter (see also Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation The Complete 
Wiehahn Report With Notes by N.E. Wiehahn (1982) xxxii). 
108 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979. 
109 Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
110 s 19 provides for: 
Substitution of 'tribunal', and references elsewhere to 'industrial tribunal'  
  (1) The principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution for the word 'tribunal' wherever it occurs of the 
words 'industrial court'. 
  (2) Any reference in any law or elsewhere to 'industrial tribunal' shall be deemed to be a reference to 'industrial 
court' as defined in the principal Act as amended by this Act (see Industrial Conciliation Amendment (n 108)). 
111 A Reichman and E Mureinik ‘Unfair Labour Practices’ 1980 ILJ 1 1. 
112 J Roos “Labour law in South Africa - 1976-1986 - the birth of a legal discipline” Acta Juridica 1987 94 98. 
113 s 1(1) Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979. 
114 Labour Relations Amendment Act 51 of 1982. 
21 
 
(a)   any labour practice or any change in any labour practice, other than a strike or a lock-out, 
which has or may have the effect that- 
    (i)  any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly affected or that his or their 
employment opportunities, work security or physical, economic, moral or social welfare is or 
may be prejudiced or jeopardized thereby; 
     (ii)  the business of any employer or class of employers is or may be unfairly affected or 
disrupted thereby; 
     (iii)  labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby; 
     (iv)  the relationship between employer and employee is or may be detrimentally affected 
thereby; or  
(b)   any other labour practice or any other change in any labour practice which has or may have 
an effect which is similar or related to any effect mentioned in paragraph (a); 
In one of its earliest decisions the Industrial Court in UAMAWU v Fodens was asked to 
determine whether retrenchment of three workers by an employer without following generally 
accepted principles amounted to an unfair labour practice.115 In answering this question, the 
court stated: “[i]t would […] appear that in regard to […] the dismissals of second and third 
applicants on the basis of retrenchment ... that the onus rests on [the employer] to establish that 
the dismissal was justified on good grounds”.116 
As indicated above, the interests of the employee were of little value in dismissals. However, 
the introduction of the Industrial Court’s unfair labour practice jurisdiction permitted the Court 
to lay down guidelines as to what ought to be considered an unfair labour practice. 
To the extent that Fodens had done,117 the Court in Shezi v Consolidated Frame Cotton 
Corporation118 provided a comprehensive guideline as regards the principles that it deemed 
important for employers to consider when approaching the question of fairness in 
retrenchments. This guideline came to be accepted and its application was encouraged by 
subsequent decisions of the courts, notably in Barsky, Meyi and Crest Hotel referred to below. 
                                                 
115 United African Motor and Allied Workers Union v Fodens (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1983 4 ILJ 212 (IC) 215. 
116 Fodens (n 115) 229G-H. 
117 The court listed the more important principles as being ‘proper prior warning of proposed retrenchments; fair 
application of agreed retrenchment selection criteria; prior consultation with representative trade union; 
adequate steps to look for alternative employment; and first in last out’ (ses Fodens (n 115) 230C-E. 
118 Shezi & others v Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation Ltd (1); Nxumalo & others v Consolidated Frame 
Cotton Corporation Ltd (2); Zuke & others v Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation Ltd 3 1984 ILJ 3 (IC). 
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Drawing on decisions in the English courts119 and the practices of more progressive employer 
organisations,120 the court enumerated general principles that normally would apply in such 
cases, among which were considerations by employers of ways to avoid retrenchments, to 
provide sufficient prior warning to the affected employees and their representatives and consult 
with the employees to be retrenched as well as with employee representatives on the criteria to 
be applied when selecting which employees are to be retrenched.121 The court held further that 
such criteria ought to be fair and objectively checkable and independent of the subjective 
determinations of the person making such selections.122 
In Barsky v SABC123 and Meyi v Ovcon124 however the courts expressed the view that the 
guidelines were not rules of law but served the purpose of “[ensuring] that the employer does 
not act arbitrarily and with an improper motive” when coming to a decision to retrench.125 
However, complying with the guidelines, in principle, is indicative of a bona fide reason to 
retrench.126 De Klerk J expressed a similar view in this regard, holding “the guide-lines are not 
hard and fast rules but nevertheless … should be followed unless there are good reasons why 
they cannot be adhered to”.127  
2.2.1.3. Operational Requirements Dismissals in the current LRA 
In contrast to the Industrial Court’s retrenchment guidelines the provisions regulating 
dismissals for operational requirements and its attendant procedures in the LRA are not 
guidelines but rules of law.128 Compliance is mandatory since non-compliance almost certainly 
renders the dismissal unfair.129 These specific issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 
below. 
 
                                                 
119 The Court was referred to and relied on the English authorities in Williams v Compare Maxam [1982] IRLR 
83 and Freud v Bentalls [1983] ICR 77 (see Shezi (n 118) 11G-13A). 
120 Such as the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa and the Transvaal Chamber of 
Industries (see Shezi (n 118) 11B-E). 
121 Shezi (n 118) 12G-13A. 
122 Above. 
123 Barsky v South African Broadcasting Corporation 1988 9 ILJ 293 (IC). 
124 Meyi & Others v Ovcon (Pty) Ltd 1988 9 ILJ 672 (IC). 
125 Barsky v SABC (n 123) at 673D; see also Meyi (n 124) 673D-E. 
126 Above. 
127 Seven Abel CC t/a The Crest Hotel v Hotel & Restaurant Workers Union and Others 1990 11 ILJ 504 (LAC) 
507H-I. 
128 The retrenchment provisions are codified in the LRA (see ss 189 and 189A of LRA (n 17). 
129 Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1998 12 BLLR 1209 (LAC) par 31. 
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2.2.2. Retrenchment or Redundancy? 
It is prudent to consider whether ‘redundancy’ or ‘retrenchment’ is the correct term which 
should be used in this study. Retrenchment and redundancy are used interchangeably when 
referring to dismissals for operational requirements. The courts defined ‘redundancy’ as 
meaning “that an employer is faced with excess employees for the number of jobs required for 
the efficient running of a business or department”.130 In Plaaslike Oorgangsraad van 
Bronkhorstspruit v Senekal the court noted that redundancy occurs when the employer closes 
or scales down its operations with the consequence that jobs disappear.131  
The court referred to the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary, which explains the 
concept as “the condition of being surplus to an organisation's staffing requirements; loss of a 
job as a result of this; a case of unemployment due to reorganisation, mechanization, etc”.132 
‘Retrenchment’ on the other hand is defined as “dismissal because the employee is redundant”. 
133 Whether the business is facing economic difficulties or is closing down, “if it is necessary 
to reduce the workforce, the employees will be retrenched”.134 The Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal Based on Operational Requirements (”Retrenchment Code”), seems to support a 
similar view, stating that “retrenchment is a ‘no-fault’ dismissal […]”.135 
In South Africa retrenchment is tantamount to a dismissal akin to the dismissal for operational 
requirements, whereas redundancy essentially is a reason for retrenchment. It seems apposite, 
consequently, to use retrenchment interchangeably with a dismissal for operational 
requirements and to treat redundancy to mean an employer’s reasons for effecting retrenchment 
(or a dismissal for operational requirements). 
2.3 The Fourth Industrial Revolution 
2.3.1 What is an Industrial Revolution? 
There is no standard or universally accepted definition of the fourth industrial revolution. The 
Cambridge Online Dictionary defines in American English an industrial revolution as “a period 
in which the development of machinery leads to major changes in agriculture, industry, 
                                                 
130 Singh (n 22) 970I. 
131 Plaaslike Oorgangsraad van Bronkhorstspruit v Senekal 2001 3 SA 9 (SCA) 25. 
132 Senekal (n 131) 26. 
133 National Union of Mineworkers & others v Free State Consolidated Gold Mines (Operations) Ltd - President 
Brand Mine (1994) 15 ILJ 1161 (IC) 1166A. 
134 Free State Consolidated Gold Mines (n 133) 1166C. 
135 Item 1 of Code of Good Practice: Dismissal Based on Operational Requirements (GG 20254 (16 July 1999)). 
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transportation, and social conditions […]”.136 The Merriam-Webster dictionary takes a more 
general approach but essentially follows the same line describing it as “a rapid, major change 
in an economy […] marked by the general introduction of power-driven machinery or by an 
important change in the prevailing types and methods of use of such machines”.137  
The Cambridge Dictionary provides a general alternative which defines it as “any period of 
time during which there is a lot of growth in industry or a particular industry”.138 What is clear 
from these definitions and may be accepted is that an industrial revolution involves major 
technological changes which, in one way or another, alter existing methods of production or 
performance in industry.139 What is not apparent, however, is whether this generic 
characterisation of industrial change accords with the changes of the fourth industrial 
revolution. 
2.3.2 Defining the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
It is widely accepted that the fourth industrial revolution introduced technologies that have 
changed many aspects of business, production and industry.140 It also altered the methods by 
which machines that have been in existence for decades operate.141 Such is the nature of the 
fourth industrial revolution that it is expected to be entirely different from any technological 
revolution before it.142 The first, second and third industrial revolutions were occasioned by 
individual breakthroughs which changed certain aspects of production, such as the invention 
of steam power, electricity, the application of science to production and manufacturing and the 
internet.143  
It would be doing a disservice to suggest that industry 4.0 is nothing more than another change 
in manufacturing or production. Sendler critiques this narrow characterisation and posits that 
doing so purports to tell those unaffected by or uninvolved in the production and manufacturing 
                                                 
136  “Industrial Revolution” Cambdridge Dictionary 2019 
(https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/industrial-revolution (2019-07-26)) 
137 “Industrial Revolution” Merriam-Webster 2019 (https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/industrial 
revolution (2019-07-26)) 
138 Cambridge Dictionary (n 136). 
139 Sendler suggests that the term ‘industrial revolution’ used to “[refer] to the transition from an agricultural 
economy to an industrial society” (Sendler “The basics” in Sendler (Ed) The Internet of Things: Industry 4.0 
Unleashed (2016) 3). 
140 Sendler (n 139) 16; see also Brynjolfsson and McAfee The Second Machine Age (2014) 9. 
141 Hauer “Society and the second age of machines: algorithms vs ethics” 2018 Society 100 100; see also 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (n 140) 9 and Sendler (n 139) 17. 
142 Sendler (n 139) 16. 
143 Schwab “The fourth industrial revolution” Foreign Affairs 2015 (https://foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-
12/fourth-industrial-revolution (2019-07-28)). 
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aspects of the value creation chain that they should not be bothered by the ensuing changes.144 
If the revolution  affects only that part of the value chain, just as all the other waves of 
technological change in the past, what business is it of theirs? To define this technological 
revolution merely as a modification of the methods of production or operation is insufficient 
and to those likely to be affected by it, is misleading. It fails to capture the essence of what the 
fourth industrial revolution really represents. 
2.3.2.1  The Benefits 
The fourth industrial revolution means more than a few changes in technological operations. It 
represents a new system of controlling and organising the entirety of industry, from concept, 
creation to customer; a wholesale overhaul of the value-creation chain.145 According to 
Schwab’s observation, industry 4.0 is the convergence and fusion of emerging technologies, 
into “physical, biological and digital domains”.146 Associated with this process are innovations 
such as additive manufacturing (3D-Printing) which is considered a critical disruption,147 bio-
manufacturing, gene sequencing, advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, quantum and cloud 
computing, big data and many others.148 An especially important aspect of this shift is found 
in the further advancement of the so-called Internet of Things (IoT). Much of IoT’s character 
is defined by interconnected objects and devices over the internet at a level which was 
inconceivable only a few years ago.149 
Driven primarily by high volumes of rapidly transmittable and accessible data (big data), 
increasingly autonomous machines such as refrigerators, televisions, printers and even washing 
machines are being produced.150 In factories and other manufacturing environments it is the 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)151 that is expected to ring in the changes. According to 
Visser, it will create smart factories where data in large quantities is produced, interpreted and 
                                                 
144 Sendler (n 139) 16. 
145 Sendler (n 139) 16. 
146 Schwab The Fourth Industrial Revolution (2016) 12. 
147 According to the 4IRSA report technological disruption exposure report, 3D printing is an example of what it 
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(Armstrong Exposure of the South African Economy to Technological Disruption – A Sectoral View (2019) 12 
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150 Sendler “Important technologies” in Sendler (n 139) 42. 
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whatever answer is derived, is acted upon in an instant.152 Some observers maintain it will drive 
up productivity, product quality and production efficiency.153  
As indicated in the preceding chapter, it is not confined merely to production,154 advances in 
artificial intelligence have already caused disruptions in non-primary sectors such as 
professional services and the media.155 The fourth industrial revolution indicates a fundamental 
shift in the way businesses and their activities are and will be carried out. Unlike the other 
industrial revolutions, it not only will change what already is known, it effectively will uproot 
production methods and business models. At this point, the issue of labour becomes more 
significant. 
2.3.2.2 The Consequences 
For all its positive contributions the fourth industrial revolution will not be without negative 
consequences. Much like the revolutions of the past it is common cause that it will displace 
workers and eliminate jobs.156 However, the striking difference between the fourth and its 
major labour-displacing predecessors is the scale on which these changes will be effected.157 
The first industrial revolution from a worker’s point of view impacted negatively on the 
manufacturing and primary industrial sectors.158 The second was confined to major 
breakthroughs in manufacturing and other closely-related industries.159 The fourth, however, 
is not industry-biased; it is expected to impact on almost every major economic sector in and 
across all economies.160 
According to an early report produced by the Fourth Industrial Revolution Partnership for 
South Africa (referred to as “4IRSA”) the industries that face a significantly high exposure to 
technological disruption are not the primary sectors of the economy but those in the secondary 
and tertiary spheres.161 Key contributing industries to the South African economy such as retail, 
                                                 
152 Visser (n 148) 54; see also Sendler (n 139) 26 and Dumitrescu “Utilizing opportunities for industrial location 
in Sendler (n 139) 208 and Schwab (n 82) 12. 
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insurance, education, healthcare and banking face a greater likelihood of real technological 
disruption than sectors such as mining and agriculture.162 However, it does not mean that 
primary sectors are not exposed to technological change, agriculture and mining are estimated 
to have a disruption likelihood of more than 30%, which indicates that a sizeable portion of 
their operations  are exposed to change.163 
Nevertheless, mere exposure to technological disruption does not predicate job losses as 
inevitable. For example, the fact that a business opts to use an automated response-software to 
handle generic customer communication nodes is not likely to result in the worker previously 
responsible for customer communication losing her job. It may ease the burden on her, allowing 
her to perform other duties she is assigned without having to worry about sending out the same-
worded email to every customer. 
The communication employee even may have more free time to learn a new skill that may 
prove useful in the execution of her duties. In this context, the change enabled by the adoption 
of new technologies improves the quality of work of the employee rather than diminishing it. 
The level of exposure is a useful indicator. Despite it not being capable of a literal translation 
to job losses, it has an important role as it gives an idea about which industries are likely to be 
affected by technological disruption and, by extension, which ones are likely to eliminate 
certain jobs as a result. 
As noted above, secondary and tertiary economic sectors are thought likely to be exposed to 
disruption in South Africa. Taking the above caveat164 into account, these sectors constitute a 
large majority of all formally employed people in the country.165 The abovementioned 4IRSA 
report estimates a quarter “of […] [the] total [economic] output and employment is highly 
exposed to technological disruption”.166 Another 20 to 25% is moderately exposed.167 If one 
takes into account all the moderately and highly-exposed sectors, a clearer picture emerges. 
First, many of these sectors have a disruption likelihood of over 60%.168  
                                                 
162 Above. 
163 Armstrong (n 147) 33. 
164 That the susceptibility to technological disruption does not translate to job losses. 
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Secondly, their employment contribution in the total formal employment sector constitutes 
approximately 75-plus percentage points of the workforce.169 However, these statistics merely 
establish the likelihood and not the expected reality. Whether the likelihood materialises and 
is a threat depends on the reaction towards these technological developments by business and 
policymakers. 
2.4 The Social Aspect of Technology-induced Unemployment 
2.4.1 The Problem of Job-Displacing Technology 
Technological progress is a constant throughout humankind’s history170 and to fight it is futile. 
It is a reality of mankind’s existence and one that has been positive in its effect.171 Work for 
compensation also is a fact.172 These important aspects of reality have interacted over the last 
three centuries with mixed results. What complicates the debate today between work and 
technological progress is the issue of striking a balance.  
The employer historically had a ‘natural’ (common law) right to control the activities of his 
business and to ensure that it is commercially viable.173 To this end the employer is vested with 
an ability to take measures aimed at ensuring that commercial viability is achieved,  which 
includes the ability to adopt and implement new technologies even if they render certain 
occupations redundant.174 This natural right, albeit with extensive preconditions, was 
entrenched in South African law under the 1995 LRA and is referred to as a dismissal for 
operational requirements.175 
Unlike the technological leaps of the past, the present advances in technology are occurring at 
such a rapid pace that it may not even be possible for humans to keep up or for them to have 
work they will be ‘qualified’ to perform.176 Improvements are  being made on a daily basis in 
technologies such as AI which continue to raise the capabilities of machines and software and 
which contribute towards the capability of machines fully to automate certain occupations. 
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171 Above. 
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2.4.2 Is Educating for 4IR Enough? 
Even more problems are created when one considers that the new jobs that purportedly will be 
created as a result of this technological miracle may not cater sufficiently and fairly for 
everyone. According to the World Economic Forum the worker of the future will require a 
personal toolbox of specialized skills in order to survive in that work environment.177 These 
skills, inter alia, include critical thinking, complex problem solving, creativity and cognitive 
flexibility.178 
These personal and learned skills are not universally spread, especially in South Africa.179 The 
World Bank says in order for many of these skills to be achieved a strong human capital 
foundation is required.180 South Africa lags behind many nations in this regard.181 In addition 
to the skills referred to above, competency in science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics (the so-called “STEM skills”) is said to be of critical import for the future 
worker.182  
There is abundant evidence that reliance on ‘education and training’ as a single all-
encompassing solution is ill-advised. Both historical and recent education statistics from 
OECD countries, which are among the most developed nations with the highest levels of human 
development and advanced education,183 shows that a significant number of its member 
populations largely fail to achieve high levels of literacy.184 A consistent trend has been 
observed since the 1970s and corroborates the argument that STEM skills are difficult to attain 
in a large majority of the population.185 Few people practically achieve high scores on basic 
literacy tests, so the expectation that a majority of people will acquire STEM skills is not 
feasible. 
A practical example of this probability is found in places where technological innovation 
displaced workers, such as the American Rust Belt. Today the Rust Belt is run-down; an ailing 
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shadow of its former self.186 It is not a booming technological hub that arguments in favour of 
‘education and training’ attempt to portray what the future after displacement will look like.187 
The Rust Belt is one of many other examples of wastelands left behind by technological 
progress.  
This situation is not an indictment of education and training nor is it an attack on the support 
thereof. Education has a critical role to play if a solution is to be found, especially in the long-
term. What the evidence suggests is that it is not a realistic or a cogent argument to suggest that 
job losses resulting from technological advances can be offset entirely by education and 
training alone. Education is not a magic wand by which problems can be made to disappear. 
Without policy intervention, education cannot solve a problem that fundamentally is economic, 
social and perhaps ethical in nature. To argue that education somehow will yield different 
results this time around is to put into practice an experiment that already has been conducted 
and shows consistent shortcomings.; it is to implement a plan without caring about the likely 
consequences on those who will lose their jobs and have their future employment prospects 
detrimentally affected as a result of technological displacement. 
2.4.3 The Importance of Work 
Perhaps a more compelling consideration that ought to inform the attitude directed towards 
labour-displacing technologies is one premised on the idea of the value of work. Labour 
relations are not impersonal relationships that lack any aspect of human relations; work far 
exceeds notions of commerciality.188 Employment is a vital part of a person’s life and enables 
the worker to lead a better existence. Bendix argues that the employee “is not a mere factor of 
production”;189 he is a “political, social, psychological and economic being who enters the 
[employment arena from a specific personal origin] and brings with [him] all the attendant 
values and interests inherent to him”.190 
Gorz provides a different perspective on the idea of the value of work. As Peters and Zhao 
note, he argues that work is a modern invention of industrial capital and cannot be perceived 
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as being “the essence of human beings”.191 He posits, as they observe, it is “a purely functional 
activity, separate from life and […] [which has been] torn from the fabric of human 
existence”.192 For Gorz, the rationalization of work by industrial capitalism as an economic 
issue has eliminated work as a way of life into another standardised factor of industrial 
capital.193 Gorz’s observations provide a developmental record of capital’s attempt at 
‘hollowing out’ labour, however his conclusion that work consequently has ceased to define 
the human condition ought to be rejected.  Work has acquired an economic aspect that 
inextricably is linked to capital, in virtually all respects work is provided by owners of the 
means of production who acquire labour to do what they require and compensate the worker 
for his efforts. 
However, this scenario is not a validation of the contentions raised by Gorz. Labour relations 
in general and work occupy a special place in modern society. This claim resonates with the 
international community’s decision to adopt developmental goals for the next 15 years at the 
Millennium Development Summit in 2000. As part of the Millennium Development Goal 
(hereinafter referred to as “MDGs”) 1 to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger”,194 a target 
aimed at “achieving full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women 
and young people” was adopted in 2001.195 
Karnani notes that the adoption of this target was informed by the “widespread conviction that 
poverty can only be reduced if people have decent and productive jobs”.196 Work continues to 
be important to the human condition. With the MDGs period of operation ending in 2015 the 
United Nations adopted a new resolution, the Sustainable Development Goals (“Agenda 
2030”).197 Goal 8 of Agenda 2030 reiterates the same commitment in target 1B of Goal 1 of 
the MDGs.198 The general and global recognition of work as a way to combat issues of a 
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socioeconomic and psychological nature is the antithesis of Gorz’s assertions. It reinstates the 
status of work in the fabric of human existence from which he purports it has been torn. 
Work is a feature which informs social standing and economic organisation.199 Although its 
economic importance cannot be overstated and the economic dimension has grown over the 
last two centuries, it has not lost its social aspect. Bendix observes, apart from its role as a way 
of earning a living, work plays a role in the structuring of personal and social identity;200 it 
reinforces familial and social bonds and, importantly, enables the worker to access various 
essential and nonessential goods and services.201  
It characterises and enables the worker’s daily life and improves the physical and mental well-
being of the worker through the enhancement of the individual’s self-confidence and esteem 
and creates a sense of self-worth.202 Importantly, society has an interest in work. It may be 
posited that work creates a sense of personal assurance for workers in knowing or at least 
believing that they are making a positive contribution to their community.  In doing so it has 
the potential to improve their social life as well as their well-being. In addition, provided they 
enjoy the benefits of decent employment they likely will not resort to the social security 
structures of the state. 
2.4.4 Workplace Social Justice 
Much of what is central to the importance of work is closely intertwined with the concept of 
social justice in the workplace. The matter of social justice is at the core of questions about the 
role and function of labour law. Social justice has not been rigorously defined and this study 
will not attempt to do so either.203 However, it is suggested what social justice in the workplace 
entails is to be found in the features that characterise it as opposed to a dictionary definition.  
According to Van der Walt’s conceptualisation of social justice, the principle involves the 
pursuit of equality, a guarantee of human dignity in addition to socioeconomic support and 
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social uplift.204 Van der Walt derives this conception from the dictum of Yacoob J in 
Grootboom where he made the following observation: 
“The people of South Africa are committed to the attainment of social justice and the improvement 
of the quality of life for everyone. The preamble to our Constitution records this commitment. The 
Constitution declares the founding values of our society to be ‘[h]uman dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms”.205 
The ILO presents a conception of social justice similar to Van der Walt’s, and perhaps is the 
best source from which to gain an understanding of social justice. According to Van Staden, 
“the concern of the [ILO] is the pursuit of social justice”.206 The preamble to the organisation’s 
constitution states that “universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon 
social justice”.207 In the Declaration of Philadelphia it reiterated that “experience has fully 
demonstrated the truth of the statement in the Constitution of the International Labour 
Organisation that lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice”.208 
Article II of the Declaration echoes Van der Walt’s observation, and in item (a) provides that 
“all human beings […] have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual 
development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal 
opportunity”.209 Under item (c) the declaration notes that the international and national 
economic and financial policies and measures ought to be evaluated and accepted insofar as 
they contribute towards the attainment of social justice.210 
Key to social justice is the uplift of the employee in the employment relationship by offering a 
counterbalance to the powers of the respective parties in the employment relationship.  
As discussed in paragraph 2.2.1.1.2 above, there is an inherent inequality between the parties 
in an employment relationship (the employer and the employee or worker). This intrinsic 
inequality precisely is what labour law aims to correct according to Weiss, who posits that “the 
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International Law 409 (Van Staden (n 11) 101) 
207 Preamble of International Labour Organisation Constitution, 1919. 
208 Art II of Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation, 1944. 
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main goal [of labour law has] always […] been to compensate the inequality of the bargaining 
power”.211 
Davies and Freedland press the issue further, arguing that:  
“The main object of labour law has always been […] and will always be […] a countervailing 
force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be inherent 
in the employment relationship. […] It is an attempt to infuse law into a relation of command 
and subordination.”212 (emphasis added) 
Social justice in the context of labour law serves a comparable purpose in that it aims to create 
a balance, not necessarily in bargaining power, but by establishing economic parity and 
progressive social conditions.213 This view is supported by the principle of the ILO which 
informs its standards. That principle states that “labour is not a commodity”,214  emphasising 
that employees are beings with their own needs, wants and aspirations. The Future of Work 
report endorses this view, and states that “people have the right to pursue their material well-
being and spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, economic security and 
equal opportunity”.215 
The above characterisation of social justice (as well as labour law) suggests that central to this 
ideal is an economic agenda existing in and out of the workplace. It is understood not as a 
concept which obtains within the employer’s operations but as one which realises its most 
effective role in society and in the personal lives of the workers. 
As stated above, a reading of the conception of social justice as characterised by Van der Walt 
demonstrates a close similarity to that of the ILO. In the context of South Africa social justice 
is a constitutional goal, which the framers of the Constitution perceived as being central in 
building the society they envisaged. 216 The Constitution unequivocally states that it is a society 
which inter alia aims to “improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person”.217 
                                                 
211 Weiss “Re-inventing labour law?” in Davidov and Langille (eds) The Idea of Labour Law (2011) 44. 
212 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (1983) 18. 
213 Van der Walt (n 204) 254. 
214 Art I(a) of Declaration of Philadelphia; see also GCFW (n 12) 23 and 38. 
215 GCFW (n 12) 23. 
216 Preamble of Constitution (n 10). 
217 Above. 
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In attaining social justice in South African labour law and in society, Van Staden observes that 
social justice should serve as something more than “[a tool] for ideological intimidation”.218 
Labour law should have as its fundamental aim the achievement of social justice.219 He posits 
that labour law has the greatest potential in realising this constitutional goal.220 
In the context of work, social justice informs the basic character of employment law. The 
precise role of labour law is best described as balancing an unequal relationship. Instead of 
advancing the interests of commerce it aims to afford the employee a right to be treated fairly 
and provides protections in this regard. With social justice as its basic aim it ensures that the 
employee not only is treated fairly but benefits from his labour. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Employers have a right to control the size of their workforce in response to cyclical changes in 
the economy or production and in industry. Changes to industry include the introduction of 
new technologies which have the effect of rendering some jobs redundant. In dealing with 
workers that become redundant employers face the difficult decision to retrench workers. 
Normally, retrenchment has not created a serious problem, but the advent of the fourth 
industrial revolution changes the landscape. Because of the nature and scope of the changes a 
growing number of jobs are exposed to replacement by more efficient machinery (through 
automation, IoT, IIoT, AI, robotics and various forms of labour-capable software). Inevitably, 
workers are rendered redundant and on an even greater scale than before. The possibility of 
widespread and unprecedented retrenchments looms large. In order to remain actively 
employed and to avoid redundancy workers need to gain new specialised skills. The attainment 
of these skills consistently has proven evasive and only sporadically gained even in nations 
with higher levels of education than South Africa. 
Workers who fail to adapt face a real possibility of losing their livelihoods as a result of the 
introduction of new technologies in the workplace. This situation presents a dilemma since the 
loss of a job takes away more than just the job. Similarly, employers need to remain competitive 
in an increasingly globalised and technological economy if they are to remain in business. That 
being said, , work holds far greater significance in the lives of workers and their community 
than being merely a source of income,  
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Work is an important aspect in the personality and life of the worker and gives them a specific 
place in the social order.  People are less dependent on social security which, in South Africa, 
is an unsustainable system in the long-term. One should also be mindful that the Constitution 
is committed to the realisation of social justice. In a workplace context it is to be achieved 
through laws that embody this goal. It is the fundamental role of labour law to achieve social 
justice and laws should be crafted with this aim in mind.  
There is a need to balance the necessity of employers being able to continue to operate (and to 
create wealth and employment) in a highly competitive environment, as well as to protect the 
interests of workers and of society. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
Everyone in the territory of the Republic has a right to enjoy fair labour practices.221 This 
constitutional right is broad and encompasses a variety of other related entitlements that 
employees enjoy.222 In order to give effect, context and content to the right the legislature 
enacted the Labour Relations Act which regulates labour issues. In terms of the Act any person 
falling under the defined conditions (that of ‘employee’) is liable for dismissal only for a fair 
reason relating to his conduct or incapacity.223 Additionally, the worker may be dismissed for 
reasons of the employer’s operational requirements.224 These forms of dismissal are subject to 
a fair procedure before they may be effected,225 however the latter form of dismissal raises 
questions in relation to fairness and to socioeconomic and  constitutional harmony in view of 
significant developments in technology and in South African society in general.  
This chapter examines the current legislative framework regulating dismissals in South Africa, 
particularly dismissals for operational requirements by exploring the constitutional right to fair 
labour practices, legislation, as well as the interpretation of and the various approaches 
evidenced  by the country’s labour and other courts. 
3.2 The Regulatory Framework 
3.2.1 The Constitution 
The present dismissal regime in South Africa has as its basis the right to fair labour practices 
in the Constitution. The Constitution is the supreme and foundational law of the Republic and 
“law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled”.226. It entrenches a Bill of Rights, asserting that the Bill is the cornerstone of the 
democratic Republic envisaged by the Constitution.227 It affirms that the Bill of Rights is 
                                                 
221 S 23 of Constitution (n 10); the right to fair labour practices in the Constitution enjoys territorial application 
and is cannot be imposed  extra-territorially (see in general s 157 of LRA (n 17) ; Gamillscheg “Conflict of laws 
in employment contracts and industrial relations” in Blanpain and Engels (eds) Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (1993) 184 and 195 and Van Niekerk Unfair Dismissal 
(2008) 4. 
222 The right is expanded to create the right to not be subjected to unfair labour practices and the right to not be 
unfairly dismissed under the LRA (see s 185 of LRA; see also National Education Health & Allied Workers 
Union v University of Cape Town and Others 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC) 114A-B). 
223 S 188(1) of LRA (n 17); see also s 185 (n 17) LRA. 
224 S 188(1)(a)(ii) of LRA (n 17). 
225 Grogan (n 4) 166; see also s 188(1)(b). 
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applicable to all law and binds every person, whether juristic or natural, as well as the state and 
obliges the latter to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill […]”.228  Germane 
to this study is that the primary source not only for employment law but of all law in South 
Africa should inform the foundation of this exploration of South African law. 
3.2.1.1 Constitutional Labour Law 
It is from the tenets of the Constitution that the regulation of labour relations and matters 
incidental to it flow. The Constitution enshrines labour rights among many of its listed rights.229 
The rights in the Bill of Rights are understood within the existing scheme of rights and 
principles which inform and give content to all other rights, including section 23 in the Bill.230 
The section of the Bill dealing with labour rights reads in part as follows: 
(1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
(2) […] 
(3) […] 
(4) […] 
(5) Every trade union, employers’ organisation and employer has the right to engage in 
collective bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining. 
To the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the limitation must 
comply with section 36(1). 
(6) National legislation may recognise union security arrangements contained in collective 
agreements. To the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the limitation 
must comply with section 36(1). 
Subsection 1 in sec. 23 of the Bill of Rights provides that “[e]veryone has a right to fair labour 
practices”.231 The right in a South African context has its genesis in the unfair labour practice 
jurisprudence that was developed by the erstwhile Industrial Court and the Labour Appeal 
Court.232 Similar to the amorphous unfair labour practice jurisdiction which forms the 
foundation therefor, the right to fair labour practices sits awkwardly in the Bill of Rights. The 
South African Constitution is one of only two specifically to recognise and entrench this 
                                                 
228 See ss 8(1)-(4) of Constitution (n 10). 
229 S 23 of Constitution (n 10). 
230 Du Toit, Godfrey, Cooper, Giles, Cohen, Conradie and Steenkamp Labour Relations Law: a Comprehensive 
Guide (2015) 74. 
231 S 23(1) of Constitution (n 10). 
232 Much of the principles that were developed under the former LRA of 1956 have been subsumed under the 
LRA (NEHAWU v UCT (n 222) 111A-B; see also Du Toit et al (n 230) 33. 
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right.233 According to Cheadle, the cause  is  that the documents founding the right, the 
Constitution and the LRA, were “[b]orn of political compromise, their conceptual coherence 
and structure often distorted and disfigured by the vagaries of faction and the vicissitudes of 
negotiation”.234 Thus,  the right has a significantly political character and the process of its 
adoption, as observed by Cheadle and Basson, seems to reflect this.235 Nonetheless, the right 
remains broad and what it entails is yet to be fully settled. However, over the past two decades 
it has acquired meaning and character through the decisions of the courts and through practice. 
3.2.1.2 What is Meant by’ Everyone’? 
Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. For Cooper this is a broadly encompassing right 
covering a broader spectrum of individuals in work-like situations.236 She notes that a generous 
reading of the term embraces even those individuals who are “on the margins of employment 
relationships, including those in employee-like relationships”.237 However, her conception of 
the term is curtailed by the observation of the Constitutional Court in NEHAWU v UCT where 
the Court held that the right “broadly speaking” covers workers in an employer-employee 
relationship.238 Despite critiquing the court for “embedding the sec. 23 right within 
employment relationships”, Cooper suggests that by its mention of “broadly speaking” the 
Constitutional Court is open to the possibility that the scope of the right remains as she suggests 
flexible and wide enough to cover the workers she refers to above.239  
Cheadle, on the other hand, seems to reject the sort of characterisation of the right as advocated 
by Cooper above. In his view the right does not apply to every individual who does work for 
or with another person (that is, persons in work-like situations or in similar relationships).240 
He notes that individual workers such as independent contractors, magistrates, judges and 
members of parliament have been found to fall outside the ambit of the term,241 rather, in order 
                                                 
233 At the time of its adoption the South African Constitution alone provided for a right to fair labour practices. 
One other country, Malawi, has since moved to constitutionalise the right in its constitution as well (NEHAWU v 
UCT (n 222) 110GH) see also Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 
(2019) 18-11. and s 31 of (1) of Constitution of Malawi). 
234 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom (n 222) 18-12. 
235 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom (n 222) 18-12; see also Basson et al (n 73) 8. 
236 Cooper “Labour relations” in Woolman and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa (2013) 3921. 
237 Cooper (n 236) 3922. 
238 NEHAWU v UCT (n 222) 113A-C. 
239 Cooper (n 236) 3922. 
240 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom (n 222) 18-12. 
241 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom (n 222) 18-12; In Miskey and Khanyile, respectively, the Labour Court held that 
members of a statutory body were not employees, as well as judges and magistrates (see also Miskey v Others v 
Maritz NO & Others 2007 28 ILJ 661 (LC) 667I-J and Khanyile v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & 
Arbitration 2004 25 ILJ 2348 (LC) 2355F-H). 
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to enjoy protection, the existence of “the employment nexus is fundamental”.242 In his view 
labour practices are founded on the existence of mutual interests between the employer and the 
worker.243 If the alleged practices emanate from a relationship that is not between an employer 
and a worker, the practice cannot be said to be an unfair labour practice and protection under 
sec. 23(1) cannot be claimed.244 In respect of situations in where a person entitled to the 
protection of the right under the Constitution is curtailed through a misrepresentation of the 
true state of affairs, it would appear that the courts and legislation are equipped to deal with 
such eventualities.245 
Cheadle’s restricted conception of the right is open to debate. Despite accepting that “[t]he 
section [23(1) right ] refers to ‘everyone’ having the right” and asserting that “its purpose is to 
protect persons from unfair labour practices that originated in an employer-employee 
relationship”,246 the Constitutional Court in Pretorius v Transport Pension Fund notes that 
contemporary trends in the labour market show the need for a broader view of the right. At 
paragraph 48 the Court takes cognizance of this trend, stating:247 
“More and more people find themselves in the “twilight zone” of employment as supposed 
“independent contractors” in time-based employment subject to faceless multinational 
companies who may operate from a web presence. […] [T]he LRA tabulated the fair labour 
practice rights of only those enjoying the benefit of formal employment […].  Though the facts 
of this case do not involve these considerations, they provide a compelling basis not to restrict 
the protection of section 23 to only those who have contracts of employment.” 
Even before Pretorius v Transport Pension Fund the view that the perimeters of the right were 
broad was prevalent. The scope of the right is broad enough to cover different types of work-
like situations, including those tainted by turpitude.248 This is evident in the decision of the 
Labour Appeal Court (“LAC”) in Kylie v CCMA.249 In casu the appellant, a sex worker, was 
dismissed by her employer, a massage parlour which had acquired her services.250 She referred 
the matter to the CCMA but the commissioner refused to adjudicate on the matter claiming a 
lack of jurisdiction and citing that the employment contract was unenforceable as it was 
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intended to achieve an unlawful end.251 The matter was taken on review to the Labour Court 
which despite holding that the definition of employee in the LRA was broad enough to include 
unenforceable contracts, decided that the appellant could not have been unfairly dismissed 
owing to the illegality of her employment contract.252 The case finally made its way to the 
LAC. Before the Court the appellant argued that the question of illegality was irrelevant at first 
instance as the primary question to be answered was whether she enjoyed sec. 23 protection.253 
In responding to the appellant’s contention, Davis AJ held as follows:254 
“Taken together these arguments support a generous approach to the range of beneficiaries of 
rights provided for in terms of s 23(1). [..]. In summary, as sex workers cannot be stripped of 
the right to be treated with dignity by their clients, it must follow that, in their other relationship, 
namely with their employers, the same protection should hold. Once it is recognized that they 
must be treated with dignity not only by their customers but by their employers, s 23 of the 
Constitution, which, at its core, protects the dignity of those in an employment relationship, 
should also be of application.” 
The LAC established that the right to fair labour practices was broad and general and that by 
granting it to ‘everyone’ the Constitution intended it to be afforded even to those who break 
the law.255 In such instances the question whether a person engaging in illegal work ought to 
be protected from an unfair dismissal is a secondary issue.256 What is clear is that the right is 
broad and general and its beneficiaries, many. This understanding of the term is reinforced by 
the view expressed by the Constitutional Court in Pretorius v Transport Trust Fund, above.257 
In addition, the view seems to accord with Cooper’s suggestion as to the broadness of the right. 
In noting that changing trends in the labour market may be reason enough not to restrict the 
scope of the right, the Court essentially accepts the idea that the right may encompass people 
in atypical work-like situations rather than merely covering those who are recognised through 
employment contracts and codes as falling within the scope of conventional employment 
relationships. 
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3.2.2 The Labour Relations Act 
3.2.2.1 Understanding the LRA 
Whereas the right to fair labour practices in the Bill of Rights is broad and all-encompassing, 
it is more restricted in the Labour Relations Act. The Act specifically excludes certain workers 
and according to Cheadle is designed to apply largely to workers who fall in the scope of formal 
employment.258 The LRA was enacted to give effect and content to the labour rights clause of 
the Constitution in terms of subsections 5 and 6 in sec. 23. 
Section 1 of the LRA provides that the purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic 
development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by 
fulfilling the primary objects of this Act”, which are in part:259  
(a) to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of the Constitution; 
(b) to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International 
Labour Organisation; 
(c) […] 
(d) to promote – 
(i)  orderly collective bargaining; 
(ii) collective bargaining at a sectoral level; 
(iii) employee participation in decision-making in the workplace; and 
(iv) the effective resolution of labour disputes” (emphasis added). 
Further, in section 3 it stipulates, in no particular order, that any person applying the Act must 
interpret its provisions in compliance with the Constitution260 as well as with South Africa’s 
public international law obligations,261 and to do so in order to give effect to its primary 
objectives.262 
3.2.2.2 Interpreting the LRA 
 To appropriately evaluate the interpretation of the LRA by the courts it is important to 
appreciate the interpretative tools upon which the courts rely in order to arrive at the 
conclusions that this study aims to consider. In addition, one cannot purport to criticise that 
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which he has not identified and understood. Therefore, it is pertinent to this study for one to 
explore the approach to interpretation of the LRA and that of related employment laws 
employed by the courts. This exploration is important because inevitably it will shape and 
position the lens through which this study aims to evaluate the LRA (that lens being social 
justice). 
From the outset section 3(a) read with section 1(a) above imposes a particular manner of 
understating the Act when interpreting and applying its provisions.263 This is a departure from 
the pre-democratic literal approach to interpretation of statutes which was favoured by South 
African courts.264 This literal theory of interpretation purported to “give words their true 
meaning”.265 According to Devenish, such a meaning is to be found in the precise or exact 
words (so-called ‘ipsissima verba’) of the legislature,266 which may prove an arduous if not 
impossible task. The general idea behind this approach is that words ought to be given their 
ordinary grammatical meaning.267 As Devenish observes words have varying meanings and 
which to apply often is influenced by the judge interpreting the statute at the time.268 Quoting 
Singer, he argues that the literal theory may give rise to “reflexive judicial construction arrived 
at conclusively by considering the language of the statute on the basis of the judges’ own 
perceived impressions as to what language means, without regard to the purpose of the act and 
other aids to interpretation”.269 The literal theory causes problems by trying to infer the 
unknowable intention of the legislature in interpreting statutes. The approach has been derided 
as primitive, absurd and outdated.270 
The LRA discards the literal approach and requires an inquiry into the purpose of the Act when 
its provisions are to be construed.271 This theory of interpretation, which Devenish refers to as 
the purposive theory, is not bound by  judicial inference of a fictional intention of the legislature 
but “requires that the interpretation should not [rely only] on the literal meaning of words 
                                                 
263 According to Du Toit et al, the “interpretation clauses effectively jettison the orthodox ‘literalist-cum-
intentionalist’ approach to statutory interpretation and require instead an explicitly purposive […] approach” 
(Du Toit et al (n 230) 79). 
264 Smalberger JA in Public Carriers Association asserted that “the literal interpretation principle is firmly 
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according to […] grammatical analysis”. Importantly, one should seek not the mischief that the 
legislature purportedly intended to address but that which the legislation and other aids aim to 
cure. The effect of imposing a purpose-seeking interpretation ensures that whoever is 
responsible for interpreting and applying the Act does not ignore its purpose in order to achieve 
his own preferred understanding. Instead, he must seek to give effect, collaboratively, to the 
Constitution, the international law obligations of the country and the primary objectives of the 
LRA. As to whether the LRA asserts its preferred interpretation tool in section 3 when applying 
and interpreting its provisions, NEHAWU v UCT is instructive. The Constitutional Court 
affirmed:272 
“The declared purpose of the LRA ‘is to advance economic development, social justice, labour 
peace and the democratisation of the workplace.’ This is to be achieved by fulfilling its primary 
objects which includes giving effect to section 23 of the Constitution. It lays down the 
parameters of its interpretation by [requiring its interpretation to be] in compliance with the 
Constitution and South Africa’s international obligations. The LRA must therefore be 
purposively construed in order to give effect to the Constitution. This is the approach that has 
been adopted by the LAC and the Labour Court in construing the LRA.” 
The LAC, nevertheless, cautions against the misinterpretation of the provision through the 
purposive approach. According to the court, “[t]he exhortation to interpret the section in a 
purposive manner cannot be faulted”,273 however sec. 3 should not be confused as providing 
an invitation for persons interpreting the Act to do so in a manner that may be extensive or 
liberal.274 In some cases a restrictive interpretation better effectuates the purposes stated in 
section 1(a). If such a situation arises in a matter, a restrictive interpretation is preferred.275 In 
other circumstances the ordinary and unambiguous meaning in the provisions of the LRA, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in SAA v AUSA seemingly cautioned, should not be slanted and 
misconstrued by reliance on the purposive approach.276 Notwithstanding, the minority opinion 
                                                 
272 NEHAWU v UCT (n 222) 113D-E and 114A; the Constitutional Court has referred to this passage with 
approval on a number of occasions and most recently in Assign Services noting that “it is trite that legislation 
must be interpreted textually, contextually and purposively” (see Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA & others (Casual Workers Advice Office as Amicus Curiae) 2018 39 ILJ 1911 (LC) 1920F-
H). 
273 Business South Africa v Congress of South African Trade Unions & others 1997 18 ILJ 474 (LAC) 479A. 
274 Business SA v COSATU (n 273) 479A-B. 
275 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & others 2008 29 ILJ 73 (CC) 109C-D; see also Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta 
Sanitary Ware v National Construction Building & Allied Workers Union (2) 1997 18 ILJ 671 (LAC) 675G-H  
and Du Toit et al (n 230) 81. 
276 While the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal was overturned in the subsequent appeal this line 
followed by the court was not impugned or set aside by the Constitutional Court (see SA Airways (Pty) Ltd v 
Aviation Union of SA & others 2011 32 ILJ 87 (SCA) 8F-G and Aviation Union of SA & another v SA Airways 
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in AUSA v SAA is compelling; Jafta J emphasises the role of the purposive approach in the 
contextualisation and interpretation of the provisions, holding that to “[determine] the 
operation of the section with reference to a single word is not the correct approach to its 
interpretation. The whole section must be read in its proper context. [The section must be read] 
[…] as a whole in the context of where it is located in the LRA and [one must pay] […] 
sufficient attention to its purpose and the objects of the LRA”.277 
The LRA lays the foundation for understanding its provisions. As does the socioeconomic right 
which informs its enactment,278 the Act provides a basis upon which labour relations and labour 
rights in South Africa ought to be understood and developed.279 In the continuing interpretation 
and development of these rights it places an obligation on persons interpreting and applying its 
provisions to give effect to its purposes. These purposes are to advance economic development, 
social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace.280 Importantly, one is 
required to give effect not only to a single purpose but to all these purposes whenever the Act’s 
provisions are interpreted and applied.281 To prefer one above the others, it is submitted, is to 
fail to match the standard set by the Act. The sec. 3 requirement that its primary objects be 
effectuated is not merely a textual option that is available to the court in interpreting its 
provisions.282 The objects must inform the process of interpretation and its provision must be 
read with reference to the objects.283 In so doing each of the purposes exists in conjunction with 
the others.284 Consequently, if one is to construe the provisions of the LRA in order to realise, 
for example, a purpose of advancing economic development that construction must have the 
effect of advancing the other objects. 
This requirement inevitably raises a problematic issue in circumstances where an interpretation 
in accomplishing one purpose falls short of achieving one or more other purposes. In these 
situations, must an interpretation, despite its nonconformity with the views expressed by the 
courts above, be interpreted as competent or acceptable? As becomes apparent in the 
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subsequent discussion it may be possible that interpretations advanced by the courts while 
effecting one purpose may not be capable of being construed as giving effect to one or more of 
the other purposes. This situation raises questions about what justifications exist for continuing 
with interpretations that appear to support the disenfranchisement of certain beneficiaries of 
protections offered by the Act. 
3.2.2.3 Chapter VIII 
Sec 23(1) of the Constitution which grants the wide and general right to fair labour practices is 
given effect under Chapter VIII of the LRA.285 This section of the Act deals with issues relating 
to unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices.286 Many  of the developments by the Industrial 
Court under its unfair labour practice jurisdiction are collated in Chapter VIII and a separate 
right not to be unfairly dismissed is granted along with one which protects workers from being 
subjected to unfair labour practices.287 The Constitution neither mentions nor specifies 
anything about unfair dismissal, but the right not to be unfairly dismissed in the LRA, 
nevertheless, flows directly from the constitutional right to fair labour practices.288 
However, the rights under this chapter have a restricted class of beneficiaries to whom they 
apply. Whereas the Constitution grants “everyone” the right to fair labour practices,289 sec 185 
of the LRA provides only for employees.290 Essentially, in order to rely on the protections 
afforded under the LRA, one must fall within the definitional boundary of ‘employee’ as 
defined in the Act.291 Section 213 of the Act explains this concept and states that an employee 
is:292 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or 
for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and 
(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer. 
                                                 
285 The section provides for rights of employees against unfair labour practices and unfair dismissals (see s 23(1) 
of Constitution (n 10); see generally s 185 to 197B of LRA (n 17). 
286 Above. 
287 Van Jaarsveld, Bakker, Dekker, Lew Roux, Olivier, Prinsloo, Smit Principles and Practice of Labour Law 
(2018) par 855; see also s 185 of LRA (n 17) and Grogan Dismissal (2017) 478. 
288 NEHAWU v UCT (n 222) 114A-B. 
289 S 23(1) of Constitution (n 10); see also Kylie v CCMA (n 249) 1608F-I. 
290 Pretorius v Transport Pension Fund (n 246) 1950F-H; see also s 2 and 200A of LRA (n 10), Grogan (n 4) 16 
and Van Niekerk (n 221) 6. 
291 Van Niekerk (n 221) 18. 
292 S 213 of LRA (n 17). 
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“Employment” and “employed” are said to have a comparable meaning to “employee” as 
defined in the Act.293 
That sec 185(1) deliberately confers these rights on employees is not by accident. The question 
of whether or not one is an employee is important as it forms the basis of any dispute about 
unfair labour practices or dismissals. The LAC ruled in this respect that whether or not a person 
is an employee is “a jurisdictional fact that must be determined, in the event of a dispute, by a 
competent court”.294 The question is important because the concepts of dismissal and unfair 
labour practice rely on the existence of an employer-employee relationship.295 For one, an 
independent contractor explicitly excluded from the definition of employee by sec. 213 cannot, 
for example, purport to leave the employ of an employer.296 The relationship between the 
parties is not founded on an existent employment relationship.297 This person is incapable of 
being dismissed or being subjected to unfair labour practices within the scope of the definition 
in the Act. Consequently, the existence of an employment relationship between the parties is 
fundamental to reliance upon the protective scope of the LRA.298 
3.3 Dismissal Under the LRA 
3.3.1 Right to Not Be Unfairly Dismissed 
Sec, 185(a) provides that every employee has a right not to be unfairly dismissed.299 It does not 
mean that the employee is protected from being dismissed. On the contrary the employee has 
no protection against dismissal.300 As noted in par 2.2.1.1.3 above, there is nothing amiss with 
the concept of dismissal. Discipline, production efficiency, economic survival or even business 
efficacy in one way or another, rely on the power of the employer to bring an employment 
relationship(s) to an end. In respect of discipline in the workplace Grogan effectively asserts 
                                                 
293 Above. 
294 Vermooten v Department of Public Enterprises & others 2017 38 ILJ 607 (LAC) 609I-J; see also Van 
Niekerk (n 221) 3, 17 and 18. 
295 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom (n 222) 18-13; see also Du Toit et al (n 230) 426, Van Jaarsveld et al (n 287) par 
64 and Van Niekerk (n 221) 18. 
296 S 213 of LRA (n 10). 
297 S 213 of LRA (n 10). 
298 While there are many different types of employment relationships, an exploration falls beyond the scope of 
this study. Suffice to say, however, that these relationships include both traditional formally employed workers 
as well as those termed ‘atypical’ workers such as seasonal workers, temporary employees, home workers, tele-
workers and casual workers (see Van Niekerk (n 221) 6). 
299 S 185(a) of LRA (n 17). 
300 The wording of s 185(a) provides guidance in this regard: the provision refers not to “a right to not be 
dismissed” but instead prefaces “dismissed” with “unfairly”. The Act is merely cognisant of the fact that the 
employer may dismiss and thus requires that such dismissal be fair (s 185(a) of LRA (n 17); Grogan argues that 
the LRA “does not confer on employees a right not to be dismissed, but only not to be unfairly dismissed” (see 
also Grogan (n 4) 166 and Van Niekerk (n 221) 32). 
48 
 
that the right to “prescribe standards of conduct for the workplace and to initiate disciplinary 
steps against transgressors is one of the most jealously guarded territories of managers 
everywhere”.301 This right to prescribe ‘standards of conduct’ forms part of the broader 
managerial prerogative which, according to Bendix, includes the natural right of employers to 
control the size of their workforce and to respond to changes in business in order to safeguard 
its welfare.302 
The provisions of the LRA aim to give effect to the right to fair labour practices which the 
Constitutional Court has stated applies to both employee and employer and must be construed 
in a manner that is fair to both.303 The court noted that “in giving content to that right” one 
should always be cognisant of the normal inherent tensions that exist between employer and 
employee and must “[take] care to accommodate, where possible, these interests so as to arrive 
at the balance required by the concept of unfair labour practice”.304 It proceeds and notes that 
is in light of these pendular interests of both parties that the LRA must be construed.305 
It may be accepted that provisions entitling the employee the right not to be unfairly dismissed 
extend to the corresponding interest of employers to terminate employment for a fair reason. 
In deciding whether the conduct of either party accords with fairness same should be deduced 
from the respective perspectives of either party. 
It is implausible the LRA grants an employee protection against unfair dismissal without an 
employer’s ability to effect dismissal. In its wording the LRA gives effect to the fair labour 
practice rights of the employer. The Act refers to an employee’s right ‘not to be unfairly 
dismissed’ and not to a right ‘not to be dismissed’. 
Sec. 185(a) is not intended to protect an employee from being dismissed. Instead, it is designed 
to curtail the right of the employer to dismiss, requiring that a dismissal not be effectuated for 
reasons that are arbitrary or unfair.306 In circumstances where an employer terminates 
employment for reasons that do not accord with fairness sec. 185(a) exists to shield the 
employee. 
 
                                                 
301 Grogan (n 4) 127. 
302 Bendix (n 97) 336. 
303 NEHAWU v UCT (n 222) 113A-B. 
304 NEHAWU v UCT (n 222) 113B-C. 
305 NEHAWU v UCT (n 222) 113C. 
306 See explanation above (n 300); see also S 185(a) of LRA (n 17) and Grogan (n 4) 166. 
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3.3.2 Unfair Dismissals 
The scheme of provisions in the LRA dealing with dismissals is found primarily in Chapter 
VIII read in conjunction with the relevant codes on dismissals promulgated in terms of the Act. 
The LRA identifies two general categories of dismissals. The Act specifies dismissals which if 
and when carried out by an employer are impugned as without a doubt unfair, unless (and this 
is restricted to one or two exceptions) certain conditions are satisfied.307 Sec. 187 lists these 
reasons for dismissal which are considered to be incapable of justification under any 
circumstances.308 It provides that a dismissal automatically is unfair if, when carrying out such 
a dismissal, the employer violates the protection against discrimination (aimed especially at 
protecting the right to freedom of association) specifically provided for in sec. 5 of the Act.309 
A dismissal, it further stipulates, also automatically is unfair if the reason advanced was 
motivated, among others, by the pregnancy or intended pregnancy of an employee,310 the 
exercise of rights by the employee in terms of the Act,311 participation, support or intended 
participation in a protest action312 or strike or such a dismissal results from the unfair 
discrimination of the employee directly or indirectly, which discrimination is founded on the 
basis of various prohibited and arbitrary grounds including, inter alia disability, sexual 
orientation, religion, age, political opinion, gender or sex.313 
The latter reason (that of discrimination based on prohibited grounds), is qualified by the 
consideration that a dismissal that may be discriminatory under that section will not be unfair 
if it can be justified by the inherent job requirements of that particular occupation.314 With 
regard to discrimination informed by the age of the employee, sec. 187(2)(b) provides that such 
discrimination will not be unfair if such distinction is made against someone who has reached 
either a normal or an agreed age of retirement.315 
As established above, the fact that employees are protected from being subjected to unfair 
dismissals under sec. 185 in itself does not mean that employees are impervious to discipline, 
                                                 
307 These are known as automatically unfair dismissals (s 187 of LRA (n 17)); see also Grogan (n 4) 166 and 
Van Niekerk (n 221) 33. 
308 Van Niekerk (n 221) 33; see also Du Toit et al (n 230) 433 and Grogan (n 4) 166- 167. 
309 S 187(1) of LRA (n 17); see also Van Niekerk (n 221) 34, Du Toit et al (n 230) 433 and Grogan (n 4) 166. 
310 S 187(1)(e) of LRA (n 17). 
311 S 187(1)(d) of LRA (n 17). 
312 S 187(1)(a) of LRA (n 17). 
313 S 187(1)(f) of LRA (n 17). 
314 S 187(2)(a) of LRA (n 17). 
315 S 187(2)(b) of LRA (n 17). 
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scrutiny or, in some cases, decision in the employer’s interest for business efficacy.316 Although 
an employer has the power, if not a right, to end the employment relationship with an 
employee,317 the Act restricts this right to three strictly defined grounds upon which such an 
exercise must be justified. A dismissal that falls outside these three grounds cannot be justified 
and therefore is unfair.318 These said categories of permissible dismissal are found under sec. 
188 of the LRA which reads: 
(1) “A dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove – 
(a)  that the reason for dismissal is a fair reason – 
(i) related to the employee’s conduct or capacity; or 
(ii) based on the employer’s operational requirements; and 
(a) that the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure.”319 
Sec. 188 prescribes that a dismissal should be effected only for a fair reason(s). The  reasons 
refer to the grounds relied upon by the employer to terminate employment (it is also the only 
way to determine the true reason for dismissal).320 The question in this situation involves 
determining whether an employer has a basis for carrying out a dismissal and, in the 
circumstances, whether dismissing an employee is the appropriate sanction.321 This is a 
question of substantive fairness. An employer contemplating a dismissal, in the first place is 
mandated to prove that the decision to dismiss was justified and made on the basis of sound 
reasons.322 If the LRA did not require that dismissals be justified on the basis of a fair reason 
(as was the case in the past), there cannot possibly be a question of unfairness. Also, it would 
render the right not to be unfairly dismissed essentially superfluous. 
It is not sufficient for a right merely to be based on a fair reason. The process leading up to the 
decision to terminate employment must be fair as well. A dismissal may be based on a sound 
reason but is found wanting in procedural fairness. Notwithstanding substantive fairness, the 
                                                 
316 Which are according to Grogan and Bendix, essential aspects of the managerial prerogative (see Grogan (n 4) 
127 and Bendix (n 97) 336); see also Grogan (n 4) 166. 
317 The LRA does not prohibit an employer from dismissing employees, it merely requires that such dismissal is 
fair (see explanation above (n 300)). 
318 An employee may be dismissed for other reasons such as incompatibility and insolvency, however, a 
discussion of these aspects falls beyond the scope of this study (for a discussion of incompatibility see Du Toit 
et al (n 230) 469). 
319 S 188(1) of LRA (n 17). 
320 Grogan notes in this respect that “[n]o dismissal can be for a valid reason unless it is related to the 
employee’s conduct or capacity, or the employer’s operational requirements” (see Grogan (n 4) 166; see also 
Van Niekerk (n 221) 48). 
321 See Item 2(4), 7(b)(iv) and 9(b)(ii) of Sch 8 of LRA (n 17). 
322 See Grogan (n 4) 166; see also Van Niekerk (n 221) 48. 
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dismissal will nevertheless be found to be unfair if the standard of procedural fairness is not 
met.323 The idea behind this requirement is that a dismissal can be fair only if the employee has 
an opportunity to defend himself against the allegations levelled against him.324 The 
requirement is not optional and is325 found in sec. 188(1)(b) which requires that a dismissal be 
effected in accordance with a fair procedure.326 Each form of dismissal has its unique principles 
that give effect to a fair procedure and which must be complied with. 
3.3.3 Forms of Dismissal 
In terms of sec. 185(1)(a)(i) an employer is permitted to dismiss an employee “for a fair reason 
related to the employee’s conduct or capacity”.327 Sec. 188(1)(ii) provides that an employer is 
permitted to dismiss an employee on the basis of his operational requirements.328 The first two 
grounds of dismissal (misconduct and incapacity) are briefly and generally discussed below. It 
should be noted that the following discussion will not describe these grounds beyond a general 
definition; aspects which relate to the determination of fairness will not be discussed.329 
3.3.3.1 Dismissal for Reasons Based on Conduct and Capacity 
Misconduct implies the behaviour of the employee over which the employee has control. 330 
To justify a dismissal on the basis of the conduct of an employee, the employee must have 
conducted himself in a manner that is contrary to the interests of the continuance of the 
employment relationship.331 This conduct usually is a result of the violation of a workplace 
standard of discipline or code of conduct or breach of a material term in the contract of 
employment.332 The reason for dismissing an employee for misconduct broadly represents the 
“legitimate loss of trust in an employee” resulting from one or more episodes “demonstrating 
                                                 
323 See Grogan (n 4) 168. 
324 Item 4(1) Sch 8 of LRA (n 17); see also Cohen “Procedurally fair dismissals – losing the plot?” 2005 South 
African Mercantile Law Journal 32 35. 
325 The Labour Court in SABC v CCMA held as follows as regard giving effect to a fair dismissal “[t]he failure 
to correctly categorise should not however detract from the appropriate inquiry in each case, namely, to assess 
[…] whether there was a substantively fair reason for dismissal and […] whether an appropriate and fair 
procedure was followed by the employer” (SABC v CCMA & Others 2006 6 BLLR 587 (LC) 591H-I); see also 
Grogan (n 287) 122 and 123. 
326 S 188(1)(b) of LRA (n 17). 
327 S 185(1)(a)(i) of LRA (n 17). 
328 S 185(1)(a)(i) of LRA (n 17). 
329 This is due to the restricted focus of this dissertation which is the dismissal ground of employer’s operational 
requirements. 
330 Grogan (n 287) 213; see also Grogan (n 4) 167. 
331 Grogan (n 287) 212; see also Grogan (n 4) 206. 
332 Item 7(a) of Sch 8 of LRA (n 17); see also Grogan (n 4) 206, Grogan (n 287) 212, and Van Niekerk (n 221) 
56. 
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[untrustworthiness] on the part of [an] employee”.333 Misconduct relates to the employee, 
whether intentionally or negligently, conducting himself in a manner which brings or justifies 
the bringing by the employer of the employment relationship to an end.334 Throughout the 
subsistence of the impugned conduct the employee has control over his conduct and may be 
held to account.335 
Unlike a dismissal for misconduct, an employee dismissed for incapacity is dismissed for 
reasons beyond his control.336 Incapacity relates to the employee’s inability to perform to the 
standard required by the employer.337 It is a failure to carry out the tasks that the employee is 
expected to perform. As is the case in retrenchment, it is a faultless dismissal.338 The employee 
neither intentionally nor negligently abandons his work, simply he is unable to discharge his 
duties as required by the employer.339 The dismissal for incapacity is subdivided into incapacity 
due to injury, illness and/or disability and incapacity due to poor work performance, which will 
not be discussed further.340 
The other ground for a valid dismissal under the LRA is one based on the operational 
requirements of the employer. It is discussed in detail in Chapter 4 below. 
  
                                                 
333 Du Toit et al (n 230) 442. 
334 Grogan (n 287) 212. 
335 Grogan (n 287) 213; see also Grogan (n 4) 167. 
336 Grogan (n 287) 213 and 443; see also Grogan (n 4) 275. 
337 Chesteron Industries (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & Others 2009 30 
ILJ 888 (LC) 892B; see also Grogan (n 287) 443. 
338 Grogan (n 287) 213 and 443; see also Grogan (n 4) 275 and Van Niekerk (n 221) 68. 
339 According to Grogan, employers are entitled to set standards of work performance of both a qualitative and 
quantitative nature and to expect reasonable performance as against them from their employees (see Grogan (n 
313) 443). 
340 Grogan (n 287) 444; see also Grogan (n 4) 275 and Du Toit et al (n 230) 462. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISMISSAL FOR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
4.1 Introduction 
Under the LRA an employer may dismiss an employee for reasons of misconduct or incapacity. 
In addition to these grounds a worker may be dismissed based on the employer’s operational 
requirements.341 These forms of dismissal are subject to a fair procedure before they may be 
effected342 however the latter form of dismissal raises questions of fairness as well as of 
socioeconomic and even constitutional harmony in view of significant developments in 
technology and in South African society in general.  
This chapter examines the dismissals for operational requirements regime in South Africa and 
explores the interpretations of and the various approaches by the country’s labour and other 
courts. Analysis is guided by the interpretative guidance discussed in Chapter 3 as well as 
through the lens of social justice as conceptualised in Chapter 2. The aim in this chapter is to 
identify the strengths and flaws in the interpretations of the operational requirements provision. 
The LRA makes separate provisions for individual and collective dismissals for operational 
requirements. However, since 2014 the differentiation between these two types of 
retrenchments has been removed and the exploration of a sec. 189 dismissal should be 
interpreted as being equally applicable to a sec. 189A dismissal. 
4.2 Dismissal for Operational Requirements 
The third ground stipulated in the LRA under sec. 188(1)(a)(ii) is the dismissal based on the 
operational requirements of the employer.343 This form of dismissal is fleshed out in sec. 189 
and 189A (for large-scale retrenchments) read with sec. 192 of the Act. The employer’s 
‘operational requirements’ perhaps are the most common of the grounds for terminating the 
employment relationship.344 This form of dismissal is different from the grounds of conduct 
and capacity above in that, in general, it does not concern itself with the personality of the 
                                                 
341 S 188(1)(a)(ii) of LRA (n 17). 
342 Grogan (n 4) 166; see also s 188(1)(b). 
343 S 188(1)(a)(ii) of LRA (n 17). 
344 This is because, due to the nature of this ground, virtually every reason, including those prohibited under s 
187 of the LRA, are capable of justification as operational requirement of the employer; see also Grogan (n 287) 
477. 
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employee.345 The employer does not inquire into the behaviour, abilities or conduct of the 
employee or any failure to perform any duty attaching to the employee’s occupation.346 
Such an inquiry is unnecessary as the basis for dismissing for operational requirements, in 
general, has little to do with the employee or anything related thereto.347 The employee is not 
responsible and need not be the cause for the reason behind the termination of employment.348 
The Retrenchment Code accepts this characterisation and states: 
“[d]ismissals for operational requirements have been categorised as “no fault” dismissals. In 
other words, it is not the employee who is responsible for the termination of employment.”349 
It states further: 
“Because retrenchment is a “no fault” dismissal and because of its human cost, the Act places 
particular obligations on an employer, most of which are directed toward ensuring that all 
possible alternatives to dismissal are explored and that the employees to be dismissed are 
treated fairly.”350 
Because operational requirements are not motivated by the actions or issues related to the 
employee the LRA places a stringent standard to be met by the employer.351 This standard is 
adopted in view of the negative social impact that the dismissal of this nature can have; the 
“human cost” referred to in the Retrenchment Code.352 In addition,  it is due to the premium 
the Act places on job security.353 A more permissive standard certainly would fail to ensure 
that employees’ security of employment at the very least is considered. 
                                                 
345 Van Niekerk in this regard writes “[in these circumstances, it is the employer’s exigencies rather than any act 
or omission on the part of the employee that is the proximate cause of the termination of employment” (Van 
Niekerk (n 221) 84; see also Item 1 of Retrenchment Code (n 135); definition of operational requirements (s 213 
of LRA (n 17)), Grogan (n 4) 295 and Le Roux (n 95) 31. 
346 Above. 
347 Le Roux (n 95) 31. 
348 Above. 
349 Item 2 of Retrenchment Code (n 135). 
350 Above. 
351 See Grogan (n 4) 295. 
352 Cheadle best describes this so-called ‘human cost’ when comparing the contending interests of the employer 
to “remain economically viable and [those of the employees] to retain their jobs in order to keep themselves and 
their families alive” (Cheadle “Retrenchment” in Brassey et al (n 78) 279); see also Item 2 of Retrenchment 
Code (n 135) and Grogan (n 4) 295. 
353 Van Niekerk notes that the existence of the unfair dismissal laws under the LRA is to confer employees with 
a right to work security as there is a “recognition that, for most employees, [the] contract of employment 
provides limited rights to work security” (Van Niekerk (n 221) 1); the courts have expressed the view that the 
Act is aimed at preserving jobs and where this is not possible that a fair procedure at least is followed (See 
Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) 2431A; see also Ndhlela 
v Sita Information Networking Computing BV (Incorporated in the Netherlands) 2014 35 ILJ 2236 (LC) 
2246A). 
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As a faultless dismissal primarily it is driven by factors that arise as a result of the daily conduct 
of business in a changing world of commerce.354 It may arise, for example, as a result of an 
employer experiencing financial or economic problems that inflict changes to the employer’s 
finances or even the employees’ work conditions.355 This may happen in circumstances where 
due to poor sales or as a consequence of ‘tough’ competition the business of the employer is 
faced with financial difficulties.356 In some instances an employer may need to restructure the 
business or scale down in order to reduce costs.357 
Although not a new development but more common today employers may introduce new 
technology in the workplace, perhaps with the view that doing so will reduce the costs of 
production or the headcount or keep the business competitive in today’s globalised economy.358 
However, it may result in new skills being required or certain tasks being eliminated or 
combined. The consequence may be that certain employees as a result become surplus to 
requirements. Whatever the reasons, these changes will likely necessitate the retrenchment of 
employees or the amendment of the terms and conditions of their employment or both. 
The LRA requires that a dismissal not only be justified by a fair and adequate reason but also 
be procedurally fair.359 These requirements apply to all dismissals including any based on the 
employer’s operational requirements.360 Although reference to aspects of procedural fairness 
are identified throughout this study, however they are a relatively uncontroversial aspect of the 
test for fairness in retrenchment.361 
4.3 Substantive Fairness Test 
The first element in the determination of the substantive fairness of a dismissal for operational 
requirements hinges on determining whether there is an operational requirement upon which 
the employer relies. The employer discharges the first element of the substantive fairness test 
if it can be established that present are any of the operational reasons discussed in paragraph 
4.3.1 below. 
                                                 
354 Grogan (n 4) 295; Cheadle (n 352) 279. 
355 Grogan (n 4) 295. 
356  Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa (2010) 421; see also Grogan (n 287) 477 and Basson et al (n 73) 
167. 
357 Above. 
358 In general, technological needs are closely related to the employer’s economic and structural needs. 
359 SABC v CCMA (n 325) 591H-I; see also Grogan (n 287) 123. 
360 Grogan (n 287) 122. 
361 Additionally, its relevance to this study is fairly remote and for these reasons will not be considered in any 
detail. 
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In terms of sec. 192(2) the employer is required to prove on a balance of probabilities that such 
a dismissal is fair.362 This is the second element of the substantive fairness test. The third 
element of the inquiry into the substantive fairness of a retrenchment is the determination of 
the selection criteria. 
The elements of the test are discussed below. 
4.3.1 Element 1: Operational Requirements 
Not every reason that has a negative impact on the operational needs of the employer can be 
advanced as a valid ground for retrenchment. For instance, an employer may not retrench 
employees who for reasons of pregnancy or their participation in a protected strike (generally) 
negatively affect the operation or operational needs of the employer’s business.363 These 
reasons despite technically being operational in nature and capable of harming the employer’s 
business operation specifically are prohibited by sec. 187(1) of the LRA.364 To give substance 
to this ground of dismissal sec. 213 therefore provides a definition of operational requirements 
and states that it“means requirements based on the economic, technological, structural or 
similar needs of an employer”.365 
This definition is not inherently useful and is evidently broad. The Act does not define what 
economic, technological, structural or similar needs mean.366 However, pursuant to sec. 203(1) 
of the LRA the Retrenchment Code was issued by the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (“NEDLAC”)367 in 1999 to flesh out the unwieldy definition in the Act. 
4.3.1.1 Status of The NEDLAC Codes 
The Code is not considered law. However, the Labour Court in Moropane v Gilbeys 
Distillers368 issued a stern warning with regard to the need to consider the codes. The Court 
cautioned that although no rights arise from the code nor is the code law, ignoring it is 
                                                 
362 S 192(2) of LRA (n 17). 
363 For example, a striking employee would be unable to work which may cause the employer’s business to 
grind to a halt. 
364 S 187(1) of LRA (n 17). 
365 S 213 of LRA (n 17). 
366 The LRA merely provides that operational requirements are those economic, technological, structural or 
similar needs of the employer (s 213 of LRA (n 17)). 
367 Appointed in terms of sec. 2 of the National Economic Development and Labour Advisory Act 35 of 1994. 
368 Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Ltd & another 1998 19 ILJ 635 (LC). 
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inadvisable.369 An employer who ignores and does not apply the code in dismissal proceedings 
is likely to find himself in a precarious position when trying to prove that the dismissal is fair.370 
The Constitutional Court held that the codes embody the standards and principles prevalent 
and widely accepted within an industry.371 Compliance, although not technically obligatory in 
nature, is expected372 and a failure to observe and conform to the relevant code likely will lead 
to an adverse finding by the labour tribunals373  in spite of the fact that the codes are merely 
guidelines and not law. It follows, therefore, that only the foolhardy will flout the code since 
compliance seems to be of great import. Aspects of the Retrenchment Code thus form part of 
the discussion in this dissertation. 
4.3.2 Operational Requirements: What They Are 
In defining operational requirements the Act acknowledges only four circumstances under 
which an employer may dismiss; the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of 
the employer.374 In this respect the Retrenchment Code notes the difficulty attendant on 
attempts at defining the “circumstances that might legitimately form the basis of a dismissal 
for [operational reasons]”375 and provides some guidance, albeit general, as regard these 
‘circumstances’ or reasons of the employer. 
The Code states that economic reasons, “[a]s a general rule […], are those [reasons] that relate 
to the financial management of the enterprise”.376 Structural needs are those that “relate to the 
redundancy of posts consequent to a restructuring of the employer’s enterprise,”377 and the 
technological needs of the employer refer to “the introduction of new technology which affects 
work relationships either by making existing jobs redundant or by requiring employees to adapt 
to the new technology or a consequential restructuring of the workplace”.378 
An analysis of circumstances falling within the ambit of operational requirements as defined 
in the Act and interpreted by the courts now follows. 
                                                 
369 Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers (n 368) 640F. 
370 Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers (n 368) 640G-H. 
371 Sidumo (n 353) 2415. 
372 See Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers (n 368) 640E-I. 
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4.3.2.1 Technological Reasons 
The LRA identifies technological reasons as being part of an employer’s operational 
requirements.379 Technological reasons are defined in the Code as referring to the introduction 
of new technology in the workplace which may have the effect of rendering certain occupations 
redundant or requiring that employees adapt to the newly implemented technologies or result 
in the eventual restructuring of the workplace.380 
These technologies often are in the form of products which have the capability either of 
improving production efficiency or of eliminating and absorbing existing tasks so that they 
may be performed by a new technology.381 The innovations may comprise everything from 
advanced robotics, computerisation and digitalisation, intelligent systems (such as AI, IoT and 
IIoT) to advances in manufacturing including but not limited to 3D manufacturing systems.382 
Technological reasons thus entail situations whereby the workplace and existing relationships 
are changed by the introduction of technological innovations which essentially affect 
workplace functionality.383 Le Roux identifies three scenarios under which these changes and 
their effects may be found. She writes: 
“First, the introduction of new technology can have the result that fewer people are needed to 
perform a particular task now performed with the help of technology. […]. Second, the new 
technology may […] require existing employees without the required skills to be replaced with 
employees who possess the required skills. In this regard it is important that the lack of skills 
is in respect of the new technology. […]. Lastly, the introduction of the new technology can 
result in the employer’s having to adopt a new configuration of its activities to accommodate 
the new technology, which necessitates restructuring.”384 
The observation above appears to be consistent with the description of technological needs 
given in the Code.385 Notwithstanding, often there are questions that arise into the reason 
behind an employer’s decision to adopt new technology (broadly referred to in this study as 
automation). 
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First, it seems apposite to repeat the principle that managers of a business are best positioned 
to make decisions, not only about the direction of the business but about measures that may 
benefit their enterprise.386 For this reason the decision to automate the workplace lies firmly in 
the managerial prerogative. 
Thompson suggests that the debate over an employer’s operational reasons essentially is an 
economic one.387 Aspects of his claim are debatable and have been impugned by the Labour 
Court,388 but his observation insofar as one considers technological needs is consonant with the 
general guise this reason often assumes. Technological needs are not necessarily self-standing 
reasons upon which decisions are made; employers generally do not make spontaneous, 
uninformed decisions in relation to the operations of their enterprise. This is true especially in 
cases of introducing new technology. The implementation of a new technology in the 
workplace often is costly and full implementation takes time. That an employer would suddenly 
decide to adopt new ways of conducting business operations without consideration as to the 
cost or to the impact a change would have on its operational integrity seems absurd.389 
Before opting to automate an employer likely will consider the benefits and drawbacks and 
will conclude that the benefits in one way or another outweigh the cost. This decision has been 
held not open for debate by employees or the courts.390 Some of the reasons that motivate an 
employer’s decision to automate include the perceived need to reduce labour and production 
costs, increase production efficiency or improve quality of output.391 Some motivations may 
even be external to the employer, such as the need to restructure in order to keep abreast of 
technological changes and remain competitive.392 What these motivations have in common is 
that they are all economic in nature. 
                                                 
386 See especially the remark by Revelas AJ in Solidarity obo MacGregor wherein he emphasises the 
entitlements of the employer (Mineworkers Union/Solidarityon behalf of Macgregor v SA National Parks 2006 
27 ILJ 818 (LC) 826G-H); see also Grogan (n 287) 478. 
387 Thompson “Bargaining, business restructuring and the operational requirements dismissal” 1999 ILJ 755 
760. 
388 See par 4.3.2.2. 
389 This observation finds support in the statement of the Labour Court where it affirmed that “it is generally 
inconceivable that a company will mismanage itself with a view to getting rid of its employees.” (Benjamin & 
others v Plessey Tellumat SA Ltd 1998 19 ILJ 595 (LC) 596G-H). 
390 Solidarity v SANParks (n 386) 826G-H; see also Forecourt Express (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport& Allied 
Workers Union & another 2006 27 ILJ 2537 (LAC) 2547I-J and 2548A. 
391 Grogan (n 287) 481; see also Grogan (n 4) 296. 
392 Above. 
60 
 
As observed above technological reasons rarely manifest as being singular, self-standing 
reasons,393 often they are adopted as solutions to problems of an economic nature. Cost-
reduction and increasing production efficiency, for example, may help the business be more 
profitable, so too may an increase in competitiveness in the global market. These are legitimate 
reasons for which technology provides a viable solution. If the outcome is a redundancy of 
posts, the adaptation of employees to new technologies (that is, a requirement of new skills) or 
the consequential restructuring of the enterprise (the latter two often leading to retrenchment 
as well), the reasons are legitimate.394 
Technological reasons may be subject to a greater level of scrutiny by the labour courts 
however. The justification for this statement is that the employer usually is the main driver 
behind the existence of the operational ground. Unlike in circumstances where retrenchment is 
forced on employees and the employer by external factors such as economic or market changes, 
automation is viewed as an internal factor which an employer often deliberately and 
premeditatedly pursues. The LAC has held to this effect in the Stirling case.395 
Stirling concerns an employee whose position was declared redundant following a restructuring 
of the employer’s operations.396 The employee, noting that he had no job description, inquired 
about his situation and the employer asked the employee to draw up a description of what he 
perceived was his job, which he did.397 Subsequently,  the employee was told that his position 
had become redundant and that he would receive a stipulated amount as a severance package.398 
Throughout the employer did not consult with the employee about his possible retrenchment.399 
The LAC determined that the LRA imposed a duty to consult on the employer and that that 
duty arises immediately when the employer, having contemplated the restructuring foresees its 
implementation.400 The Court distinguished between job losses resulting from changes that are 
external to the employer such as economic downturns and the loss of jobs that result as a 
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consequence of changes that are internal to the employer such as restructuring or automation.401 
In this respect, the Court held: 
“In general, in the case of [retrenchment] brought about by internal changes, the employer is in 
control of the situation and need not make hasty decisions. Time is not as critical as it is when 
retrenchment is due to an economic downturn, and where any delay might severely prejudice 
the employer.”402 
In the view of the labour courts, technological needs, although certainly a valid reason for 
retrenchment, are perceived as employer-directed eventualities. In such a situation an employer 
reasonably can foresee the effect of the changes their decision might cause. For this reason, the 
courts seem circumspect about attaching a similar level of urgency to operational needs arising 
from “internal factors” (such as technological needs) to circumstances where conditions 
beyond the employer’s control occasion the operational requirement. 
4.3.2.2 Economic Reasons 
The Retrenchment Code explains economic reasons are “those [reasons] that relate to the 
financial management [of the employer’s enterprise]”.403 By ‘financial management’ the Code 
refers to an array of circumstances of an economic nature in the world of commerce, such as 
economic downturns, recessions or other economic movements all of which cause vacillation 
in the commercial activities or economic fortunes of the enterprise.404 In these circumstances 
the employer often seeks to safeguard the future of the business either by retrenchment or 
restructuring or both.405 
That an employer may dismiss for economic reasons is settled law406  and dismissals based on 
economic reasons are the most common of the operational grounds. However, a reason of an 
economic nature does not mean that it automatically is fair. The decisions of the courts in this 
regard are a guide. 
The labour courts acknowledge that an employer whose enterprise is experiencing financial 
strain is entitled to rely on operational requirements as a justification for retrenching 
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employees. This situation has been described as “the corporate equivalent of excessive bleeding 
and imminent death”.407 In order to stem “excessive bleeding” and avert the enterprise’s 
“imminent death” an employer may resort to retrenchments or reorganisation.408 
Before the coming into operation of the LRA these circumstances were recognised by the 
former Appellate Division in Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA409 where the court stated: 
“[t]his stage would normally be preceded by a perception or recognition by management that 
its business enterprise is ailing or failing; a consideration of the causes and possible remedies; 
an appreciation of the need to take remedial steps; and the identification of retrenchment as a 
possible remedial measure.”410 
In 2003 the Labour Court echoed a similar sentiment in Mabaso & others v Universal Product 
Network (Pty) Ltd,411 holding that: 
“an employer is the one who suffers most upon his business operation failing and collapsing. 
The employer is, therefore, the first person who is, at all times reasonably expected to take such 
steps as are necessary to ensure the continued survival and viability of the business. At times 
and in appropriate instances the retrenchment of staff becomes the only plausible option to 
resort to in order to sustain the commercial viability of the business. The courts will therefore 
ordinarily not interfere with decisions taken by business managements where the decision taken 
was clearly and objectively in the best commercial interest of the business concerned.”412 
That an employer may retrench employees in order to ensure survival is a factual reality (and 
daily possibility) of engaging in commercial enterprise. Even in the absence of statutory 
permission granted under sec. 188(1)(a)(ii) employers still would be able to seek retrenchment 
of employees in the event of genuine and imminent financial ruin. It should not matter who or 
what is the cause of such economic circumstances informing a move to retrench. The courts 
have accepted that an employer is entitled to dismiss for operational requirements, even if the 
reason relied upon is a result of mismanagement by the employer.413 Basson J explained this 
position in Benjamin v Plessey Tellumat SA as follows: 
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“[E]ven if the economic rationale for the retrenchments […] was due to mismanagement, the 
court will generally still regard it as a legitimate basis for dismissals for operational 
requirements.”414 
However, operational requirements informed by economic reasons are not limited to those 
changes in economic fortune causing financial hardship. The active pursuit of  profit by the 
employer is accepted as a fair reason falling within the ambit of the economic needs of the 
employer. 
The question of whether an employer may retrench employees in order to achieve a greater 
profit margin was considered in Van Rensburg v Austen Safe Co.415 In casu the employer whose 
business was the manufacturing of physical security equipment the continuance of which no 
longer was profitable decided to restructure in order to focus on new avenues of operations.416 
The change in business focus resulted in the position of the employee becoming redundant;417 
after consultation with the employee the employer gave him a choice of accepting demotion or 
be retrenched.418 The employee accepted the offer subject to a judicial challenge of the 
employer’s decision.419 The Labour Court stated that an employer is required to show that a 
fair reason exists for retrenchment and that it also followed a fair procedure.420 Although 
acknowledging that an employee has a constitutionally-protected right to fair labour 
practices,421 the Court held that this 
“[u]nfortunately […] does not mean that an employee has the right to permanent and indefinite 
employment […] or that an employer may only retrench an employee when it can show 
financial ruin. An employer is entitled to look for new areas to better itself.”422 
In accepting the view that an employer need not be in financial distress to retrench,423 the Court 
effectively upheld the sufficiency of pursuit of greater profit by the employer as a fair economic 
reason. The Court in this respect held that courts should avoid meddling in the genuine business 
                                                 
414 Above. 
415 Van Rensburg v Austen Safe Co 1998 19 ILJ 158 (LC). 
416 Austen Safe (n 415) 161E-G. 
417 Austen Safe (n 415) 162. 
418 Austen Safe (n 415) 160A-B. 
419 Above. 
420 Austen Safe (n 415) 168E. 
421 Austen Safe (n 415) 168F. 
422 Austen Safe (n 415) 168F-G. 
423 Above. 
64 
 
decisions taken by employers who (note the wording) are “entitled to make profits and even 
better profits if this can be achieved.”424 (emphasis added) 
The LAC adopted a principle similar to that expressed by the Labour Court in Austen Safe in 
the case of Fry’s Metal v NUMSA.425 In casu the LAC dismissed the respondent union’s 
contention that the employer was not entitled to retrench in pursuance of profit under the LRA. 
The union contended that employers could not rely on operational requirements if the purpose 
was to pursue profit.426 In its rejection of this contention the court noted that the argument was 
inspired by the opinion of Thompson in his 1999 article,427 which contention was rejected as 
having “no statutory basis in our law”.428 
The Court added “[n]either Thompson in his article nor counsel in his argument has pointed to 
any provision in the Act that can be relied upon to make this distinction”.429 
It continued, further, noting that its view is informed by the fact that: 
“all that the Act refers to, and recognizes, […] is an employer's right to dismiss for a reason 
based on its operational requirements without making any distinction between operational 
requirements in the context of a business the survival of which is under threat and a business 
which is making profit and wants to make more profit.”430 
The LAC reaffirmed this view in 2004, stating “all things being equal, a company is entitled to 
insist by economic [restructuring] that a profitable centre becomes even more profitable”.431 
The labour courts continue to apply this principle to date.432 
In spite of the aforementioned the Labour Court in Van Rooyen v Blue Financial Services seems 
to suggest that there may be varying degrees of scrutiny subjected to reasons advanced by 
employers as to economic needs depending on whether a dismissal is aimed at achieving the 
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purpose of economic survival or if greater profitability is the objective.433 In addition, it has 
been suggested as regards economic reasons that the ipse dixit of the employer will not be 
accepted readily as representative of the existence of a valid operational reason.434 
In Elliot International v Veloo on appeal from the Labour Court, the appellant enclosed audited 
financial statements as evidence of financial distress.435 Counsel for the appellant argued that 
the Labour Court should have considered the financial statements as, having been audited, they 
were public documents.436 The LAC rejected this notion, pointing out that the mere fact that 
the documents had been enclosed in the court bundle was not sufficient evidence to establish 
that the company was in financial distress.437 The Court held that the appellant should have 
called the financial auditor who was responsible  as a witness to testify as to the veracity and 
accuracy of the financial statements.438 Additionally, the statements of the auditor should have 
been presented to the respondent employee’s witnesses.439 
The labour courts recognise that an employer in financial distress has a right to seek termination 
of employment for economic reasons under the scope of operational requirements. However, 
that is not all they have acknowledged. The courts are prepared to accept, even promote, the 
idea that a profit-seeking endeavour falls within the ambit of economic reasons which justify 
retrenchments under the LRA. However, the Labour Court also seems to suggest that it may 
differentiate between the economic objectives being pursued by an employer. The Van Rooyen 
court notes that where an employer seeks to secure the financial sustainability of an enterprise 
the requirement to consult as well as the scope of such consultation will be more onerous in 
profit-seeking endeavours than in a situation where an employer attempts to stem the proverbial 
state of “corporate […] excessive bleeding and imminent death”.440 
4.3.2.3 Structural Reasons 
The Retrenchment Code describes restructuring as related to post redundancy due to the   
restructuring of the enterprise.441 There does not appear to be a suggestion in the LRA or in the 
Code that restructuring should be occasioned by any specific event. Thus, restructuring may 
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accommodate many reasons including reduction of labour and production costs, the adoption 
of technology, the accommodation of new operational functionalities or of economic needs.442 
Restructuring assumes various forms however, it should never be used for ulterior or 
impermissible ends (such as dismissing employees who, for reasons of incapacity or 
misconduct, are undesired by the employer).443 
It appears to be the case that in circumstances where an employer after restructuring acquires 
the services of a third party to perform functions that were performed by its retrenched ex-
employees the courts are likely to be unwilling to find the retrenchment to be fair. For example, 
the employer in Genlux Lighting restructured its business retrenching 70, hourly-paid 
employees citing reasons of financial distress caused by absenteeism and theft.444 However, it 
re-employed 63 of the 70 through a third party to which it outsourced its human resources 
function.445 The employees occupied the same positions and performed the same tasks  they 
had prior to the retrenchments (in addition to the employer taking on a greater financial burden 
and bringing in extra staff).446 On noting this, the court held that the evidence was indicative 
of an “indispensability of the labour force in the core functioning of the [employer]”.447 There 
existed a need for the employer to retain the employees’ services and despite its financial 
decline was able to take back 63 of the employees.448 In light of this the Court held that the 
claim of “economic and structural needs due to restructuring of human resources, productivity 
processes and downsizing to affect the employees is clearly far from the truth”.449 The 
retrenchments were not justified by genuine operational needs and consequently the decision 
to retrench was no more than a sham.450 
In contrast, the appellant in the Forecourt case decided to retrench employees of a business it 
bought in order to acquire a ferrying contract it had with a major automobile maker.451 The 
appellant operated its business through subcontractors and did not have any ferrying vehicles 
of its own,452 the same was proposed in respect of the recently acquired business, effectively 
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changing the manner in which that particular unit would operate.453 In this case the LAC found 
that the restructuring by the employer was reason enough to justify the retrenchment of 
employees because the employer after having acquired the business restructured its operations 
completely so that  no job was available for the employees to perform.454 
Accordingly, an employer who restructures an enterprise may not rely on the restructuring as 
a reason for retrenchment if it has no genuine reason to restructure.455 The LRA does not 
describe reasons under which restructuring may be carried out so they may be any economic, 
technological or other commercially rational goal of the employer.456 In such circumstances it 
will have to tender evidence to the effect that an operational reason exists to restructure and 
which occasioned the need to retrench. This certainly is the case where an employer after 
retrenching employees reacquires the services of workers similar to those its employees 
forfeited through retrenchments. 
4.3.2.4 Similar Needs 
There is little guidance in the LRA as to what similar needs entail and the Code does not define 
what constitutes a similar need. However, according to Le Roux there are circumstances which 
do not match the needs of financial management or the competitiveness of the enterprise (both 
of which are linked to economic needs).457 However, she notes that these circumstances 
negatively affect the functionality of the employer’s business operations yet none of which is 
on the strength of any specific employee’s act or omission.458 It would seem that the Labour 
Court agrees with the above view. 
In the 2001 case of Makgabo v Premier Foods it dismissed an application by retrenched 
employees who had been so dismissed following a decision by the employer to close down one 
of its operations in response to acts of sabotage and unsustainable financial losses.459 The 
Labour Court held in this regard that where an employer is subjected to unidentified acts of 
sabotage, continued acts of this nature may give rise to reasons for dismissing on operational 
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grounds.460 It did not identify which particular operational need such dismissals fell under but 
noted that the consequence was the loss of customers by the employer.461 
In Tiger Food Brands v Levy Ngcamu AJ held that the violent resistance by employees to 
changes introduced by the employer in order improve productivity and stem escalating 
financial losses constituted an operational need of the employer.462 In casu a manager recently 
recruited to two substantially unprofitable operations identified areas that needed to be changed 
but every attempt to effect said changes was met with violent resistance and death threats 
including an attempt on the life of the manager.463 Because the company was unable to identify 
the perpetrators and also feared for the safety of its staff, it was of the opinion that it no longer 
could continue viably to operate the business (which was not financially sustainable either).464 
The company decided to close down the bakery and suspend all employees and in terms of the 
Act requested a facilitator. This attempt at facilitation was thwarted when the CCMA accepted 
that the reason for the proposed retrenchments did not fall within the scope of operational 
requirements as defined in the LRA.465 
On the question of whether the employer’s reasons constituted operational requirements in 
terms of the Act the Labour Court held that “[a]s the [LRA] does not [define] […] economic, 
technological and structural needs of the employer, [interpreting] […] the definition [narrowly] 
cannot be appropriate”.466 It noted that the inability to manage its business and the fears over 
the safety of its staff meant that the economic sustainability of the operation was affected (and 
would constitute an economic reason).467 However the Court held the primary reason behind 
the desire to retrench arose from the unidentified actions of employees.468 In this respect it 
would not be possible to carry out individual disciplinary proceedings as the perpetrators are 
unknown to the employer.469 Collective disciplinary procedures though possible would mean 
that innocent employees likely would be dismissed without benefits.470 Thus, in the Court’s 
opinion “there [was] an economic reason or reason similar to that for the anticipated 
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retrenchment”(emphasis added).471 The Court advanced this opinion after suggesting that 
similar needs “[relate] to the needs of the employer that have some resemblance of economic, 
technological or structural [sic].”472 
In 2010 the Labour Court confirmed that where retrenchments are occasioned by misconduct 
the employer will have to satisfy the court that “the misconduct has caused an economic 
rationale for dismissal in the sense that the company’s economic viability or economic stability 
is under threat […]”.473 
Consequently, it seems that the similar needs of the employer are not open to being stretched 
to include all manner of reasons that may affect the operation of the employer’s business. In 
fact, reliance on similar needs is ring-fenced to those economic, technological or structural 
needs of the employer and in any of these instances the employer must establish the factual 
existence of the need concerned. 
4.4 Element 2: Fairness of the Reason 
Historically, the labour courts held that fairness in dismissal based on operational grounds 
obtained in circumstances where the employer could prove a valid reason for retrenchment.474 
The employer merely had to establish that it had a reason and that the reason fell within the 
scope of the definition of operational requirements in order to prove fairness. 
4.4.1 The Bona Fides and Commercial Rationale 
The courts relied on the bona fides of the employer and on nothing else.475 Should the employer 
establish that it had a bona fide reason to retrench it would have discharged the onus as regards 
the fairness of the reason for retrenchment.476 No further inquiry into the merits of the dismissal 
would follow. The justification is found in the belief that the employer is in a better position to 
make decisions regarding the needs of its business than the labour courts. The employer’s 
prerogative, as indicated above, has been reinforced numerous times by the labour courts. 
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Notwithstanding this view, the former LAC before the coming into operation of the LRA 
acknowledged the flaws inherent in merely requiring the employer’s bona fides when 
determining the fairness of retrenchments. In the Court’s view simply requiring that the 
employer’s decision to retrench be bona fide and commercially rational could not accord with 
fairness because, it held in Atlantis Diesel (LAC), that fairness: 
“in this context goes further than bona fides and the commercial justification for the decision 
to retrench. It is concerned, first and foremost, with the question whether termination of 
employment is the only reasonable option in the circumstances.”477 
The LAC opined in this regard that to determine fairness on the basis of the employer’s bona 
fides alone is incorrect;478 even  consideration of the economic rationale is insufficient.479 The 
requirement for there to be an economic rationale represents a stricter standard than merely 
requiring that the decision to retrench be genuine; it meant that ultimately the decision ought 
to  be aimed at achieving a valid economic goal. The court did not concern itself merely with 
whether an ulterior motive existed. Where there was no ulterior motive, nevertheless it 
proceeded to consider whether an economic objective could be attained.480 The Atlantis Diesel 
(LAC) court was prepared to go to greater lengths beyond commercial rationale and 
genuineness of the decision. In the Court’s view an inquiry into the fairness of the retrenchment 
should seek to establish if the dismissal was the only reasonable option available to the 
employer,481 that is, whether or not, it was the last resort. 
In spite of the comprehensiveness of the test developed, the Atlantis Diesel (LAC) decision 
initially found little support under the LRA. Instead the labour courts created under the new 
Act initially determined the question of substantive fairness in view of the employer’s bona 
fides and economic rationale, the standard the former LAC had criticised. The courts generally 
showed deference to the employer’s decision-making over their own right to scrutinise the 
decision. This deference was expounded by the LAC in SACTWU v Discreto where the Court 
described its function in scrutinising the consultation process as one not grounded in: 
“[…]second­[guessing] the commercial or business efficacy of the employer’s ultimate 
decision, [which it is no position to] […], but to pass judgment on whether the ultimate decision 
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arrived at was genuine and not merely a sham […].The manner in which the court [adjudges 
said genuineness] […] is to enquire whether the legal requirements for a proper consultation 
process has been followed and, if so, whether the ultimate decision arrived at by the employer 
is operationally and commercially justifiable on rational grounds, having regard to what 
emerged from the consultation process. It is important to note that when determining the 
rationality of the employer’s ultimate decision on retrenchment, it is not the court’s function to 
decide whether it was the best decision under the circumstances, but only whether it was a 
rational commercial or operational decision, properly taking into account what emerged during 
the consultation process.”482(emphasis added) 
The Discreto approach by no means gives carte blanche to the employer to retrench as opposed 
to the criterion of genuineness (and in fact accords with the conception of economic needs 
developed by the LAC in Fry’s Metals), nevertheless it favours a consideration of fairness as 
perceived by the employer. The LAC affirmed that its only duty is to determine if the decision 
to retrench is operationally and commercially justifiable on rational grounds in light of the 
consultation process.483 According to the court the LRA did not occasion the duty on the 
employer to consider other alternatives short of dismissal even if these alternatives may have 
been tenable or commercially more rational.484 It is not for the court to decide whether or not 
there is a better alternative.485 The court is not entitled to decide whether the decision taken 
was “the best decision under the circumstances, but only whether it was a rational commercial 
or operational decision”.486 
According to Du Toit the LAC “appeared to reassert the [so-called] ‘reasonable employer test’ 
by equating rational conduct by an employer with fairness”.487 However, the test has been 
rejected in the context of dismissals for misconduct by the Constitutional Court. In Sidumo v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines the Constitutional Court declared that the so-called ‘reasonable 
employer’ test had no legislative or constitutional foundation in South African law.488 In that 
context, the suggestion that a commissioner tasked with determining the fairness of a dismissal 
for misconduct was supposed to perceive the dispute from the perspective of any particular 
party was found to be misguided, instead:489  
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 “all […] indications are to the contrary. A plain reading of all the relevant provisions compels 
the conclusion that the commissioner is to determine the dismissal dispute as an impartial 
adjudicator.”490 
In matters relating to dismissal for misconduct the rejection of the ‘reasonable employer’ test 
is unambiguous. However, it is not clear whether the same rule applies in matters relating to 
retrenchments. As seen below, the labour courts have delivered mixed decisions as to what test 
for substantive fairness is applicable in dismissal for operational requirements. The test 
developed by the Discreto court emphasises deference to the employer; in this test the court 
does not inquire beyond the question of commercial and operational rationality.  
4.4.2 Reasonableness, Rationality or Fairness and The Last Resort Principle 
In subsequent decisions of the labour courts post-Discreto there has been a willingness to probe 
the employer’s chosen avenue. It did not take long for the courts to temper the Discreto 
approach as a year later the LAC arrived at a different conclusion in respect of its functions in 
determining the fairness of retrenchments.  
In SACWU v Afrox the LAC characterised the employer’s duties under the LRA as being 
dissimilar to those expressed in Discreto. Froneman DJP, as he then was, declared that it is 
implicit in terms of sec. 189(2) that while engaged in consultations an employer is required to: 
“take substantive steps on his or her own initiative to take appropriate measures to avoid the 
dismissals; to minimise the number of dismissals; to change the timing of the dismissals; to 
mitigate the adverse effects of the dismissals; to select a fair and objective method for the 
dismissals […] and to provide appropriate severance pay for dismissed employees. What is 
appropriate will depend on the facts of each case, and on the evidence presented about the steps 
taken, if the matter proceeds to court.” 491 (emphasis added) 
The LAC’s approach above imported an objective element into the test for fairness. It now was 
incumbent on the employer to consider available alternatives and to establish on a 
preponderance of probabilities that it complied with the requirements set out in sec. 189(2);492 
sec. 192(2) mandates this.493 The LAC’s position in SACWU v Afrox was more incisive than in 
Discreto. It notes this change, stating that: 
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“it [could] no longer be said that the court’s function in scrutinising the consultation process in 
dismissals for operational requirements is merely to determine the [bona fides] […] of the 
employer […]. The matter is now one of proof by the employer, on a balance of probabilities 
of: the cause or reason for the dismissal […];  the defined ‘operational requirements’ that the 
dismissal was based on […]; a fair procedure in accordance with section 189 […]; the facts 
upon which a finding of a substantively fair reason for the dismissal can be made […].”494 
The LAC confirms that “[t]hese are all indications that dismissal should at least not be the first 
resort, even though the LRA does not expressly state that dismissal should only be used as a 
last resort when dismissing for operational reasons”.495 
In contrast to the approach in Discreto the LAC in SACWU v Afrox suggests that a retrenchment 
decision is fair only if the employer considered alternatives before coming to its final decision. 
The LAC adopted a position that bears similarity to the one adopted by the former LAC in 
Atlantis Diesel (LAC).496 The LAC accepts that it is not sufficient for an employer to have a 
good reason to dismiss or that the reason is rationally or commercially justifiable. An employer 
cannot arrive at a decision without first genuinely considering other options available which 
have the effect of minimising the scope of retrenchment or eliminating the need altogether.  
Retrenchment is fair only if the employer’s decision is reasonable in light of available options 
which must be considered in reaching the decision. 
In BMD Knitting Mills the LAC followed a similar approach of scrutinising the employer’s 
decision to that adopted in Afrox. The Court criticised Discreto for its deference to employers. 
The LAC stated obiter that it doubted whether the deferential approach sourced from 
administrative law applied equally to cases of dismissal in light of the wording of the Act which 
requires that the reason for dismissal be fair.497 Davis AJA observed: 
“The word ’fair’ introduces a comparator, that is a reason which must be fair to both parties 
affected by the decision. The starting point is whether there is a commercial rationale for the 
decision. But, rather than take such justification at face value, a court is entitled to examine 
whether the particular decision has been taken in a manner which is also fair to the affected 
party, namely the employees to be retrenched. To this extent the court is entitled to enquire as 
to whether a reasonable basis exists on which the decision, including the proposed manner, to 
dismiss for operational requirements is predicated. Viewed accordingly, the test becomes less 
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deferential and the court is entitled to examine the content of the reasons given by the employer, 
albeit that the enquiry is not directed to whether the reason offered is the one which would have 
been chosen by the court. Fairness, not correctness is the mandated test.”498 
The approach in Afrox and BMD Knitting Mills was applied even more strictly in CWIU v 
Algorax.499 Affirming that the court need not defer to the employer, the LAC stated that the 
question of fairness in dismissal is a matter to be answered by the court.500 It held this oversight 
was to be done objectively, independently of the opinion of the employer.501 Importantly, the 
court unambiguously asserted that a decision to retrench is defective if the employer’s decision 
is not the only available option.502 The court stated that  the LRA imposes an obligation on the 
employer if possible, to avoid dismissing employees for operational requirements, to minimise 
the number of retrenchments and to seek alternatives, which is indicative of an obligation on 
the employer to proceed with retrenchment only as a last resort.503 
However, the LAC conceived the last resort principle in relative terms in the case of Enterprise 
v Allen in contrast to the forceful statement in Algorax. The court held that where an employer 
wishes to retrench but is faced with a rational option, the choice that preserves jobs should be 
preferred.504 
A similar expression regarding the last resort principle was made in Forecourt where the LAC 
stated that “it is unfair for an employer, in [choosing] a solution to deal with problems in his 
business, to choose a solution that entails job losses if there is another solution which can 
satisfactorily address his problems without any job losses”.505 
4.4.2.1 Correct Application? 
A decision which properly applies these elements together appears to be the 2014 case of 
Ndhlela v Sita Information Networking Computing BV. In casu the Labour Court held that the 
provisions of sec. 189 were aimed at preserving jobs and where this is not possible, at ensuring 
that the process resulting in the loss of jobs is fair and the negative effects are mitigated.506 The 
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court affirmed that the retrenchment provisions of the LRA require that an employer has a 
genuine reason for retrenchment.507 Ngcukaitobi AJ stated: 
“it is apparent that a court is not entitled to dictate to an employer as to the most commercially 
viable way of running its business. But this does not mean the path chosen by an employer 
should not be tested for justification; it should. […] [It] could not be fair for an employer to 
choose a solution to its operational needs which would lead to job losses when another solution 
which would not lead to job losses was available. This shows, in my view, that a court is 
required to conduct a qualitative examination of the reasons — and the evidence tendered [in] 
support thereof — given by the employer in support of its claim that a dismissal based on 
operational requirements is fair.”508 
He continues at 2248D-G: 
“The purpose of this exercise is not to determine whether the employer is making economically 
rational business decisions. It is to establish factually the existence of a genuine operational 
requirement for the restructuring. Once this has been done, the court must consider the fairness 
of the decision to dismiss based on the proven operational requirement. It is here that an 
employer’s decision must be compared to other available measures other than a dismissal which 
could address the operational requirement but were not considered. This approach strikes a fair 
balance between the interests of employees who will be affected by the decision and the 
interests of the employer which may be affected by a genuine operational need to dismiss 
employees.”509 
Accordingly, the test for substantive fairness seems to be one which requires that an employer 
has a valid operational requirement which should be considered for bona fides by the court. 
Once it is established, the court must inquire whether there is a reasonable basis for the decision 
and whether the decision was arrived at in a manner that is fair to the retrenched employee. 
Whether or not the decision is fair will be determined by the court which is entitled to scrutinise 
the employer’s reasons.510 In doing so the court determines if there are alternatives which the 
employer could have relied on to achieve the end it sought to realise through retrenchment.511 
Although the court is not entitled to “dictate to an employer as to the most commercially viable 
way of running its business”,512 it will interfere in the employer’s decision-making powers 
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where an alternative short of dismissal is found to exist.513 Significantly, the employer in order 
to establish the fairness of its decision is expected to tender evidence in proof, failing which 
the dismissal will be found to be substantively unfair.514 
4.4.3 Sec. 189(19) 
Until 2014 the LRA imposed a formula for determining substantive fairness in large-scale 
retrenchments in the form of sec. 189A(19). In terms of the provision, a dismissal for 
operational requirements would be substantively fair if it was (a) to give effect to an operational 
requirement of the employer as defined, (b) operationally justifiable on rational grounds, (c) 
there was a proper consideration of alternatives and (d) the selection criteria used was fair and 
objective.515 In a welcome development the provision was repealed by the 2014 LRAA516 and 
it would appear that the courts have an opportunity to continue development of a single 
retrenchment scheme which applies both to small and large-scale retrenchments. 
4.5 Element 3: Fair and Objective Selection Criteria 
The third determinant element in the inquiry into the substantive fairness of a retrenchment 
relates to selection criteria. The question of selecting which employee to dismiss is an important 
consideration in the test. In instances where the employer does not apply appropriate criteria 
when choosing employees to retrench the whole retrenchment process may be found to be 
tainted and found to be substantively unfair.517 Therefore, it is essential for the employer to 
ensure that it follows and applies selection criteria that are consistent with the provisions of the 
LRA. Significantly, the application of selection criteria is not a matter to be decided by the 
employer alone. 
Sec. 189(1) of the LRA requires that an employer must consult with relevant parties including 
workplace fora, trade unions or individual employees.518 The employer is obligated to consult 
with whoever is likely to be retrenched or their respective representatives.519 Under sec. 
189(2)(b) the employer further is required during consultation to try and reach consensus on 
“the method for selecting employees to retrenched”.520 This “method” referred to in the Act is 
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expanded under sec. 189(7) which provides that “the employer must select employees to be 
retrenched according to selection criteria that were agreed upon by the […] parties” to the 
consultation process, in the absence of which fair objective criteria should be followed.521 
Similarly, the Code restates the provisions of the Act and provides that “if one or more 
employees are to be selected for [retrenchment] from a number of employees […], the criteria 
for the selection must be either agreed with the consulting parties or, if no criteria have been 
agreed, be fair and objective criteria”.522 
As stated above, it is not up to the employer to decide what selection criteria are applicable in 
a particular retrenchment scenario. The employer has no discretion under the Act. The wording 
of the LRA and of the Retrenchment Code indicate unequivocally that it is compulsory for the 
employer to consult with the relevant consulting parties on the criteria to be applied first, before 
relying on any possible selection criteria. The LC has held that whether or not selection criteria 
are appropriate is irrelevant in instances where the employer has not consulted first with 
employees to be retrenched. The Court emphasised that “the fact is that there should […] [be] 
consultation on selection criteria[…]”.523 (emphasis added) 
If, during the consultation process the consulting parties manage to reach an agreement as to 
the selection criteria to be applied, the employer is required to apply the agreed criteria.524 If, 
however, the parties fail to reach consensus with respect to the applicable criteria, the Act 
requires that the employer apply criteria that are fair and objective.525 According to Basson, the 
fairness of criteria for retrenching employees entails that each criterion applied is “not […] 
arbitrary but relevant in that it relates to attributes […] of the employee such as [his] length of 
service, ability, capacity, productivity and the needs of the business”. 526 This list is not a 
numerus clausus either as the labour courts have recognised other possible criteria that may be 
applied by the employer. The LAC has recognised other grounds upon which an employer may 
found standards for choosing employees to retrench. These include technical expertise or 
experience, conduct, the employee’s competence, age, service record and gender.527 The 
Retrenchment Code provides with respect to the question of fairness in this regard that: 
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“Criteria that infringe a fundamental right protected by the Act when they are applied, can never 
be fair. These include selection on the basis of union membership or activity, pregnancy, or 
some other unfair discriminatory ground. Criteria that are neutral on the face of it should be 
carefully examined to ensure that when they are applied, they do not have a discriminatory 
effect. […].”528 
The other consideration when scrutinising the propriety of selection criteria is objectivity. 
Selection criteria will be objective if the determination is independent of the subjective input 
of the employer.529 Where an employer relies on criteria based on the opinion of the employee 
such as an employee’s willingness to cooperate with management, such criteria cannot be fair. 
The Labour Court in Singh v Mondi Paper expressed a similar view stating:  
“the selection process must rank as the most fundamental issue for scrutiny in order to 
determine whether the dismissal was fair or not. An employer can get everything else right but 
if the selection process during which the employees who were ultimately dismissed is found to 
be unfair and subjective, the entire process is flawed thereby.”530 
Similarly, in CEPPWAWU v Republican Press the court noted that the respondent employer in 
determining the skills it would use to select employees for retrenchment determined these based 
on the subjective opinions of its foremen and managers.531 The employees had not been made 
aware that their skills would be considered nor were they afforded an opportunity to comment 
on the determinations made.532 Because of this lack the court asserted that “[t]he subjectivity 
of the process undermined its integrity altogether”.533 The LAC emphasised the need for 
employers to apply objective tests as well as the value assigned in the LRA. It affirmed that: 
“[t]he use of subjective selection criteria where they have not been agreed upon can easily lead 
to abuse [thereof] […]. This would be the case where they are used to get rid of employees that 
the employer may view as unwanted but against whom it is unable to produce acceptable proof 
of unacceptable conduct.”534 
Emphasising the importance of applying objective criteria, the LAC continues and notes: 
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 “[t]hat is why the Act contemplates the use of subjective selection criteria only where the 
parties have reached agreement thereupon. In other words, the policy behind the provisions of 
the Act is that there is a price to be paid by an employer if he wants to use subjective selection 
criteria in a retrenchment case. That price is to secure an agreement with the other consulting 
party about the use of such selection criteria. If an employer strikes such a deal, it can go ahead 
and use subjective selection criteria. However, if it does not strike a deal with the other 
consulting party on the use of such criteria, the price it pays for not reaching an agreement 
thereon is that it may not use subjective selection criteria to select employees to be dismissed. 
In such a case, it must use selection criteria that are 'fair and objective' as required by s 189(7)(b) 
[…].”535 
Accordingly, even in instances where the parties fail to agree on the criteria to be applied the 
LRA imposes on the employer a duty to select employees for retrenchment in a manner that is 
not arbitrary or subjective. The employer may not rely on their own determinations about the 
employee which essentially are based on their opinions. They also may not rely on 
considerations that offend sec. 187 of the Act. Even if the selection criteria are to achieve 
legitimate legislative aims such as affirmative action, reliance on a ground that offends sec. 
187 may be unfair.536 Therefore, offending the requirements of sec. 189(7)(b) that employees 
be selected in accordance with the stipulated criteria renders a dismissal substantively unfair. 
4.5.1 The Criteria 
4.5.1.1 Last In, First Out 
The most widely accepted and generally applied principle for selecting employees for 
retrenchment is the so-called LIFO or Last In, First Out, principle. The LIFO principle relates 
to the seniority of an employee and is one of the criteria identified in the Retrenchment Code;537 
item 9 of the Code notes that the test which determines the fairness and objectivity of selection 
criteria “will be satisfied by the use of the last in, first out […] principle”.538 In Mtshali v Bell 
Equipment, the LAC described the principle in the following terms: 
“LIFO […] as a method of selection entails that employees are selected for retrenchment 
according to the period they have been with the employer. It simply means that employees who 
have served for a shorter period would be higher on the list of those likely to be retrenched. 
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Although it has its own difficulties, LIFO is still regarded as the most objective and fair method 
of selecting employees.”539 
As described by the LAC in Mtshali above, the employee who has a longer service record, will 
not be the first to be retrenched when applying LIFO. In Screenex the LAC described a decision 
to select employees who have been in the service of the employer for a long time ahead of 
those recently appointed as a strange way of rewarding their loyalty.540  
Whereas  LIFO consistently has been found to be a fair and objective criterion by the labour 
courts, its inverse, FIFO, which sees longer-serving employees higher on the list of those likely 
to be retrenched however has been held to be at odds with the aim of the LRA and incapable 
of being fair, It is even described as “[flying]  in the face of international norms and labour 
standards”.541 
Notwithstanding, it may happen that an employer’s operational requirements affect only a 
specific division of its operations. In this instance the question is what happens to the employee 
with a long record of service in the affected division. It is possible that in a different division, 
there may be an employee with a shorter service record. In this situation the courts have 
endorsed the principle of ‘bumping’. The rationale for ‘bumping’ relates to the LAC-endorsed 
observation that loyalty and continuity must be rewarded.542 In Porter Motor Group v Karachi 
the LAC expounded this view as follows: 
“Bumping is situated within the 'last in first out' (LIFO) principle which is itself rooted in 
fairness for well-established reasons. Longer serving employees have devoted a considerable 
part of their working lives to the company and their experience and expertise are an invaluable 
asset. Their long service is an objective tribute to their skills and industry and their avoidance 
of misconduct. In the absence of other factors, […] their service alone is sufficient reason for 
them to remain and others to be retrenched. Fairness requires that their loyalty be rewarded.”543 
Bumping seems to suggest that selection of employees when using LIFO ought to be done 
across the factory floor as opposed to a single affected department.544 With bumping, the long-
serving employee will take the position of another employee with a shorter service record, in a 
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different division.545 However, the employer is not obliged to bump an unskilled, long-serving 
employee to the position of a skilled employee with a short service record which position 
requires those skills.546 An employer thus is not required to bump if so doing would seriously 
affect the operational efficiency of its enterprise.547 However, where a skilled position requires 
little training the employer it seems is obliged to retrench the shorter term skilled employee. 
4.5.1.2 Skills 
Notwithstanding, LIFO is not applied by every employer. As stated above the employer may 
select employees based on considerations other than length of service such as qualifications, 
skills and the requirements of the business. The Retrenchment Code notes this possibility as 
well and provides that “[t]here may be instances where the LIFO principle or other criteria need 
to be adapted. […]”.548 An employer may sometimes need to retain employees with skills 
essential for the effective operation of the enterprise. Also, the employer’s operational needs 
may require that certain newer employees be retained if retrenching them in the stead of long-
serving employees would seriously affect its operations.549 
In some cases, employers choose to render all positions redundant and invite employees to 
apply for the newly-created posts. This practice is not prohibited, however it is tantamount to 
selection criteria.550 As a result an employer who opts for this avenue is required to meet the 
standards of fairness and objectivity applicable to selection criteria under the LRA; whether or 
not the appointment of employees (and retrenchment of those who fail to be appointed) is fair 
and objective is determined by the manner in which the employer appoints the employees to 
the position.  
In FAWU v SA Breweries the employer opted to restructure its enterprise in order to make it 
globally competitive and in so doing invited employees to apply for the new positions within 
the newly created structure.551 However, it required that the employees meet a minimum 
standard of adult basic education and training (ABET) and numeracy levels in order to be 
considered for appointment.552 The requirements were purported to measure the ability of the 
employees to perform efficiently within the new structure. The Labour Court was not 
                                                 
545 Grogan (n 4) 313. 
546 Grogan (n 4) 314. 
547 Above. 
548 Item 9 Retrenchment Code (n 135). 
549 Grogan (n 4) 314. 
550 Grogan (n 4) 312. 
551 Food & Allied Workers Union & others v SA Breweries Ltd (2004) 25 ILJ 1979 (LC) 1992. 
552 FAWU v SA Breweries (n 551) 1991. 
82 
 
convinced that these requirements served the purpose for which they were purported to exist, 
it emphasised that specifications for a position should “measure ‘the person for the job and not 
the person in the abstract’”.553 
Also, the test applied in appointing employees should be capable of reasonably predicting or 
should “significantly [correlate] with the important elements of the work behaviour which […] 
are relevant to the [positions] for which the [employees] are being evaluated”.554 An employer 
cannot require that employees who are applying for new posts have skills that are not relevant 
to the post. For example, it cannot filter applicants by requiring that they be in possession of a 
computer science degree in order to be eligible when the duty inherent to the position requires 
merely the ability to use (not maintain) Microsoft Office software; doing so renders the 
selection criteria unfair. 
Ultimately, selection criteria are not contentious if and when they are agreed upon by the 
consulting parties. In instances where the employer and the employees agree on the criteria to 
be applied there does not seem to be a requirement for the criteria to be fair or objective. 
However, once the employer fails to reach consensus in respect of criteria for selecting 
employees to be retrenched, the employer is required to follow fair and objective criteria. 
Generally, applying LIFO satisfies this requirement, however an employer may rely on other 
criteria. The courts have endorsed a variety of criteria that may be applied by an employer; 
whichever criterion the employer resorts to has to meet the yardstick of fairness and objectivity 
required by sec. 189(7)(b) of the LRA. In this respect the farther an employer moves from 
LIFO when applying its criteria, the more likely it invites a possible determination of unfairness 
against its decision. 
4.6 Training: Up-skilling 
The fairness of a dismissal also is determined with consideration as to the consultation process. 
Other than consultation over selection criteria, which is discussed in detail in paragraph 4.5 
above, the employer is enjoined by the LRA to consult with employees on various subjects. 
These include consultation over appropriate measures to minimise the number of 
retrenchments, relevant measures to change the timing of consultations and to mitigate the 
adverse effects of retrenchment.555 The employer also is obliged to consult with employees on 
                                                 
553 FAWU v SA Breweries (n 551) 2014. 
554 Above. 
555 S 189(2) of LRA (n 17). 
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the amount of severance pay to be paid as well as any relevant topic that a consulting party 
may raise during the consultation process.556 In addition, the employer is tasked with a duty to 
consult on measures to avoid dismissals.557 
Among the changes created for employees and employers alike by the fourth industrial 
revolution is the creation of new occupations that require employees to be equipped with 
certain skills. As discussed in paragraph 2.3.1 above, the worker of the future will be required 
to acquire specialised skills in order to survive. At the same time employers express a concern 
that these technological changes create new posts they are unable to fill due to a deficient pool 
of qualified or sufficiently skilled personnel in their workforce. In the absence of skilled 
employees, employers often are left without a choice but to retrench those employees whose 
occupations become redundant as a consequence of the fourth industrial revolution and whose 
skills are not sufficient for them to fill the new jobs. However, the veracity of these claims may 
be questioned; has the employer audited its workforce to determine if any of its employees are 
incapable of filling these new occupations? If it has done so, has the employer done anything 
towards equipping its employees with the necessary skills to fill these posts? 
In situations where training can counterbalance retrenchment by allowing employees to take 
up alternative positions in the enterprise, it seems logical that an employer would offer 
employees the relevant training. However, it is not a requirement under the LRA.558 The Act 
does not oblige the employer specifically to provide training to an employee who for reasons 
of redundancy is faced with the possibility of retrenchment due to his lack of skills required by 
an alternative position. Nevertheless, the duty to consult over measures to avoid dismissal 
includes the question of training. If an employer has alternative positions that require some 
form of training, it is not beyond reason that an employer at least provide employees with the 
relevant training. 
However, the Labour Court has taken a rather different view regarding this issue. In SACCAWU 
v Amalgamated Retailers, faced with a contention by an employee that her retrenchment was 
substantively unfair because the employer had failed to provide her with training for an 
alternative position in the organisation,559 the court dismissed the argument, stating:  
                                                 
556 Ss 189(2)(c) and 189(5)-(6) of LRA (n 17). 
557 S 189(2)(a)(i) of LRA (n 17). 
558 The Act does not impose any duty to train employee. 
559 SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union & another v Amalgamated Retailers (Pt)) Ltd 2002 23 ILJ 
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“[t]hese contentions can be disposed of at the outset. There is no provision in the Labour 
Relations Act nor is there any other basis to support the contention that the respondent was 
substantively obliged to train [the employee] or offer her training to equip her for an alternative 
position either within its ranks or elsewhere.”560 
Accordingly, employers have no statutory or any other duty to provide employees with training 
even if there are alternative positions to which employees may be allocated in the organisation. 
The responsibility to up-skill lies squarely with the employee and is not a responsibility of the 
employer. The only time an employer’s decision not to train an employee can be attacked is if 
the employee requires minimal training to be placed in an alternative position. This was the 
conclusion of the LAC in Oosthuizen v Telkom where the court accepted that: 
 “an employer has an obligation not to dismiss an employee [sic] for operational requirements 
if that employer has work which such employee can perform either without any additional 
training or with minimal training”.561 
It is emphasised that this especially is applicable to cases where the employer relies on the 
redundancy of employees as a reason to retrench.562 Nevertheless, the court prefaced its finding 
with the observation that such a duty should “ […] be within reason, because […] an employer 
cannot be burdened with an exercise that has unnecessary cost implications”.563 (emphasis 
added) 
The employer’s duty to train employees before resorting to retrenchment is confined only to 
those instances where the training does not require a significant investment and the training 
required, correspondingly, is minimal.564 If an alternative position in the organisation requires 
substantial training of the employee before he qualifies to be appointed, the employer is 
exempted from an obligation to provide training. The LAC has declared this as beyond reason 
and unnecessarily places a financial obligation on the employer.565 
 
 
                                                 
560 SACCAWU v Amalgamated Retailers (n 559) 168B-C. 
561 SACCAWU v Amalgamated Retailers (n 559) 2535B-C. 
562 SACCAWU v Amalgamated Retailers (n 559) 2535C-D. 
563 SACCAWU v Amalgamated Retailers (n 559) 2534A-F. 
564 SACCAWU v Amalgamated Retailers (n 559) 2534A-F. 
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4.7 Analysis 
The following section analyses those aspects of the substantive fairness test in retrenchment 
which are controversial or likely to be problematic considering the fourth industrial revolution. 
4.7.1 Is Profit an Economic Need? 
In many retrenchment cases economic ruin militates against the continued employment of some 
employees. The employer in such a situation relies on their financial position to found a reason 
for retrenchment. Generally, so doing is not contentious, however the employer may retrench 
employees for economic reasons of a different kind; to increase profit.566 
The argument that retrenchments in pursuit of profit are not covered by the operational 
requirements provisions in the LRA has been rejected by the Labour Court and the LAC.567 
The labour courts in addition to recognising the ‘natural’ right of the employer to retrench in 
order to avoid financial calamity are prepared to permit achieving greater profit gains even if 
so doing requires the retrenchment of employees.568 The reasoning advanced by the LAC in 
this regard is that the Act does not distinguish between economic reasons in order to ensure 
financial survival and those that arise as a result of the employer’s deliberate pursuit of further 
profit (emphasis added).569 For this reason an employer is “entitled to make further profits if 
this can be achieved”.570 This observation by the court is unfortunate. 
The principles adopted by the courts and provided for in the LRA with respect to the 
interpretation and application of its provisions ought to be kept in mind.571 As noted above, the 
LRA provides in sec. 3 that in interpreting and applying the Act a person must do so in a manner 
that gives effect to the primary objectives of the Act.572 These objects are designed to give 
effect to the purposes of the LRA, which include the advancement of economic development 
and social justice in addition to labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace.573 The 
LAC has held that giving effect to one goal, a court interpreting the Act must do so in 
                                                 
566 General Food Industries (n 27) 1277I. 
567 Fry’s Metal (n 425) 148D. 
568 Fry’s Metal (n 425) 148D-E; see also General Food Industries (n 27) 1277I. 
569 Fry’s Metal (n 425) 148D-E. 
570 General Food Industries (n 27) 1277I ; see also Austen Safe (n 415) 168H. 
571 S 3 of LRA (n 17). 
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573 S 1 of LRA (n 17). 
86 
 
conjunction with the other goals.574 In essence, the court in Foodgro v Keil confirmed that one 
goal is no more important than another. 
The LAC’s reasoning, particularly in Fry’s Metal, as regards the LRA’s economic reasons on 
the surface reveals that the court is correct. The Act provides that an employer may dismiss 
employees based on its operational requirements, which requirements may have been created 
by an economic need.575 It does not establish that economic needs, as the Court correctly 
observes, ought to be negative. However, the court’s observation in this regard should not be 
taken to confirm that its application is incontrovertible. 
Sec. 3 requires that the primary objects of the Act be effectuated.576 These are so structured in 
order to give effect to the purposes of the Act. It is doubtful whether the purposes of the LRA 
are effectuated as required, if one follows the interpretation preferred by the Fry’s Metal court.  
In permitting employers to retrench in order to increase their profits, the court gives effect to 
the purpose of advancing economic development. It permits employers to build more 
sustainable and profitable enterprises which will have a positive impact for both the economy 
and their shareholders. Regarding the purpose of democratising the workplace, the consultation 
process entrenched in the LRA in terms of sec. 189 and 189A promotes employee participation 
in the decision-making process.577 
It is through this process that employees can present their case and be heard.578 The process is 
designed so that the employees can influence the ultimate decision of the employer with regard 
to retrenchment.579 The Act makes provision for the employer to consult over issues such as 
measures affecting the possibility of dismissal and selection criteria in addition to severance 
allowance.580 It requires that the employer disclose information relating to the reason for the 
retrenchment, offer alternatives to retrenchment, propose severance pay and provide other 
assistance.581 The LRA enables the employees at the initiative of the employer, collectively to 
bargain to affect the employer’s decision and avoid retrenchment. Should the employer decide 
to proceed with retrenchment, the process enables employees to bargain for favourable terms 
                                                 
574 Foodgro v Keil (n 281) 2524H-I. 
575 The Act provides that a dismissal is fair if it is based on the operational requirements of the employer which 
are defined to include economic, technological, structural and other similar needs of the employer (See ss 
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577 See in particular ss 189(5)-(6) of LRA (n 17). 
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579 Above. 
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of separation.582 Theoretically, it is consonant with the concept of social justice in the 
workplace and may ensure labour peace.583 
The above scenario as it relates to the attainment of social justice and labour peace may be 
consistent even when the reason for retrenchment is contentious as in seeking further 
profitability for an already-profitable enterprise. If the employer has an economic objective 
which, by a court’s determination is legitimate, it would satisfy the first and second leg of the 
substantive fairness test.584 If in the quest of further profitability, the employer is unable to 
achieve the objective by alternative means, the employer is entitled to retrench.585 
Permitting employers to retrench where to do so is not driven by an urgent need to protect the 
business from ruin or some external economic pressure such as increased competition, is 
problematic. It opens up possibilities for defeating the attainment of social justice and in 
consequence maintaining labour peace. It especially is true when one accounts for the changes 
which fundamentally are transforming the operational dynamics of the labour market. Today, 
employees and employers alike operate in an environment characterised by rapid developments 
in technology. 
As discussed in par. 2.2 above, the technologies of the fourth industrial age are capable of 
performing menial as well as some cognitive tasks that currently are performed by human 
beings.586 Some of these technologies, particularly digitalisation and the application of artificial 
intelligence software, have altered the manner in which employers operate and have led to 
redundancy of posts such as call centre workers and similar customer services personnel.587 
Overall between a quarter and two-thirds (possibly more) of all formally employed people in 
South Africa occupy positions that readily are automatable.588 The nature of these technologies 
which already exist and are expected to be developed over the next decade ought to be a cause 
for concern if the question of the continued validity of retrenchment in pursuit of profit remains 
unanswered. 
As indicated above, the operational requirements which include the economic, technological, 
structural and similar needs of the employer do not operate independently of each other. In 
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almost every case of technological, structural or similar needs there is an economic imperative 
informing each. The solution to meeting the economic needs of the employer may be solved 
either by retrenching employees without making any changes to the structure of the employer’s 
business operations or by restructuring its operations. Today, this goal can be effectively 
achieved through the introduction of technology.589  
4.7.1.1 The Problem 
The confirmation by the LAC that the employer’s economic needs do not preclude the pursuit 
of further profitability leads to an expectation of technology-induced retrenchments. In 
circumstances where the employer automates, posts are likely either to become redundant or 
conditions of employment will be altered. If new positions are created, the likelihood of the 
same skill required by the job now obsolete being applicable is minimal, especially taking into 
account the nature of the work created in the fourth industrial revolution.590 At the same time, 
it is not desirable to compel an employer to retain personnel they have no use for.  
The consequence, given the capabilities of technology, of “[entitling] [an employer] to insist 
by economic [restructuring] that a profitable centre becomes even more profitable”591 creates 
the opportunity for employers to achieve substantial profitability at the expense of social and 
labour stability. South Africa has a high rate of inequality.592 Many employees who are likely 
to be retrenched already are afflicted by poverty. The loss of their employment not only is a 
setback, but will exacerbate the high level of unemployment, irrespective of whether one relies 
on the official statistic or an expanded definition.593 
These are not legal points, however. But they present a reality within which the retrenchment 
laws operate. They raise a question as to the proper purpose of employment law if in South 
Africa an employer is permitted to retrench even if an economic need, technically,  does not 
exist. (Emphasis added). Without being a compelling enough reason for retrenchment, 
dismissal in pursuit of profit will only exacerbate the situation in the labour market and 
consequently, in South African society. 
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Central to this observation is that the scale at which retrenchments may be effected has 
increased significantly;594 a larger number of workers may be rendered redundant at the same 
time than previously thought possible. With a right to retrench in pursuit of further profit595 an 
employer has the means to retrench if it can legitimately show that its economic objectives can 
be attained through automation.  
In these terms, a profit-seeking endeavour is no different from the objective of the employer 
facing financial ruin and whose reasons for retrenchment are prima facie genuine.596 The LAC 
has endorsed a pursuit of further profit as a legitimate reason for depriving employees of their 
livelihoods. As well as negative societal issues that retrenchment causes, depriving an 
employee of his source of income has personal consequences. As discussed in par 2.4 above, 
an employee’s job is an important aspect of his personality.597 In the case of the employee 
social justice obtains at an economic and job security level,598 which means the employee is at 
the centre of economic decisions and his interests are vital in determining appropriate action 
when retrenchment for any operational need is contemplated. 
The employee’s interests seem to be irrelevant to the pursuit of financial gain. The endorsement 
of a profitable employer’s right to retrench in pursuance of further profit means that the interest 
in the economic security of the employee is secondary to an employer even if an employer is 
not under any objective tension or market compulsion to seek retrenchment. 
It is difficult to reconcile retrenchments occasioned by a desire to further profit with sections 1 
and 3 of the LRA. The Act requires that each object in sec. 1 be fulfilled to give effect to its 
purposes.599 Retrenchments for profit relegate social justice to a subordinate issue. It makes the 
inclusion of this object merely as a fulfilment of a formality and renders the consultation 
process pointless. In these circumstances it does not matter what are the interests of the 
employee. It is  difficult to reconcile this situation with the conclusions of the LAC in multiple 
decisions, that the LRA places a premium on job security; that “it is unfair for an employer, in 
[choosing] a solution to deal with problems in his business, to [opt for] a solution that entails 
job losses if there is another solution which [can save jobs]”.600 If the statements of the courts 
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are to be believed, an employer who faces no reasonable business demands that justify 
retrenchment cannot have a legitimate operational requirement. 
A counterargument is that employees can negotiate for better separation benefits and are not 
forced into an inferior position. However, this counterargument is incorrect. The LRA imposes 
a duty on the employer to consult over severance benefits and other payments;601  the employer 
is obliged to pay all the remuneration benefits for the work done including other payments due 
to the employee such as retirement withdrawal benefits, notice pay and leave pay.602 In 
addition, the employer is required to pay the statutory minimum of one week’s remuneration 
per year of completed service.603 The parties may negotiate for a severance amount above that 
stipulated in sec. 41(2) read with sec. 35(5) of the BCEA.604 If during consultation the employer 
refuses a severance payment suggested by the employees which is higher than the default, no 
court or tribunal has the power to force an employer to go above and beyond its statutory 
obligation.605 
For these reasons it is submitted that it is an incorrect view. What the LRA considers a fair 
reason for retrenchment should  be derived from more than a plain reading of the text of the 
statute, it should be interpreted purposively and contextually to effectuate the “[advancement] 
of economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the 
workplace”.606 It is in weighing up  the interests of the employee and those of the employer 
that a court arrives at a conclusion which is appropriate, fair and consistent with the Act. The 
Constitutional Court affirms as much by stating that “[t]he purpose of [a provision] […] must 
be contextualised within the right to fair labour practices […] and the purpose of the LRA as a 
whole”607 and that “[e]very provision of the LRA must therefore be read to create clear and 
precise parameters through which both employers and employees can meaningfully participate 
in labour relations”.608 (Emphasis added). If an interpretation fails to give effect to the stated 
purpose of the LRA, effectively by excluding the basic interests of a party to the matter, such 
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party cannot partake meaningfully in arriving at any relevant decision. As a result, an 
interpretation which permits this situation cannot be said to accord with the purpose of the Act. 
4.7.2 Timing of Consultation in Tech-Induced Dismissals 
This study deals specifically with the substantive aspects of retrenchments; however, the issue 
of consultation is relevant in that the substantive fairness of a retrenchment is effectuated 
during consultation.609 The timing of the consultation process has a significant bearing on the 
fairness of the outcome. 
 It is trite that the LRA recognises the technological needs of the employer as a legitimate 
reason for retrenchment.610 Technological reasons are unique in that unlike economic needs 
arising from financial distress they are initiated through the actions of the employer. For this 
reason, the LAC has suggested that a greater duty to consult extensively exists in these 
situations.611 It appears that the labour courts will scrutinise the case of the employer who 
automates, however it is unclear whether the decision has any effect on the timing of 
consultations in cases of workplace automation. The Labour Court in Singh v Mondi Papers 
held that where the employer introduces new technology and reorganises the way in which they 
conduct operations, they do not have to consult until after implementation.612 The Court  stated 
that redundancy created by technology does not lead ipso facto to dismissal, especially in large 
organisations in which alternative employment can be offered.613 
The Court’s observation has merit, but it ignores the character of retrenchments directed by 
internal exigencies. In taking the decision to implement new technologies in the workplace, the 
employer often is in a position to assess whether so doing will result in new skills being 
required or whether the labour force may be reduced or whether all positions will become 
redundant. 
As held in Stirling, an employer has reasonable foresight when contemplating the 
implementation of internally-driven changes.614 In these circumstances an employer is able to 
predict whether or not the introduction of new machinery or software will result in some 
occupations being rendered obsolete. When an employer intends to implement changes, 
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whether through the introduction of new technology or by restructuring of the enterprise but 
not for reasons attached to an urgent economic concern, this position is questionable.  
The possibility of alternative positions is not sufficient reason to delay consultation.  An 
occupation in the organisation may require different skills from those which the employees 
possess or are able to attain or the remuneration package attached to the alternative position 
may not be satisfactory. 
That the employer need not consult until after the decision has been implemented needs to be 
reviewed. 
4.7.3 Training & Upskilling 
Linked to the issue of the timing of consultation and retrenchment in pursuit of further profit 
is the question of up-skilling. Education and training have a significant role to play in 
alleviating the potential for job losses stemming from the redundancy of posts likely to be 
caused by automation. The import of the role of education and training can be gleaned from 
various reports released by the ILO, the World Economic Forum and the World Bank.615 Some 
skills fundamental to a successful career in the future require a degree of training and others 
require a foundational shift in the education system.616 An exploration of the flaws in the 
education system falls outside the scope of this study, but there is a fundamental need for the 
education system to be reconfigured in order to cope with the requirements of a STEM-based 
labour market. 
Training, on the other hand, particularly re-skilling and up-skilling are matters which affect the 
workplace and whose importance is of equal import in view of automation. Often automation 
creates new occupations in the enterprise and the associated responsibilities require some level 
of employee retraining. For some positions the requirement for retraining is minimal and 
uncomplicated whereas in other occupations an employee may be required to take a course to 
acquire the relevant skills. 
The courts do not place a duty on employers to invest substantially in up-skilling employees as 
an alternative to retrenchment. This is especially concerning in a case where the employer is a 
profitable enterprise. This legal position leads to a situation where employees are left to fend 
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for themselves, even though they may have been capable of successfully up-skilling to meet 
the requirements of alternative positions in the enterprise. 
It is unclear whether or not this contributes to the substantive unfairness of a retrenchment. 
However, it appears to relate more to business ethics as well as moral considerations, as 
opposed to a legal issue. Nevertheless, it is an issue the acceptance of which ought to be 
reconsidered and its effects properly evaluated with regard to the negative impact it has. 
4.8 Concluding Remarks 
South African law on unfair retrenchments provides a comprehensive legislative mechanism 
in the form of the LRA by means of which disputes over retrenchment can be properly and 
extensively ventilated between the parties concerned. The Act provides an approach through 
which its provisions are to be interpreted. The legislative provisions generally appear capable 
of being interpreted in a manner that gives effect to the interests of both employer and employee 
and similarly provide protection to employees. 
The problems begin to appear when the judiciary is tasked with the responsibility to interpret 
the provisions of the LRA. The courts generally have applied the retrenchment provisions 
properly but have also created several legal pitfalls which appear inconsonant with the objects 
and purposes of the Act. On some issues, the statute is silent and leaves much to the discretion 
of the courts. The problems identified in this chapter have the potential to expose employees 
to potentially unfair retrenchment practices, especially in light of the fourth technological 
revolution.  The following problems have been identified in this study: 
• The courts have adopted an expansive definition of the employer’s economic needs 
entitling profitable enterprises to dismiss employees for economic needs. It is evident 
that the courts in accepting this conception of economic needs fail to give reasonable 
effect to the purposes of the LRA which relate to social justice and labour peace. In 
addition, the court’s conceptualisation of economic needs may have the effect of 
exposing a broader spectrum of employees to the possibility of retrenchment caused by 
automation of posts resulting from a pursuit of further profit. The LRA is silent on this 
point, but it can be inferred that the court errs in failing to apply the principles of 
sections 1 and 3 of the Act. 
• The LRA does not make a distinction between retrenchments driven by internal forces 
under the control of the employer and retrenchment beyond the control of the employer 
(that is, caused by external factors). The courts have made this distinction and have 
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stated that the consultation process will be more onerous for an employer than if the 
retrenchment is driven by external forces. It is, unclear whether this position affects the 
timing of consultations if an employer chooses to automate, since the Labour Court has 
held that the duty to consult in these circumstances arises only when the employer has 
implemented the changes and redundancies occur. The reason this is problematic is that 
it deprives employees of an opportunity either to re-skill and/or up-skill for alternative 
posts in the enterprise or may dispossess them of the opportunity to find alternative 
employment prior to their occupations being rendered redundant or the conditions of 
employment altered. 
• The courts accept that an employer, especially one who relies on redundancies as a 
reason to retrench, has a duty to train employees for alternative positions available in 
the operation, but the obligation does not extend to substantial investment in up-
skilling. It should be noted that employers who rely on the redundancy of posts as a 
means to retrench often do not face financial ruin. In that environment, the employee is 
responsible for his own training regardless of the financial position of the employer. In 
an era where technology forces employees (in South Africa sometimes poorly paid)617 
to acquire new and specialised skills, this approach lacks moral and ethical content. 
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CHAPTER 5: BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS FROM FRANCE 
5.1 Introduction 
Contemporary South African labour law is a product of a process influenced by international 
law and practices as well as foreign law.618 Formulated extensively by the former Industrial 
Court under its unfair labour practice jurisdiction, the contents of what is reflected in the LRA 
is a result of importations from a number of foreign jurisdictions as well as the ILO. Foreign 
law is not to be ignored; it serves as an important source on which our courts can draw.  
The purpose in this chapter is to explore the best practices and developments in retrenchment 
law in the French Republic. It is not an in-depth exploration of every aspect of French 
retrenchment law but focuses on best practices. Although reference is made to features of its 
procedural aspects, such as notices, it is not an exploration of the step-by-step process of 
retrenchment.  
France distinguishes between individual and collective retrenchments, which have their 
respective requirements. However, the retrenchment practices that are most relevant to this 
found are on collective redundancies.619 Therefore, this chapter will only focus thereon. 
5.2 Relevance of Foreign Law 
The importance of foreign law is embedded in modern South African constitutional law. The 
Constitution “encourages an international and foreign law-friendly approach” which is given 
content in sec. 39 and effectuated through case law.620 Sec. 39(1)(a) requires that any court or 
tribunal interpreting the Bill of Rights “must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”.621 This duty imposed on 
courts is that the Constitution warrants a standard against which the courts’ may determine 
adherence to this basic tenet. The Constitutional Court in Ferreira v Levin (decided under the 
Interim Constitution) confirmed this fact, stating: 
“Nevertheless, section 33(1) of our Constitution enjoins us to consider, inter alia, what would 
be “justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality” and section 
35(1) obliges us to promote the values underlying such a society when we interpret Chapter 3 
and encourages us to have regard to comparable case law. In construing and applying our 
                                                 
618 See Shezi (n 118); see discussion in par 2.2; see Cheadle 
619 Which will, often be referred to as “retrenchments” for convenience. 
620 See Fourie “Non-standard workers: the South African context, international law and regulation by the 
European Union” 2008 PER 110 132. 
621 S 39(1)(a) of Constitution (n 10). 
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Constitution, we are dealing with fundamental legal norms which are steadily becoming more 
universal in character.  [When a foreign jurisdiction makes certain findings on a relevant issue] 
[…], we have regard to these findings, not in order to draw direct analogies, but to identify the 
underlying reasoning with a view to establishing the norms that apply in other open and 
democratic societies based on freedom and equality.”622 (emphasis added) 
The South African Bill of Rights has been greatly influenced by foreign law, especially 
Canadian and German law.623 Foreign law continues to play an important role in judicial 
interpretation in South Africa and the Constitutional Court leads the way in this comparative 
approach. Enabling the Court in this endeavour are sections 39(1)(b) and 39(1)(c) which enjoin 
any court or tribunal to consider international law and invite them to consider foreign law when 
interpreting the Bill.624 Foreign law, although not always readily transplantable has persuasive 
value. However, the High Court, accepting the importance of foreign law, nevertheless has 
cautioned against the wanton transplantation of foreign law, stating 
“[h]aving regard to all these considerations it appears to me that a Court, when considering the 
responses of other legal systems […], should avoid an uncritical adoption of foreign law 
principles”.625 
The High Court opinion is in the context of the law of delict, but the principle is true for other 
fields of law. Although a court is encouraged by the Constitution to consider foreign law, the 
Constitution does not give it the binding effect it affords international law.626 Accordingly, a 
court may refer to foreign law either as a means to find a better example or a bad application 
of a particular provision, but is not bound to follow it.627 
Foreign law nevertheless is a vital source of law from which South African courts in their 
discretion may derive principles or guidance. The inclusion of this provision in the Constitution 
is not merely due to a constitutional legal system in its infancy but reflects a conscientious 
legislative decision upon which the South African constitutional order is founded. 
 
                                                 
622 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
1025C-E. 
623 Du Bois and Visser “The influence of foreign law in South Africa” 2003 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 593 632. 
624 S 39(b)-(c) of Constitution (n 10). 
625 Mahlangu v Minister of Police 2017 38 ILJ 1749 (GP) 1755I-J and 1756A. 
626 See Fourie (n 620) 133; see also s 39(1)(b)-(c) of Constitution (n 10). 
627 See Fourie (n 620) 133. 
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5.3 Employment Law in France 
5.3.1 Overview of France and Justifications 
The modern French Republic (the French Fifth Republic) was established in terms of the 
Constitution of 1958.628 France has a population of approximately 67 million people and is the 
sixth largest economy in the world.629 France is a founding member of the European Union and 
maintains an important position in global geopolitics.630  France is a member of the ILO and 
has ratified about 127 conventions, 79 of which remain in force (including all 8 fundamental 
ILO conventions in addition to Convention 158 on the Termination of 
Employment).631Although its political system differs substantially from South Africa’s, France 
reflects economic similarity to South Africa by its government playing a significant role in the 
economy.632 
Fundamental to French society are the social democratic foundations of the country which are 
reflected in the country’s employment laws.633 France has been described as having the most 
stringent labour laws of all European Union member states.634 It maintains an extensive 
employment social security benefits system which is backed substantially by employers.635 
Despite these restrictive labour laws, some of which have since been amended,636 France 
                                                 
628 French Constitution, 1958; see also Blanpain, Bisom-Rapp, Corbett, Josephs and Zimmer The Global 
Workplace: International and Comparative Employment Law – Cases and Materials (2007) 432. 
629 “Population changes – demographics balance sheet 2018” Institut National de la Statistique et des Études 
Économiques 2019 (https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/2382601?sommaire=2382613 (20-10-2019)); 
“GDP(current US$) – France” The World Bank 2019 
(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=FR&year_high_desc=true (20-10-2019)) 
630 France is a member of the so-called Inner Six, a group of states that founded the European Community, the 
precursor to the European Union (Blanpain et al (n 628) 435); France is one of the 5 permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council “Current members” United Nations Security Council 2019 
(https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members (20-10-2019)). 
631 “Ratifications of France” ILO 2019 
(https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102632(20-10-
2019)); Notwithstanding, France is noted for its high rate of non-compliance with its ILO obligations (Blanpain 
et al (n 628) 435. 
632 This is  through the Government Shareholding Agency (APE) (see Government Shareholding Agency 
Annual Report 2017-2018 (2018) 12 (available from 
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/agence-participations-etat/Documents/Rapports-de-
l-Etat-actionnaire/2017/REA_EN_72dpi.pdf (20-10-2019)). 
633 Blanpain et al (n 628) 433. 
634 Le Barbachon and Malherbet (n 68) 11; Blanpain et al (n 628) 433; see also Grandu (n 67) 403. 
635 Above. 
636 Ordonnance n° 2017-1387 of 22 September 2017 (accessible from 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000035607388&categorieLien=id (09-05-
2019)). 
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recorded substantial economic growth in the past and has an unemployment rate of 
approximately 8.5%.637 
5.3.2 Retrenchment Law in France 
5.3.2.1 Sources 
The main source of labour law in France is national legislation.638 Protection against unfair 
dismissal is found in a comprehensive collection of laws known as the Code du Travail. The 
French Labour Code deals extensively with many aspects of labour relations and practices 
including inter alia regulation of the contracts of employment, regulation of the conditions of 
employment, employee representation and the laws governing resolution of labour disputes.639 
The other sources of labour law are European Union (“EU”) regulations and directives, 
decisions of the European Court of Justice, international law, as well as contracts of 
employment, collective bargaining agreements and employer’s workplace rules.640 However, 
much of French labour law is understood in terms of the comprehensive body of laws contained 
in the Labour Code and, since France is an EU member state, the interpretation of the Labour 
Code must be read in compliance with EU law.641 
French retrenchment law is based in part on Directive 75/129/EEC on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies (mutatis mutandis).642 However, 
the French Labour Code complies with the Directive and is more detailed and protective. 
Therefore, it is justifiable to consider the Labour Code independently of the Directive. 
5.3.2.2 Dismissal for Operational Requirements in France 
The French Labour Code recognises two types of situations whereby employment may be 
terminated by the employer, namely a dismissal for personal reasons or personal motives 
(licenciement pour motif personnel) and a dismissal for economic reasons (licenciement pour 
motif économique).643 
 
                                                 
637 “Report for selected countries” International Monetary Fund 2019 (https://bit.ly/2Jjac43 (20-10-2919)); see 
also “Unemployment by sex and age - monthly average” Eurostat 2019 
(https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_m&lang=en (22-10-2019)) 
638 Blanpain et al (n 628) 435. 
639 Blanpain et al (n 628) 435. 
640 Above. 
641 Blanpain et al (n 628) 435. 
642 Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies. 
643 See Titre III Chapitre II and III of Code du Travail (n 29). 
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5.3.2.3 Dismissal for Economic Reasons 
According to article L1233-3 a dismissal for economic reasons is constituted by the termination 
of a contract of employment of indefinite duration by an employer for reasons unrelated to the 
employee’s person and as a consequence of an occupation or job being eliminated or modified 
or the modification of an essential aspect of the contract brought about by economic difficulties, 
changes in technology, restructuring of the business to safeguard its competitiveness or by the 
cessation of the activities of the business.644 A dismissal for economic reasons is differentiated 
from personal reasons in that it concerns no objective fault on the part of the employee.645 
The economic reasons an employer may rely on are economic difficulties, technological 
changes, restructuring in order to safeguard its competitiveness or if the business is insolvent. 
The Code describes economic difficulties as characterized by the significant change of at least 
one economic indicator such as a decrease in orders or turnover, operating losses or by the 
deterioration in the cash flow or the gross profit of the operation or by any other factor likely 
to justify these difficulties.646 The economic difficulties need not be catastrophic in their effect, 
they merely have to be real and serious.647 Significant reduction of the turnover and orders are 
determined in comparison to the same period in the previous year, having regard to the number 
of employees in the enterprise.648  
Changes in technology have been described as the acquisition of new technologies that change 
the methods of operation of the enterprise as well as computerisation and may result in 
redundancies.649 The employer is entitled to introduce new technologies into the workplace 
regardless of the effect. 
From the definition three points may be inferred. First, a dismissal for economic reasons may 
occur when financial difficulties, the introduction of new technology or restructuring cause an 
occupation to become redundant or be modified. Second, it may occur if for the same reasons 
an employee refuses to accept a modification of an essential element of the contract (élément 
                                                 
644 Art L. 1233-3 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
645 The courts  however recognise personal reasons that do not impute fault on the part of the employee (see 
Blanpain (n 628) 439). 
646 Art L. 1233-3 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
647 See discussion in par 5.3.2.4; see also Cass. soc., 9 juill. 1997, n° 95-43.722, Bull. 1997 V N° 261 p. 188. 
(https://www.doctrine.fr/d/CASS/1997/JURITEXT000007037922). 
648 Art L. 1233-3 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
649 Cass. soc., 2 juin 1993, n° 90-44.956, Bull. 1993 V N° 155 p. 106. 
(https://www.doctrine.fr/d/CASS/1993/JURITEXT000007030368 (20-10-2019)). 
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essentiel du contrat de travail). The third point that can be inferred is that the dismissal for 
economic reasons cannot be effected on employees on fixed-term contracts.650 
5.2.3.4 Real and Serious Cause 
Whether a dismissal is for personal or economic reasons the Labour Code stipulates that for a 
dismissal to be valid and lawful either ground of termination must first be justified by a real 
and serious cause (une cause réelle et sérieuse).651 The requirement implies that the reason 
must be a result of a material fact which is capable of being proved;652 it must be connected to 
the performance of the contract and relate either to the person of the employee or his ability or 
to the organization and the proper functioning of the enterprise.653 
If a court finds that a retrenchment is without real and serious cause, the court will declare it to 
be unjustified (or unfair). In these circumstances the employee will be reinstated subject to his 
length of service and the size of the company;654 otherwise the employee will be entitled to 
end-of-contract benefits including severance benefits, paid leave and notice pay in addition to 
compensation by the employer for the unjustified dismissal as determined by a judge in 
accordance with the prescribed minimums set out in the Labour Code.655 
5.2.3.5 Key Substantive Measures in Dismissal for Economic Reasons 
The Labour Code stipulates that prior to proceeding with any collective redundancy an 
employer must twice consult with the Social and Economic Committee (comité social et 
économique, “CSE”)656 in respect of the reasons for the dismissals and their conditions.657 At 
the same time the employer is obliged to communicate with the Regional Directorate for 
Enterprises, Competition, Consumption, Labour and Employment (Direction régionale des 
Entreprises, de la Concurrence, de la Consommation, du Travail et de l'Emploi, “Direccte”)658 
by registered post, informing it of the proposed retrenchments.659 If an employer fails to comply 
                                                 
650 This is an interesting position given the controversy that has followed a similar finding by the LAC in 
Buthelezi where the Court held that dismissal for operational requirements may not apply to persons on fixed-
term contracts (See Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board 2004 25 ILJ 2317 (LAC)). 
651 Art L1233-2 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
652 Cass. soc., 9 juill. 2014, n° 13-13.719 (https://www.doctrine.fr/d/CASS/2014/JURITEXT000029248294 (20-
10-2019)). 
653 Cass. soc., 9 juill. 2014, n° 13-13.719; see also Cass. soc., 14 mai 1996, n° 94-45.499, Bull. 1996 V N° 189 
p. 133 (https://www.doctrine.fr/d/CASS/1996/JURITEXT000007038341 (20-10-2019)) and Cass. soc., 20 mars 
1990, n° 89-40.515, Bull. 1990 V N° 124 p. 72. 
(https://www.doctrine.fr/d/CASS/1990/JURITEXT000007024597 (20-10-2019)) 
654 Art L. 1235-5 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
655 Art L. 1235-3 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
656 Which represents staff within a company. 
657 Art L. 1233-28 to L. 1233-30 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
658 A state agency responsible for overseeing the application of labour laws. 
659 Art L. 1233-46 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
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with these requirements, the employee has a claim for damages against the employer for failure 
to comply with a correct procedure.660 There is no maximum cap placed on the amount. 
5.2.3.5.1 Training, Adaptation, Reclassification 
The French Labour Code imposes an important prior obligation on the employer in its quest to 
retrench. Article L. 1233-4 states the following:  
“Le licenciement pour motif économique d'un salarié ne peut intervenir que lorsque 
tous les efforts de formation et d'adaptation ont été réalisés et que le reclassement de 
l'intéressé ne peut être opéré sur les emplois disponibles […]”.661  
 It means that a dismissal for economic reasons can become effective only after the employer 
offers training and attempts at adaptation and thereafter the employee cannot be placed in any 
available position (or alternative position). The Code states that the available positions in the 
enterprise on which ‘reclassification’ attempts should be made must be located within the 
national territory of France.662  
If the employer belongs to a group of companies, reclassification must be made to an available 
position in that group of companies as defined in art. L. 233-1, I and II of art. L. 233-3 and 
Article L. 233-16 of the French Commercial Code.663 The reclassification must be to a position 
in the same category as the redundant one or in an equivalent position with equivalent 
remuneration.664 An employee whose position has become redundant may be placed in a lower 
category position only with his consent.665  
5.2.3.5.1.1 Skills Development Plan 
As well as an obligation to train and attempt to adapt employees before retrenchment, there is 
a skills development plan (Le Plan de Développement des Compétences “PDC”).666 The Labour 
Code does not make it obligatory for an employer to implement a skills development plan 
nevertheless it makes provision for obligations attaching to the development and continued 
                                                 
660 Art L. 1235-12 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
661 Art L. 1233-4 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
662 Art L. 1233-4 of Code du Travail (n 29); This used to apply internationally to a group of companies but was 
changed by the Ordonnance of the French President in 2018 (Ordonnance n° 2017-1387 of 22 September 2017 
(n 635)) 
663 Art L. 1233-4 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
664 Art L. 1233-4 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
665 Above. 
666 Which replaced the former training plan on 1 January 2019 
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adaptation of employees to their workstations.667 One can  assume that it is encouraged if not, 
similar to the Retrenchment Code in South Africa, easily mandated. If an employer decides to 
implement a PDC, the plan must contain various compulsory and optional programmes. The 
plan is required to provide training in order to allow for the adaptation of the employee to his 
job by acquiring skills which can be used in the execution of his contract of employment.668  
This obligation extends to other skills which, although not necessary, may become so as part 
of a planned transformation of the workplace or occupations within the workplace. The plan 
may contain other training actions which are not compulsory, such as acquisition of skills that 
are not critical for the retention of the job, but which may allow the employee to acquire 
professional development in or outside the company. 
The employer does not need the permission of the employee to place him in a compulsory 
training regime. The Labour Code allows the employee a right to refuse compulsory training if 
it is offered outside working hours.669 
5.2.3.5.2 Partial Activity 
A pre-retrenchment device that may be used by an employer is called a partial activity of the 
employee (activité partielle du salarié) which can be implemented only with the prior 
authorisation of the Direccte.670 Under partial activity, employees are not retrenched by the 
employer but may lose earnings due to a reduction of working hours below the legal minimum 
or by the partial or temporary closure of the employer’s operation.671  
Once the employer acquires a partial activity permit (which expires after 6 months)672 the 
employees who suffer a loss of earnings will be compensated by the employer who, in turn, is 
reimbursed by the State.673 
The partial activity permit suspends the contract of employment but does not modify or 
terminate it.674 The employer undertakes not to dismiss employees who are placed on partial 
activity for the duration of the permit (subject to past partial activity permits).675 
                                                 
667 Art L. 1233-4, L. 6312-1 and L. 6321-1 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
668 Art L. 6312-1 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
669 Art R. 6321-4 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
670 Art R. 5122-1 and R. 5122-1 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
671 Art L. 5122-1-I of Code du Travail (n 29). 
672 Art R. 5122-9-I of Code du Travail (n 29). 
673 Art L. 5122-1-II and R5122-5 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
674 Art R. 5122-9 of Code du Travail (n 29) 
675 Above. 
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5.2.3.5.3 Plan for Safeguarding Employment 
In every dismissal for economic reasons any employer who employs 50 or more employees 
and contemplates dismissing a minimum of 10 of those employees within a period of 30 
consecutive days is required to implement a Plan for Safeguarding Employment ( Plan de 
sauvegarde de l'emploi, “PSE”).676 A PSE scheme is aimed at either avoiding or limiting the 
number of dismissals by the employer.  
The PSE includes a reclassification plan which will facilitate the reclassification of those 
employees whose retrenchment cannot be avoided (that is, those whose positions are 
redundant).677 The plan must detail inter alia plans to reclassify employees internally within 
the national territory of France in positions in the same category or equivalent jobs, measures 
to reduce or adjust working hours, conditions for implementing reclassification leave or the 
contract of professional security.678 
The PSE may be agreed by way of a majority collective agreement, in the absence of which 
the employer may formulate one.679 Whether by way of collective agreement or formulated by 
the employer, the employer must consult with the CSE on the Plan for Safeguarding 
Employment before the document is submitted to the Direccte, which has to approve the PSE 
before it comes into effect.680  
If an employer fails to implement a PSE, the subsequent retrenchment will be void and the 
employee will be entitled to reinstatement.681 If the employee opts not to be reinstated or it is 
not possible to reinstate the employee due to insolvency or as a result of the judicial liquidation 
of the enterprise, the employee will be entitled to compensation that cannot be lower than 6 
months’ remuneration.682 
5.2.3.5.4 Contract of Professional Security 
Another measure that the Code makes provision for is a contract of professional security 
(contrat de sécurisation professionnelle “CSP”). Before an employer can proceed with the 
retrenchment procedure, they are required to propose to an employee consultation over a 
                                                 
676 Art L. 1233-61 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
677 Art L. 1233-61 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
678 Art L. 1233-62 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
679 Art L. 1233-24-1 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
680 Art L. 1233-57-1 and 1233-57-2 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
681 Art L. 1235-10 and L. 1235-11 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
682 Art L. 1235-11 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
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CSP.683 This measure is designed to place employees on an accelerated path towards future 
reemployment, whether with the same employer or elsewhere.684 The CSP applies to employers 
with no more than 1000 employees.685 If the employer has more than 1000 employees, they are 
required to provide reclassification leave (congé de reclassement) instead.  
If the employee refuses to accept a CSP, the employer will follow the normal retrenchment 
procedure.686 If, however, the employee accepts a CSP, he will benefit from a skills assessment 
consultation with an employment centre (pôle emploi) or whichever organisation is in charge 
of the CSP system in the employee’s domicile.687 Where an employee accepts the CSP his 
employment is terminated by mutual agreement and the CSP takes effect on the following day 
(and will subsist for 12 months).688 
During the subsistence of the CSP the employee may be required to attend training or receive 
offers of reclassification.689 In addition, the employee receives a monthly professional security 
allowance (allocation de sécurisation professionnelle “ASP”) in addition to severance pay.690 
If the employee has been employed for more than 1 year, he may receive a remainder of the 
notice pay if  greater than 3 months’ pay.691 
If during the duration of the CSP the employee unreasonably refuses to accept a reclassification 
offer, refuses two offers of employment or provides false statements in order to benefit from 
the CSP, the CSP will be terminated before term.692 
5.2.3.6 Selection Criteria 
It seems apposite to consider the process of selecting employees in France despite it not being 
too controversial a procedure under South African law. With regard to the selection of which 
employees to retrench the Labour Code imposes criteria for the selection of employees for 
                                                 
683 Art L. 1233-66 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
684 Art L. 1233-66 of Code du Travail (n 29); see also Art 1 Art 10 of Arrêté du 16 avril 2015 relatif à l'agrément 
de la convention du 26 janvier 2015 relative au contrat de sécurisation professionnelle (available from 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000030513552 (20-10-2019)). 
685 Art L. 1233-71 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
686 Art L. 1233-71 of Code du Travail (n 29). 
687 Art 5(1), 8 and 9(1) of Arrêté du 16 avril 2015 (n 684). 
688 Art 16 Arrêté du 6 octobre 2011 relatif à l'agrément de la convention du 19 juillet 2011 relative au contrat de 
sécurisation professionnelle (accessible from 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000024691298 (20-10-2019)); see also Art 
6 Arrêté du 16 avril 2015 (n 684). 
689 Art 10 of Arrêté du 16 avril 2015 (n 684). 
690 Art 15, 16 and 17 of Arrêté du 16 avril 2015 (n 684). 
691 Art 21 of Arrêté du 16 avril 2015 (n 684). 
692 Art 20 of Arrêté du 16 avril 2015 (n 684). 
105 
 
retrenchment provided they have not been determined in terms of a collective agreement.693 In 
terms of article L. 1233-5 where there is no collective agreement which determines the 
selection criteria the employer after consulting with the CSE must define selection criteria for 
retrenchment.694  
These criteria must take into account the family responsibilities of the employee, especially if 
the employee is a single parent.695 It should also account for the employees’ length of service 
and social attributes, including any difficulty with future workplace reintegration, particularly 
in relation to employees with disabilities and older workers.696 The criteria also must take into 
account the professional qualities and skills which must be determined in terms of the relevant 
job categories.697 
The Code further provides that the employer may prefer any one of the criteria, provided that 
they take each one into account when formulating the selection criteria.698 This situation is 
different in South Africa in that the selection criteria under the LRA are biased in favour of the 
LIFO principle which may even prove burdensome on younger employees. And the farther an 
employer moves away from LIFO when applying the selection criteria, the more likely that he 
invites an unfavourable decision. 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
The law governing dismissals for operational requirements (or dismissal for economic reasons) 
in France is complicated; but it nevertheless provides extensive protection to employees. It 
appears to demand looser requirements in instances where the employer has economic reasons. 
An employer does not have to face stringent justification requirements in order to establish that 
the reasons relied on are valid (or real and serious) but this situation is compensated for by the 
pre-dismissal requirements contained in the Labour Code.  
The Code makes provisions for various compulsory measures that considering the fourth 
industrial revolution, may prove useful in re-skilling and job retention. In addition, and apart 
from offering employees greater protection from retrenchment, the Code makes the process of 
                                                 
693 Art L. 1233-5of Code du Travail (n 29). 
694 Art L. 1233-5of Code du Travail (n 29). 
695 Art L. 1233-5of Code du Travail (n 29). 
696 Art L. 1233-5of Code du Travail (n 29). 
697 Art L. 1233-5of Code du Travail (n 29). 
698 Art L. 1233-5of Code du Travail (n 29). 
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retrenchment expensive for the employer, thus encouraging retention and the up-skilling of 
workers. 
A unique characteristic of French dismissal law involves the role of the state. In every collective 
dismissal an organ of state, the Direccte, is notified prior to the implementation of the collective 
redundancy process. Furthermore, the state plays a critical role in preserving jobs through 
various incentives which may have a cumulative and positive effect on the goal of job retention. 
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Findings: South Africa 
The South African law of unfair dismissal is governed by legislation in the form of the Labour 
Relations Act. In part the Act lays the foundation for the law relating to retrenchments, referred 
to as dismissals for operational requirements.  However, it does more. The Act stipulates 
various goals that it aims to achieve by regulating employment matters. The Act identifies these 
as the advancement of economic development, social justice, democratisation of the workplace 
and labour peace. The courts have affirmed these goals need to be achieved in conjunction with 
one another.699 
The question whether the LRA, its attendant regulations and interpretations provide sufficiently 
fair protection to workers in respect of retrenchments occasioned by today’s technological 
revolution remains to be answered. This chapter aims to provide a possible answer to this 
question. 
Throughout this study various observations were made and are summarised below: 
• South Africa has a serious problem with unemployment. At 27% at the end of 2018 the 
official unemployment rate is among the highest in the world despite it not reflecting 
the actual rate of unemployment which is almost 10% higher.700 In addition, the country 
is among the most unequal societies, with a large section of the population living in 
poverty.701 The problems of unemployment and inequality threaten to be made worse 
by the possibility of future job losses. The cause of uncertainty is the unprecedented, 
rapid and unrestricted entry of technology into the workplace. Technology already has 
transformed many methods of performing tasks across industries, obviating the need 
for certain tasks in certain jobs and rendering entire occupations redundant. This 
process is likely to result in more people being rendered jobless as employers retrench 
in order to increase productivity by adopting efficient and productive technologies. 
• The impact of these job losses will be far-reaching on individuals and society as a 
whole; work represents a fundamental aspect of the social fabric. For the employee it 
creates economic security and fosters self-worth and physical and mental well-being 
                                                 
699 Foodgro v Keil (n 281) 2524H-I. 
700 QLFS (n 59) 7. 
701 QLFS (n 59) 7; see also Mahadea and Kaseeram (n 59) 204; see also Zurnamer and Shivdasani (n 617) 5. 
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and secures one’s place in society.702 For the society the benefits include reduced 
poverty and unemployment and the independence of citizens from the state’s social 
security apparatus. Work can help to lessen inequality in society and create peace and 
prosperity. The need to reduce inequality is among the main objects of labour 
regulation. The role of labour law includes achieving the goal of social justice, a goal 
which is recognised also by the Constitution.703 Social justice in the workplace entails 
the economic uplift of workers. It involves the empowerment of employees by not 
relegating their interests below the economic benefit of employers but by placing them 
at the centre of economic decision-making.704 For these reasons the LRA imposes an 
interpretative approach towards its provisions which build on the purposes it aims to 
achieve. Among the goals set out by the LRA is the advancement of social justice. 
• The LRA is legislation which caters for the question of retrenchment in South African 
dismissal law. The Act identifies four circumstances under which retrenchments may 
be carried out fairly,705 it does not provide a useful definition nor does it define their 
scope. As a direct consequence of the Act’s silence in this regard much of what these 
operational requirements entail is left to the determination of the labour courts. The 
courts have given content to the definitions provided in the Act and expanded on them. 
Also, they may have created the possibility for future mass retrenchments. The courts 
appear to have failed to follow the interpretative tool provided by the LRA and thus, 
fail to give effect to its purposes. In addition, the courts appear unwilling to impose 
duties on employers which, if levied, could empower and uplift employees (that is, 
attain social justice). The problems created by the LRA’s silence that are identified in 
this study are the following: 
o First, the courts have ruled that employers may retrench employees even when 
the aim for such retrenchment is the pursuit of further profit. As has been 
observed in this study economic purposes inform every reason for retrenchment 
regardless of whether the reason given by the employer is an economic, 
technological or structural need. Although this issue remains controversial, it 
was argued that the recognition of economic purposes by the courts fell short of 
the purposive standard required by the LRA. This observation was made in view 
                                                 
702 See discussion in par 2.4. 
703 S 1 of LRA (n 17); see also Preamble of Constitution (n 10). 
704 See discussion in par 2.4.4. 
705 Which are economic, technological, structural and similar needs of the employer. 
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of the increased opportunities of employers to employ technology in place of 
workers. It was argued further that a profitable enterprise which is permitted to 
retrench employees does not give effect to the purpose of the LRA because 
inevitably it ignores the interests of employees and does not effectuate social 
justice. Social justice, it was argued, entails the economic uplift of employees 
by placing their interests at the centre of all economic decision-making. 
Relegating the interests of employees below economic needs of employers may 
also jeopardise the achievement of labour peace. 
o Second, the courts have held that employers whose actions create the reason to 
retrench have no duty to consult until they have implemented their decisions 
and after redundancies have occurred. It was argued that the position taken by 
the court needs to be reviewed. An employer who intends to introduce changes 
that result in retrenchment in fairness ought to occasion measures that obviate 
the possible retrenchments, either by up-skilling and re-adapting or by allowing 
workers to seek alternative employment. It was argued employers can foresee 
changes which their actions introduce in the workplace. 
o An issue that raises concern is the question of training. In this regard the courts 
accept that an employer has a duty to train its employees for alternative positions 
in the enterprise before resorting to retrenchment. However, the courts have 
found it prudent to restrict this duty to what they term “minimal training”. 
Essentially, it means employees cannot be adapted to new occupations and are 
dismissed even when they could be retrained whatever the extent of the training 
required, in order to shield profitable employers from “unnecessary costs 
implications”.706  
This study has observed that the provisions of the LRA governing retrenchments create a 
comprehensive scheme of laws which provides protection to employees by imposing various 
obligations on the employer. By requiring employers to consult with employees before making 
a decision to retrench, the LRA ensures that matters of substance in the retrenchments of 
employees such as (but not limited to) attempts at saving jobs or minimising job losses and, 
where this is not possible, discussions regarding issues of benefit to the employees are properly 
ventilated and that the decision arrived at is fair to the employees as well. However, the Act 
does not go far enough. It leaves the determination of several substantive aspects of 
                                                 
706 SACCAWU v Amalgamated Retailers (n 559) 2534A-F. 
110 
 
retrenchment to the discretion of the courts which in interpreting the provisions fail to give 
effect to the LRA’s basic aims. Given the courts’ inconsistency in this regard, it is suggested 
that it would be justifiable for the LRA to be amended and, in the circumstances that will be 
discussed in paragraph 6.3 below, the Act makes specific provision therefor. 
6.2 Comparative Value of French Retrenchment Practices 
Before a discussion of the recommendations, the exploration of the best practices in French 
collective redundancy law is briefly discussed. The French Labour Code is one of the most 
restrictive, particularly as regards collective redundancies (or retrenchments). The observations 
informing the preceding statement are summarised below: 
• Under the Labour Code an employer may not proceed with dismissals unless he has a 
real and serious cause to do so. A serious cause in retrenchments is established only by 
a real and provable reason which affects the organisation or its proper function. 
• Once such a real and serious cause has been established the employer is not given the 
opportunity to retrench. Instead, the employer is required first to provide employees as 
much training and adaptation as is needed in order to ‘reclassify’ them for any available 
position in the enterprise of a similar nature and value. This reclassification is not 
restricted to a particular operation, it is determined at a national level or at a group level 
if the employer belongs to a group of companies. Only after such attempts have been 
made and the employee is unable to be placed in any available occupation can the 
employer initiate the process of retrenchment. To facilitate the programme of training 
and adaptation the Labour Code encourages employers to implement a skills 
development plan through which employees may be equipped with the relevant skills. 
• Another method that the French Labour Code makes available to employers is a partial 
activity permit. Through this device the employer may reduce employees’ working 
hours or partially cease operations while paying employees’ wages. However, if 
employees have worked certain hours below their standard wage, the employer will be 
reimbursed by the state for the amount paid to employees and which constituted a loss 
of earnings for the respective employees. 
• During the process of retrenchment, employers are required to implement some 
measures and to make various offers to employees prior to retrenching them: 
o First, provided they meet the requirements discussed in paragraph 5.2.3.5.3, 
employers are required to implement a PSE. This plan is required to set out the 
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measures that employers will take to allocate workers to alternative positions, 
measures for minimising retrenchments and steps that employers will take to 
ensure retrenched employees will be fast-tracked for future employment with 
the employer or elsewhere. 
o As discussed in paragraph 5.2.3.5.4 employers are required to offer employees 
to be retrenched a CSP which places employees with an employment centre. 
The retrenched employees will receive a professional security allowance for 12 
months in addition to a skills assessment consultation, skills training and 
possible offers of employment. 
It is observed in this study that under French retrenchment law the Labour Code attempts to 
ensure that employers cannot dismiss employees for lacking relevant skills unless they can 
objectively prove it to be the case. It does so by preventing employers from retrenching until 
they have attempted to train employees and to allocate them in alternative posts, failing which 
they may be retrenched. The Code does not make retrenchment easy; it attempts to encourage 
employers to find solutions other than retrenchment for their business problems. The Code 
provides an avenue by means of which an employer for a limited time with financial assistance 
from the state may attempt to achieve the object they would have attained through 
retrenchment. If employers opt for retrenchment, the Labour Code deliberately makes 
retrenchment unattractive by imposing financial obligations on the employer, making 
retrenchment expensive. 
6.3 Recommendations 
In light of the observations made in the concluding remarks below, it should be emphasised 
that the LRA, in general, is reasonably capable of providing employees with sufficient 
protection from retrenchment that may be occasioned by employers adopting technologies.  In 
certain areas, the Act is silent as to what it requires, forcing the courts to give content to the 
Act’s provisions.  The courts have diluted the protections afforded by the Act and as a result 
raise the possibility of widespread retrenchment. The following proposals aim to address the 
problematic issues identified in this study. 
This study acknowledges that it is difficult to reverse an accepted legal principle that has 
become a part of our law; the reversal of the LAC’s and Labour Court’s decisions in Fry’s 
Metals, SACCAWU v Amalgamated Retailers and Singh v Mondi Papers is not envisioned. It 
is proposed that the remedy be by way of legislation through the amendment of the LRA, 
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specifically to require employers in respect of operational reasons not driven by urgent 
economic needs to comply with certain statutory minimums before they can retrench. The 
following amendments to the LRA are proposed: 
189B. Any employer not faced with a serious or reasonably foreseeable economic harm who 
seeks to dismiss an employee for reasons of operational requirements shall do so only after 
having offered the employee a professional security contract at the expense of the employer for 
a period of 12 months and the employer— 
(1) shall guarantee to provide relevant skills training to the employee with the employer or 
a skills development institution; and 
(2) should attempt to assist the employee in finding alternative employment with the 
employer or with another employer. 
(3) Subject to subsections (1) and (2), an employer who restructures their enterprise as a 
consequence of a reorganisation of its operations or due to the employer’s introduction 
of new technology shall dismiss an employee for reasons of operational requirements 
only — 
(i) after having provided the employee with appropriate training; and 
(ii) after having attempted to appoint the employee in any available alternative 
position with the employer; or 
(iii) subject to item (ii), if the employer belongs to a group of companies, the 
employer shall also attempt to appoint the employee in any appropriate 
alternative position within the group of companies in the territory of the 
Republic. 
(4) The provisions of this section do not apply to an employer who establishes a serious or 
reasonably foreseeable economic harm which shall be proved by the employer in terms 
of section 192(2). 
With respect to the duty to consult it is proposed that the duty should arise prior to 
implementation of the technology. However, this should be the case only if the employer 
seriously contemplates the introduction of new technology and having done so, considers that 
certain positions will become redundant or that other skills will be required. This proposal is 
made in light of the correct observation by the Stirling court where the court notes that an 
employer driven by internal exigencies has control over its operational requirements. 
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An employer in this position, if early consultation is pursued, may be able to take measures to 
best respond to the contemplated technological changes by retraining those employees to equip 
them with skills required by the new machinery or an alternative position. If retrenchment is 
inevitable or if employees wish not to accept reallocation to an alternative post, the employees 
should be afforded ample time to find alternative employment before the inevitable 
consequences take effect. 
In cases of retrenchments driven by internal changes such as adoption of technology or 
restructuring in pursuit of greater profit, fairness dictates that employees be given more time to 
make necessary adjustments, to soften the blow of losing their jobs. As for employees who 
wish not to take up the alternative posts, they should be given enough time to seek employment 
elsewhere. In these circumstances, the LAC has also said that “[t]ime is not as critical as it is 
when retrenchment is due to an economic downturn, and where any delay might severely 
prejudice the employer”. Fairness dictates that this be the case. 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
An overall appreciation of South African retrenchment law reveals a robust legal system that 
manages to achieve a balance between the interests of labour and those of employers. 
Generally, the law governing dismissal for operational requirements is so designed that when 
properly interpreted, it is reasonably capable of giving effect to the purposes of the LRA and 
supporting the constitutional goal of achieving social justice. 
The LRA’s purposes appear to be in tension with one another, however. On the one hand the 
LRA aims to advance economic development, on the other it aims to advance social justice, 
labour peace and to democratise the workplace. To remedy this tension, it imposes a purposive 
interpretation which the courts correctly hold, entails the concurrence of each of the said 
purposes. As important as is the interpretation clause of the Act, the labour courts’ decisions 
have not always been compliant. The courts have loosened the protections the Act sets out to 
provide.  
The consequence, it was argued, is the exposure of employees to retrenchment, especially in 
light of the threat posed by the technologies of the fourth industrial revolution. It is submitted 
that the fault lies in the LRA. It is argued that the silence of the Act on various important 
retrenchment provisions has created the problems identified in this study and to remedy these 
problems, this study sets out proposals. 
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This study was undertaken with the stated purpose to investigate whether the provisions of the 
LRA, its judicial interpretation and attendant regulations were still appropriate to justify the 
dismissal of employees based on operational requirements of the employer. The objective was 
assumed in light of the constitutional object to achieve social justice and equality in the 
workplace and, especially, in view of the technological changes in the workplace as a result of 
the fourth industrial revolution. 
To conclude, the deficiencies in the LRA are minimal and the Act provides a fair amount of 
protection to employees. However, in light of the issues that inform this study,  the pursuit of 
social justice and the entry of technological change as a result of the fourth industrial revolution 
in the workplace, and based on the findings of this study the LRA, its regulations and 
particularly its judicial interpretation, it is suggested, may be inadequate to offer protection to 
employees in a manner  deemed justifiable or fair. 
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